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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-05 03:34:29Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-05 03:04:28Z)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-05/030

TIME: 050335Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: CRITICAL: STEPNOHORSK BREACH IMMINENT. LOGISTICAL OPPORTUNITY CREATED BY TEMRYUK STRIKE. PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE J3 DECISION REQUIRED. MLD LAUNCH NLT 050345Z.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

The operational situation remains defined by maximum RF kinetic pressure aimed at forcing a breakthrough at Stepnohorsk (Zaporizhzhia Axis). The air domain threat is dispersed and critically stressing UAF AD command.

  • Zaporizhzhia MLD: Preparation fires (TOS-1A) are assessed as concluding. The 37th GMRB Main Land Drive (MLD) is expected to commence kinetic maneuver operations within the next 10-15 minutes.
  • Air/AD Threat: Hostile UAV track remains fixed toward the Poltava region via Western Kharkiv, maintaining geographic pressure designed to fragment AD allocation from the high-value Dnipro C2 node.
  • Maritime Domain (NEW DEVELOPMENT): UAF deep strike capabilities (assessed as maritime or aerial drones) successfully targeted the Maktren-Nafta LPG terminal at Temryuk Port (Black Sea/Azov connection, 03:29Z). This kinetic success provides a significant, albeit temporary, strategic advantage by degrading RF fuel transit capacity.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Clear conditions persist across the Southern and Central axes, facilitating continued RF multi-domain operations (UAVs, KABs, heavy mechanized maneuver).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: CRITICAL)

UAF AD resources are stretched across four high-priority zones. The primary internal risk factor remains the J3's CRITICALLY OVERDUE decision on the commitment of the BRAVO-BLOCK operational reserve (Decision Point: NLT 050300Z). The reserve must be committed immediately to meet the imminent Stepnohorsk threat.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Intention: RF intends to use maximum fire and shock effect (TOS-1A, KABs, Kuryer UGVs) to breach Phase Line BRAVO at Stepnohorsk NLT 050345Z. The air domain effort (Poltava/Dnipro) is a coordinated fixation designed to prevent UAF reserves from reinforcing the MLD sector.

Tactical Adaptation (Vovchansk): Claims of UAF prisoner capture in Vovchansk (03:23Z) suggest renewed low-level fixing attacks in the Kharkiv region. This is assessed as a secondary effort designed to fix UAF 92nd/103rd Brigades in the North, preventing their lateral shift southward.

Technology Development (Future Naval Threat): NATO assessment confirming RF progress in naval drone application (03:06Z) suggests future RF capabilities will increasingly threaten UAF Black Sea and coastal infrastructure, requiring accelerated counter-ASV development.

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

The successful UAF strike on the Temryuk LPG terminal (03:29Z) confirms UAF capability to hit critical RF logistical infrastructure. This attack forces RF to rapidly adjust fuel distribution from maritime/port facilities to internal rail or road transport.

  • Judgment: While this strike will not halt the initial 37th GMRB assault (which is pre-staged), it will severely degrade RF follow-on sustainment capacity, particularly fuel, after the initial 24-48 hours of the MLD.
  • Assessment: The previous assessment of RF fuel constraints NLT 050400Z is now reinforced by this terminal strike.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the continued simultaneous synchronization of kinetic land operations (TOS-1A, KABs) with deep, dispersed multi-domain air operations (UAVs targeting Poltava/Dnipro). RF tactical IO messaging (VDV morale boost, Vovchansk claims) also confirms tight coordination between IO and kinetic commands.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

Friendly forces maintain a high combat tempo but are currently suffering command paralysis regarding the commitment of critical operational reserves. AD readiness is critically strained by the expanded threat geometry.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Successes: Successful deep kinetic strike on Temryuk LPG Terminal, negatively impacting RF strategic logistics. Strategic morale boost from confirmed UK aid. Setbacks: The reserve allocation decision point remains overdue (EXPIRED 050300Z). Alleged loss of personnel in Vovchansk (requires validation).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The 050300Z J3 reserve allocation decision point has been missed. The MLD threat NLT 050345Z necessitates immediate execution of the reserve commitment plan to the Stepnohorsk breach sector. Failure to act now guarantees operational risk exposure.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

DomainFinding (FACT/Observation/Judgment)ConfidenceImpact on Operations
UK Strategic AidUK Government confirmed $10.6 Billion asset transfer plan (Fact).HIGHCRITICAL COUNTER-IO SUCCESS. Provides maximum morale lift and refutes RF "Western Abandonment" narrative precisely during RF kinetic maximum effort.
RF Tactical IO (Vovchansk)RF sources claim UAF POW capture in Vovchansk (03:23Z).MEDIUM (Observation/Judgment)Attempts to create tactical panic and fix UAF attention/reserves in the North during the Southern MLD. Requires immediate P9 validation.
RF Tactical IO (Internal)Targeted morale boost disseminated to VDV community (03:31Z).HIGH (Fact)Confirms continued RF internal IO focus on maintaining cohesion and morale within elite assault units likely committed to the MLD or flank operations.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

RF will launch the kinetic phase of the MLD at Stepnohorsk NLT 050345Z. The initial assault wave will utilize "Kuryer" UGVs to breach minefields under cover of suppressive fire (TOS-1A, KABs). The Poltava UAV track will continue to pull AD resources, while fixing attacks (e.g., Vovchansk) prevent lateral reinforcement.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

UAF command paralysis regarding reserve commitment continues. The MLD breaches Phase Line BRAVO using the robotic spearhead. Simultaneously, the AD screen is penetrated, and the Dnipro C2 node is successfully struck, resulting in a localized C2 collapse while the RF 37th GMRB achieves operational penetration deep into the Zaporizhzhia region.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL - EXPIRED)

EventEstimated Time FrameDecision PointStatus
RF Main Land Drive (MLD) LaunchNLT 050345ZJ3 commitment of the reserve must precede MLD launch.IMMINENT
TOS-1A NeutralizationNLT 050345ZCounter-battery priority must neutralize the confirmed TOS-1A asset.URGENT
Final Reserve Allocation DecisionNLT 050300ZDecision point EXPIRED. Action must be taken IMMEDIATELY.CRITICAL (OVERDUE)
Poltava UAV Status/InterceptNLT 050350ZAD Command must allocate minimum mobile AD to protect deep assets/ISR.URGENT

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionRequired ActionConfidence Impact
P1 (CRITICAL - MANEUVER/FLANK)Vector and immediate intention of the 38th GMRB. (Unchanged)ISR Tasking (IMINT/HUMINT): Dedicated observation of 38th GMRB staging areas.HIGH, dictates final commitment of operational reserves.
P7 (CRITICAL - AD SATURATION)Type and target of the Kharkiv/Poltava UAV ingress.IMMEDIATE AD/ISR Tasking: Dedicated radar focus on the Poltava corridor.CRITICAL, dictates AD resource diversion depth.
P9 (NEW - LOGISTICS/MARITIME)Functional damage assessment and capacity loss at Temryuk LPG Terminal.IMINT/GEOINT: Post-strike BDA to quantify the loss of fuel throughput capacity.HIGH, informs strategic targeting of follow-on logistics (rail).
P10 (NEW - INFO WARFARE)Validation of Vovchansk POW claims.HUMINT/SIGINT/OSINT: Confirm UAF personnel status in the Vovchansk sector.MEDIUM, informs STRATCOM response and local force protection needs.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operational Maneuver and Force Protection (J3 / J7)

ACTION: IMMEDIATE RESERVE COMMITMENT (CRITICAL)

  1. Reserve Commitment (IMMEDIATE): The J3 must immediately commit the full BRAVO-BLOCK operational reserve toward the Stepnohorsk breach area (Zaporizhzhia Axis). The threat window is now closed; the risk of RF penetration is higher than the risk of preemptive commitment.
  2. UGV Countermeasures: Commanders at Stepnohorsk must enforce immediate counter-UGV doctrine (HMG/AGL priority) to neutralize "Kuryer" robotic platforms spearheading the MLD, thereby preserving ATGM assets for main RF armor.

7.2. Fires and Targeting (J2 / J3)

ACTION: LOGISTICAL INTERDICTION AND FIRES SUPPORT

  1. TOS-1A Counter-Battery (CRITICAL): Execute immediate, high-priority counter-battery fire (HIMARS/Artillery) against the confirmed TOS-1A "Solntsepek" position near Huliaipole NLT 050345Z.
  2. Exploitation of Temryuk Strike: Shift targeting focus to RF rail infrastructure leading from internal Russia toward the Black Sea ports and occupied Crimea. Exploit the damage to Temryuk Port to increase reliance on rail and make these lines high-value targets.

7.3. Electronic Warfare and Air Defense (J6 / AD Command)

ACTION: RIGID AD PRIORITIZATION

  1. AD Prioritization: Dnipro C2 node defense remains the non-negotiable highest priority. Allocate minimal, highly mobile AD resources to track and attempt interception of the Poltava UAV corridor (P7), accepting temporary risk in the deep rear to maintain C2 integrity during the Stepnohorsk assault.
  2. EW Focus: Concentrate all available EW assets (including COTS jamming) within the Stepnohorsk engagement zone to disrupt "Kuryer" UGV C2 links and airborne ISR supporting the MLD.

7.4. Strategic Communications (STRATCOM / J7)

ACTION: COUNTER-NARRATIVE DISSEMINATION

  1. UK Aid/Resilience Narrative: Immediately and broadly publicize the UK $10.6 Billion aid package as a decisive strategic victory, contrasting it with RF kinetic failures.
  2. Vovchansk/Poltava Denial: Prepare and disseminate rapid, coordinated responses denying the Vovchansk POW claims and aggressively debunking the "Kremenchuk busification" (Poltava) propaganda to stabilize morale in the rear echelons during the kinetic attack phase.
Previous (2025-12-05 03:04:28Z)

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