Sitrep 2025-12-05 03:04:28

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-05/029

TIME: 050304Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: CRITICAL AD STRESSORS EXPANDING TO POLTAVA. UK STRATEGIC IO OPPORTUNITY. PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE J3 DECISION ON OPERATIONAL RESERVE COMMITMENT.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

The operational focus remains the RF Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) at Stepnohorsk (Zaporizhzhia), supported by concentrated kinetic assets (TOS-1A, KAB). The air domain threat has expanded geographically, stretching UAF Air Defense (AD) assets.

Zaporizhzhia Axis: High-intensity fires persist. Confirmed continued KAB launches directed toward the Donetsk region (02:51Z), indicating RF intention to maintain pressure on the Eastern flank (38th GMRB area of operation) simultaneously with the Stepnohorsk breach preparation.
Air Domain Expansion: The multi-axis UAV saturation attack previously identified in Dnipro and Kharkiv is confirmed to have expanded. A new hostile UAV track is detected moving toward the Poltava region via Western Kharkiv (02:54Z). This creates a critical, fourth-dimension AD requirement.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Unchanged: Conditions remain optimal for RF multi-domain operations (UAVs, heavy mechanized maneuver).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

UAF AD Command is now executing triage across four high-priority requirements:

Dnipro C2 node defense (Highest Priority).
Zaporizhzhia KAB defense (High Priority).
Kharkiv (Urban/ISR defense).
Poltava Corridor (New Deep Strike/ISR track).

The deadline for the J3 decision on the commitment of the remaining 50% BRAVO-BLOCK reserve (NLT 050300Z) is now overdue. This delay introduces unacceptable risk given the confirmed TOS-1A fire preparation.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Intention: RF remains committed to achieving a kinetic breakthrough at Stepnohorsk using overwhelming fire support (TOS-1A, KAB). The expansion of UAV activity to Poltava region is designed to achieve maximum AD dispersion, concealing the true intent of the air assault (likely deep ISR for reserve tracking or C2 targeting).

Tactical Adaptation (Expanded Threat Geometry): The deployment of UAVs across a vastly expanded geographic area (Dnipro, Kharkiv, Poltava) confirms a highly sophisticated strategy to overload UAF AD resources and degrade situational awareness deep within the rear. This synchronization requires high-level RF command integration.

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

Unchanged: The high consumption rate of precision guided munitions (KABs) and high-value assets (TOS-1A) indicates RF is pushing for immediate kinetic effect, confirming the earlier assessment that the MLD must succeed before logistical constraints (fuel, estimated 050400Z) take effect.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Continued successful synchronization of ground fires (TOS-1A, KAB Donetsk) with highly dispersed multi-domain assets (UAVs targeting Poltava) demonstrates robust and effective RF C2 across multiple Military Districts.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

While morale remains high, the AD readiness posture is critically strained by the expanded threat geometry. The delay in J3 decision-making regarding the maneuver reserve is the primary internal risk factor.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Tactical Setbacks: Loss of a Kozak BMM near Pryiut and continued exposure to TOS-1A fire.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

AD Constraint (CRITICAL): The appearance of a UAV track toward Poltava necessitates further fragmentation of limited AD resources. If the Dnipro C2 defense is weakened to cover the new Poltava threat, the likelihood of MDCOA success increases exponentially.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

Domain	Finding (FACT/Observation/Judgment)	Confidence	Impact on Operations
UK Strategic Aid	UK Government prepared to transfer $10.6 Billion in frozen RF assets to support Ukraine (The Times, 03:02Z).	HIGH (Fact)	STRATEGIC COUNTER-IO OPPORTUNITY. This action directly and powerfully refutes the RF "US Betrayal" and "Western Abandonment" narratives. Provides a critical morale boost and long-term financial security signal, timed perfectly during maximum RF kinetic effort.
RF Tactical IO (Internal)	Pro-RF channels disseminated footage depicting forced mobilization/kidnapping ("busification") in Kremenchuk (Poltava region, 03:03Z).	HIGH (Fact)	Deep PSYOP Targeting. This messaging attempts to generate panic and distrust in UAF command/mobilization efforts deep within the rear (Poltava), coinciding with the physical UAV threat in the same geographic area. A clear attempt to degrade rear-echelon stability.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

RF will execute the immediate breaching attempt at Stepnohorsk (37th GMRB) NLT 050330Z, capitalizing on the psychological effect and physical destruction caused by the TOS-1A saturation fire. The Poltava UAV track is assessed as primarily high-value ISR (e.g., searching for UAF reserve movements, deep C2 nodes, or SAM sites) designed to force AD repositioning away from Dnipro. KAB strikes will continue on Donetsk to fix UAF Eastern reserves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

The combined UAV saturation achieves AD paralysis across Central Ukraine. The Poltava UAV executes a successful deep strike, potentially targeting a critical POL or reserve staging area. Simultaneously, the Dnipro C2 node is hit, and the 37th GMRB breaches Phase Line BRAVO at Stepnohorsk, leading to operational collapse on the Southern Front.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (UPDATED - EXPIRED/CRITICAL)

Event	Estimated Time Frame	Decision Point	Status Change
Dnipro UAV Intercept/Strike	NLT 050245Z	CRITICAL: Decision point EXPIRED (050304Z). Immediate status required on P6 threat.	OVERDUE
Poltava UAV Status/Intercept	NLT 050330Z	AD Command must allocate minimum necessary mobile AD to the Poltava corridor.	URGENT
MLD Penetration Assessment (P5)	NLT 050245Z	J3 assessment overdue.	OVERDUE
Final Reserve Allocation Decision	NLT 050300Z	Decision point for the remaining 50% BRAVO-BLOCK reserve EXPIRED (050304Z). Action must be taken NOW.	CRITICAL (IMMEDIATE)

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Required Action	Confidence Impact
P1 (CRITICAL - MANEUVER/FLANK)	Vector and immediate intention of the 38th GMRB. (Unchanged)	ISR Tasking (IMINT/HUMINT): Dedicated observation of 38th GMRB staging areas (Chervone/Dobropillya flanks).	HIGH, dictates final commitment of operational reserves.
P7 (CRITICAL - AD SATURATION)	Type, volume, and intended target of the Kharkiv/Poltava UAV ingress.	IMMEDIATE AD/ISR Tasking: Airborne/Ground radar focus on the Northern/Western approach corridors to Poltava. Confirm if this is a high-speed strike drone (e.g., Lancet derivative) or an ISR platform.	CRITICAL, dictates AD resource diversion depth.
P8 (NEW - FIRES/EW)	Location of the command assets controlling the KAB strikes on Donetsk.	ELINT/SIGINT Tasking: Locate C2 nodes responsible for coordinating high-volume KAB use.	MEDIUM, enables counter-targeting to degrade Eastern pressure.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operational Maneuver and Force Protection (J3 / J7)

ACTION: IMMEDIATE RESERVE COMMITMENT AND MANEUVER.

Reserve Commitment (IMMEDIATE - NOW): J3 must immediately execute the full commitment of the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve. The risk posed by the confirmed TOS-1A fire and the expired decision point dictates immediate action. Vector the committed reserve toward the most threatened sector, assessed as the Stepnohorsk breach line.
Flank Contingency: The remaining 50% of the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve standby must be used to create a short-term, temporary reserve. Primary vector remains the 38th GMRB flanking route (P1 resolution), but preparation for rapid commitment to Stepnohorsk defense is paramount.

7.2. Electronic Warfare and Air Defense (J6 / AD Command)

ACTION: RIGID AD PRIORITIZATION AND EW TARGETING.

AD Triage (IMMEDIATE): Dnipro C2 node defense remains the absolute highest priority. Accept increased risk to the Poltava corridor/Western Kharkiv, allocating the minimum required mobile AD assets to track the Poltava UAV (P7).
EW Focus: Maintain maximum, uncompromising EW coverage (including 2.4 GHz COTS jamming) in the Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia AORs to mitigate tactical and strategic drone threats in the main battle zone.

7.3. Strategic Communications (STRATCOM / J7)

ACTION: COUNTER-NARRATIVE EXPLOITATION.

Patriot / UK Aid Dissemination (IMMEDIATE): Leverage the confirmation of the $10.6 Billion UK aid package to aggressively counter the RF information operation of "Western Abandonment." Frame the aid as decisive support for Ukraine's multi-year resilience and financial stability.
Counter-Propaganda: Prepare immediate messaging to deny and debunk the "busification" narrative disseminated regarding Kremenchuk (Poltava), emphasizing adherence to mobilization laws and minimizing panic in the deep rear, particularly given the concurrent physical UAV threat.

7.4. Fires and Targeting (J2 / J3)

ACTION: TOS-1A NEUTRALIZATION.

Counter-Battery Priority (CRITICAL): Re-confirm immediate counter-battery fire (HIMARS/Artillery) against the confirmed TOS-1A "Solntsepek" deployment near Huliaipole. This asset is a system-level threat to UAF defenses. Neutralization is required NLT 050330Z.

Situation Report