Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-04/017

TIME: 042106Z DEC 2025

SUBJECT: MULTI-DOMAIN STRIKE EXPANDS WESTWARD. RESERVE COMMITMENT WINDOW CRITICAL. MYRNOHRAD FIRE INTENSITY INCREASING.

PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF RESERVE MOVEMENT AND WESTERN AD RELOCATION.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

The RF synchronized operational design remains in Phase II (Kinetic Preparation and Fixing). The predicted Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) at Stepnohorsk is imminent (T-minus NLT 050000Z).

• Deep Domain Expansion (CRITICAL UPDATE): The deep UAV campaign is expanding in scope and depth. New confirmed threat vectors:
  • UAV activity confirmed over Kramatorsk (042045Z), sustaining KAB fixation fires (Sloviansk/Kramatorsk cluster).
  • UAV activity in Bila Tserkva District (Kyiv Oblast) moving West (042038Z).
  • UAV activity over Cherkasy Oblast past Zhashkiv, moving towards Vinnytsia Oblast (042102Z).
  • UAV threat declared for Kherson Oblast (042101Z).
• Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk: Continued heavy fire support saturation suggests RF 38th GMRB is postured for an immediate exploitation move, synchronized with the deep strikes and the imminent MLD.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

No change. Conditions continue to favor RF offensive synchronization (low UAV flight, ground maneuver).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

ANALYTICAL JUDGMENT: The window for covert movement of the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve is severely reduced or functionally closed due to the expanded RF deep reconnaissance grid (UAVs in Bila Tserkva, Cherkasy/Vinnytsia vector). Commanders must accept high risk of detection if the reserve movement is initiated after the 042100Z critical time.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

Intention: RF intends to prevent the UAF High Command from effectively utilizing strategic reserves by forcing multi-directional AD asset commitment and deep paralysis. The expansion of UAV coverage toward Vinnytsia suggests the RF is either targeting key rail/road arteries leading to Western Ukraine (NATO supply routes) or confirming targets for long-range ballistic strikes (Kinzhal/Iskander) on deeply located C2 nodes.

Capabilities:

• Sustained Operational Depth: Demonstrated capability to simultaneously threaten logistics in the East (Kramatorsk UAV), Central Dnieper crossings (Kyiv/Bila Tserkva UAVs), and now deep Western logistics (Zhaskiv/Vinnytsia vector).
• Strategic Economic Resilience: The US Treasury partial suspension of sanctions against Lukoil (042053Z) provides long-term strategic relief for the RF energy sector, potentially mitigating the impact of recent UAF deep strikes on fuel depots.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

The tactical adaptation is the confirmation of UAV coverage targeting UAF lines of communication (LOCs) toward the west (Vinnytsia area). This expands the RF strategic goal beyond paralyzing Central UAF logistics to directly threatening NATO supply routes into the operational area.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

While UAF deep strikes (Millerovo, Stavropol) impact immediate operational sustainment, the strategic political/economic development regarding Lukoil signals that RF logistics networks retain a high degree of global resilience and sanction-evasion capability.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

RF C2 remains effective, exemplified by the continued synchronization of deep kinetic attacks with immediate information warfare campaigns that consolidate recent claimed territorial gains (Colonelcassad 042046Z).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

The most critical factor is the status of the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve. Failure to execute the deployment order by 042100Z has significantly increased the risk profile for the subsequent movement phase. UAF must rapidly prioritize the defense of its deep western logistics hubs (rail lines, staging areas).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

TACTICAL SUCCESSES: UAF (ДПСУ) is actively adapting to the drone war by recruiting specialized drone units (042040Z), confirming rapid technological integration and human capital prioritization. CRITICAL OPERATIONAL SETBACK: The escalating risk associated with the reserve commitment due to the expanded deep threat grid.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1. Mobile AD Assets: Immediate relocation of high-mobility air defense to cover the Vinnytsia/Western Ukraine LOCs and the rail corridors leading from the Polish border.
2. EW/SIGINT: Critical requirement to task assets to confirm the intent and precise target sets of the new UAV trajectories (Bila Tserkva, Vinnytsia).

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

The RF IO effort has shifted to leveraging Western political friction points to undermine confidence in aid, while promoting internal morale among forces.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (Confidence: HIGH)

RF executes the full synchronization plan. The MLD at Stepnohorsk initiates NLT 050000Z. The 38th GMRB continues kinetic pressure and potential UGV deployment around Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk to force collapse NLT 050600Z. UAV saturation deep in Vinnytsia Oblast targets a critical NATO LOC hub (rail exchange facility or transit node) between 050300Z and 050700Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (Confidence: MEDIUM)

RF achieves a rapid tactical breach at Stepnohorsk using UGVs, coinciding with the successful targeting and disruption of the overdue BRAVO-BLOCK reserve movement in Central Ukraine (Cherkasy/Dnipro region) by concentrated artillery or missile fire, guided by the expanded UAV reconnaissance grid (Bila Tserkva/Cherkasy). This paralysis allows RF exploitation toward the Dnipro River unchecked.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operational Maneuver and Force Protection (J3 / J7)

ACTION: IMMEDIATE RESERVE MOVEMENT WITH MAXIMUM EMCON AND DYNAMIC AD PROTECTION.

1. Reserve Commitment (BRAVO-BLOCK): CONFIRM MOVEMENT STATUS IMMEDIATELY. If movement has not yet commenced, proceed with high-speed, low-emission movement protocols, acknowledging the increased risk of detection due to expanded RF deep reconnaissance. Designate mobile AD protection to continuously leapfrog ahead of the reserve convoy.
2. Air Defense Re-tasking (Deep West): Immediately deploy available high-mobility AD assets (e.g., Gepard/NASAMS if feasible) to cover the logistics corridor threatened by the Vinnytsia-bound UAVs. Prioritize protection of major rail junction points in this area.
3. Myrnohrad MEDEVAC: Execute the planned high-risk, low-altitude night-flying missions (UAV/Helicopter) NLT 042200Z. Prioritize casualty evacuation over resupply to prevent a morale collapse that could expedite RF breakthrough.

7.2. Fires and Targeting (J2 / J3)

ACTION: TARGETING OF UAV LAUNCH/SUPPORT AND COUNTER-UGV.

1. Counter-UAS Doctrine: Given the high density of small drones (042045Z Kramatorsk report), ensure forward units are fully briefed to use high-volume suppressive fire (HMG/AGL) against both air and ground (UGV) robotic threats to conserve precious ATGM/SAM inventory.
2. Exploitation: Task IMINT and targeting assets to identify potential replacement logistics hubs for Lukoil fuel that may materialize outside of the previously targeted depots, anticipating increased reliance on rail transport now that static targets have been hit.

7.3. Strategic Communications (STRATCOM / J7)

ACTION: MAINTAIN UNITY AND COUNTER SANCTIONS FATIGUE.

1. Domestic Narrative: Aggressively utilize successful recruitment drives (Drone operator DPSG ad) and confirmed deep strikes (Stavropol, Millerovo) to project resilience and innovation, directly countering the RF narrative of technological superiority (UGVs) and UAF organizational fatigue.
2. Western Outreach: Coordinate with diplomatic channels (MFA) to minimize the impact of the Lukoil sanction suspension, framing it as a narrow, temporary administrative move rather than a strategic shift away from anti-RF sanctions. Simultaneously, emphasize the complex but continuing aid negotiations (Belgium, Germany) to ensure public perception of unwavering allied support.