Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-04/013

TIME: 041930Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD: RESERVE WINDOW CLOSED. ENEMY FIXATION CONFIRMED (SUMY/KHARKIV). UAF DEEP STRIKE ON RF MIC/CHEM PLANT. PRIORITY: IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF RESERVE PROTOCOL.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The focus of decision remains the Stepnohorsk Sector (Zaporizhzhia Axis), where the Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) is now fully underway. RF shaping operations have intensified in the Northeast, confirming a coordinated multi-domain fixation strategy.

• Zaporizhzhia (Stepnohorsk): MLD initiation confirmed. UAF forces are executing defensive holding actions against VDV/37th GMRB penetration attempts utilizing "Kuryer" UGVs.
• Sumy/Kharkiv Axes: CRITICAL FACT: UAF Air Force confirms renewed kinetic activity:
  • KAB launches reported targeting Sumy Oblast (041837Z).
  • Group of UAVs (Shahed/Lancet assumed) confirmed moving toward Chuhuiv/Kharkiv Oblast (041902Z). This activity confirms the enemy intent to fix Northern Air Defense and C2 resources, directly supporting the Stepnohorsk MLD.
• Kherson: Confirmed destruction of the Kherson Thermal Power Plant (CHP) by previous RF shelling (reported 041840Z), impacting regional energy resilience.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Persistent low visibility favors RF forces using thermal optics. The ongoing Geomagnetic Storm (GMS) continues to degrade UAF GPS/ISR effectiveness. The loss of Kherson CHP will impact civilian support infrastructure and potentially tactical repair capacity in the immediate area.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The commitment of the UAF reserve force ("BRAVO-BLOCK") is now OVERDUE based on the optimal time frame (NLT 1850Z). Delay increases kinetic risk to the reserve during deployment and reduces the probability of a successful counter-penetration. Air Defense resources are severely stretched between the Stepnohorsk high-value targets, the Northern/Central C2 sites (Kyiv/Chernihiv), and the new confirmed threat in Kharkiv.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Intention: RF intent is confirmed as achieving rapid penetration at Stepnohorsk through robotic breaching while paralyzing UAF response via synchronized kinetic fixation operations in the North (Sumy/Kharkiv) and high-volume Information Operations (IO).

Capabilities:

• C2/Intelligence: Putin's public comments (041850Z) joking about intelligence tracking reinforce the RF internal narrative of strategic competence and external paranoia, suggesting high confidence in current operational intelligence supporting the MLD targeting matrix.
• Strategic Projection: RF Defence Minister Belousov's confirmed working visit to India (041844Z) signals continued success in securing military-technical cooperation and maintaining non-Western diplomatic support, reducing the effectiveness of Western sanctions.
• IO Narrative: Deputy Foreign Minister Grushko (041838Z) promotes the narrative that the West has normalized war preparation against Russia. This is a classic deflection mechanism aimed at internally justifying the current invasion and MLD.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The simultaneous KAB strikes on Sumy and UAV movement toward Kharkiv confirms a tactical refinement of the Northern fixation effort. RF is aggressively leveraging its deep strike capability (KABs/UAVs) to overwhelm UAF AD coverage across maximum geography precisely when the main effort (MLD) is underway in Zaporizhzhia. CONFIDENCE: HIGH

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

JUDGMENT: UAF deep strikes targeting the RF Military-Industrial Complex (MIC) are having a systemic effect. Confirmed destruction of the MIC enterprise producing explosive components and a chemical plant near Stavropol (041853Z/1859Z) indicates successful targeting of strategic sustainment depth.

• Economic Vulnerability: RF oil and gas budget revenue drop (34% YoY in Nov 2025, reported 041901Z) confirms long-term economic pressure is mounting, although immediate MLD sustainment (48 hours) remains intact (GRAU Score 26.12).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in synchronizing multi-domain operations (MLD, Northern Fixation, Strategic IO). However, internal IO friction (milblogger complaints about limited mobilization, 041840Z) suggests internal elite dissatisfaction regarding the scope and results of the conflict, posing a long-term strategic vulnerability.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces in Zaporizhzhia remain defensively positioned but are now operating under increased pressure due to the RF fixation campaign in the Northeast. Readiness is high, but the failure to execute the reserve commitment NLT 1850Z forces a reactive deployment. The need for increased mobilization is underscored by public appeals from International Legion volunteers (041854Z).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

CRITICAL SUCCESS: Confirmed successful deep strike by UAF (likely GUR/SBU long-range UAVs or missiles) against two high-value RF strategic targets:

1. MIC enterprise producing explosive components.
2. Chemical plant near Stavropol (confirmed by GenStaff 041859Z). These strikes directly degrade RF capability to replenish ammunition and explosives for future operations and represent a major strategic counter-move against the MLD.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Energy resilience is now a critical constraint in Kherson due to the destruction of the CHP. Logistical constraints regarding frontline mobility (vehicles) and the urgent need for enhanced reserve manpower (as highlighted by volunteer footage) persist. Furthermore, ongoing domestic tax reform (VAT for Individual Entrepreneurs, 041842Z) signals internal economic strain requiring significant political management.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

The IE is a theater of high-intensity RF strategic deflection and internal friction, while UAF seeks to stabilize the narrative following the critical deep strike successes.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The failure to execute the reserve deployment in the optimal window (pre-1900Z) significantly increases the probability of MDCOA elements manifesting.

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

COA: Deep MLD Penetration and C2 Saturation. (Confidence: HIGH) RF VDV/37th GMRB will leverage the "Kuryer" UGV advantage to accelerate penetration at Stepnohorsk. The simultaneous KAB/UAV strikes in Sumy and Kharkiv will be sustained through the night (until 050300Z), maximizing C2 workload for UAF OG Dnipro and preventing the orderly counter-penetration deployment of the "BRAVO-BLOCK" reserve. The 38th GMRB will fix Dobropillya.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

COA: Operational Gap Exploitation and Southern Encirclement. (Confidence: MEDIUM-HIGH) The 38th GMRB successfully executes a rapid, covert NW bypass of Dobropillya, exploiting the P1 intelligence gap before "BRAVO-BLOCK" can establish its Phase Line DELTA blocking positions. Simultaneously, RF launches a focused missile/loitering munition strike (guided by confirmed UAVs/GMS effects) against a critical, high-value C2 node (e.g., OG Dnipro HQ) while AD assets are dispersed to address the Northern fixation (Kharkiv/Sumy).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operational Maneuver (J3)

ACTION: EMERGENCY EXECUTION OF BRAVO-BLOCK PROTOCOL.

1. Reserve Commitment: EXECUTE PROTOCOL "BRAVO-BLOCK" IMMEDIATELY. Commanders must accept the risk of deployment under fire. Proceed with the split deployment (70% Stepnohorsk, 30% Phase Line DELTA NW of Dobropillya). Emphasis must be placed on speed and dispersion during movement.
2. Northern AD Response: Due to confirmed KAB/UAV activity on Sumy/Kharkiv, temporarily shift mobile, short-range AD systems (MANPADS teams, Gepard/Shilka) from rear areas to protect critical infrastructure around Kharkiv (e.g., C2 nodes, key logistics chokepoints, local energy grids). Do not degrade C2 protection in Zaporizhzhia.
3. Kherson Resilience: Immediate activation of military engineering teams to stabilize the remaining functional parts of the Kherson CHP infrastructure and initiate rapid replacement/repair plans, minimizing local operational burden.

7.2. Intelligence Exploitation (J2)

ACTION: LEVERAGE DEEP STRIKE SUCCESS AGAINST LOGISTICS.

1. Deep Targeting Priority Shift: Immediately elevate the targeting priority of RF Rail-Tanker Staging (P3 Gap) to maximize the operational impact of the Stavropol MIC strike and the Kacha Airfield AD gap.
2. UGV Data Dissemination: Rapidly analyze feedback from Stepnohorsk regarding the effectiveness of counter-UGV doctrine (P0 Gap). If HMG/AGL prove insufficient, issue urgent supplemental guidance (e.g., focused artillery fire coordination, anti-materiel rifle focus).

7.3. Strategic Communications and Diplomacy (STRATCOM / J7)

ACTION: EXPLOIT RF FRICTION AND PROJECT STRENGTH.

1. Amplify Deep Strike Success: Utilize UAF General Staff confirmation of the Stavropol/MIC strikes to dominate the international narrative, framing them as direct counter-force actions against the illegal MLD and Russian military-industrial capacity.
2. IO Targeting RF Elite: Develop messaging based on the milblogger internal criticism (insufficient national mobilization) to fuel existing friction between the RF military command and the political administration regarding resource allocation and strategic objectives.
3. Mobilization Messaging: Use the International Legion volunteer's testimonial to reinforce the critical need for mobilization, framing it as necessary defense against a high-intensity offensive (MLD) and a reflection of the commitment of international partners.