Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-04/006

TIME: 041730Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: CONFIRMED VDV INTEGRATION INTO STEPNOHORSK MLD; CRITICAL NEED FOR IMMEDIATE RESERVE COMMITMENT AND COUNTER-UGV ENHANCEMENT. PRIORITY: CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Zaporizhzhia Axis, specifically the Stepnohorsk sector (Main Effort).

• Stepnohorsk Sector (CRITICAL): High-volume preparatory Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) strikes targeting UAF defensive positions remain sustained (041600Z ongoing). Russian media confirms the deployment of the RTK «Курьер» (Courier) UGV system, specifically operated by elements of the 11th Guards Airborne Assault Brigade (VDV), indicating a high-priority, mechanized assault NLT 042000Z DEC.
• Northern Axis (SHAPING EFFORT): UAV activity confirmed by UAF Air Force in Northern Chernihiv region, coupled with RF messaging suggesting a potential Chernihiv offensive. This is assessed as a likely fixation or deception effort intended to divert UAF strategic reserves from the South.
• Black Sea: Diplomatic tension confirmed by TASS reporting that RF Temporary Chargé d'Affaires Ivanov was invited to the Turkish MFA regarding the Black Sea situation. This indicates potential friction impacting RF naval freedom of movement, complementing the UAF kinetic success at Kacha.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Previous assessments regarding the Geomagnetic Storm stand. No new environmental factors are noted to inhibit the impending Main Land Drive (MLD).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are sustaining preparatory fires along Phase Line BRAVO. The disposition of the operational reserve (Protocol "BRAVO-BLOCK") remains pending, constrained by the P1 Intelligence Gap regarding the 38th GMRB vector.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Intention: RF intends to achieve a rapid, synchronized mechanized penetration at Stepnohorsk, spearheaded by elite VDV forces and augmented by Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs).

Capabilities:

1. Vetted Assault Force: Deployment of the 11th VDV confirms the assault is intended to be high-speed and high-stakes, designed to rapidly exploit any breach. (Confidence: HIGH)
2. Robotic Breaching (CRITICAL): The «Курьер» UGV provides the 11th VDV with a force multiplier for mine clearance, dramatically reducing the time and risk of breaching UAF mine belts.
3. Maximumist Political Signaling: RF State Duma Deputy Pevtsov's explicit territorial claims on Kyiv, Odesa, Mykolaiv, and Poltava are timed to project operational confidence and geopolitical maximalism, applying psychological pressure just prior to the MLD launch. (Confidence: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed integration of the 11th VDV using the «Курьер» UGV replaces initial assumptions that the assault would be led solely by conventional motorized rifle brigades (37th GMRB). This increases the expected professionalism and speed of the breach.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF ammunition throughput (Score 26.12) remains Critical. The deep political signaling (Putin in India, securing a $2B submarine lease from India) serves to legitimize continued war funding and reinforce the military-industrial complex narrative. The reliance on rail logistics (P3 Gap) is confirmed.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective in synchronizing deep strikes, diplomatic signaling, and kinetic preparatory fires. A major effort is underway to degrade UAF Command Cohesion via Information Warfare (see Section 4).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are postured for active defense. The focus is shifting to rapid implementation of counter-UGV tactics, which is now a higher priority given the confirmed VDV involvement.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Strategic): Securing the $500M Patriot missile package directly counters the RF narrative of Western policy friction.
• Success (Counter-IO): UAF captured personnel (Danilov Evgeny) provide compelling testimonial evidence regarding the use of Russian prisoners as assault wave fodder ("кидают людей в одну сторону"). This is a critical IO opportunity to degrade RF morale.
• Setbacks (IO Targeting): RF IO is successfully seeding narratives of political division (alleged disagreement between Deputies and Commander-in-Chief Syrsky over Pokrovsk) and domestic instability (reported fatal attack on a TCC employee in Lviv). These narratives are designed to create friction within the UAF command structure and society during the critical MLD phase.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

P1 Intelligence Gap (38th GMRB vector): This remains the primary constraint. Commanders must decide between accepting the risk of imperfect placement versus the operational risk of delaying the reserve commitment until after the Stepnohorsk breach is established.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

The Information Environment is saturated with synchronized RF narratives designed to create strategic distraction, internal UAF friction, and internal RF stability.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

COA: VDV-Enabled Mechanized Breakthrough at Stepnohorsk. (Confidence: HIGH) RF will launch the MLD NLT 042000Z DEC. The assault will be led by the highly professional 11th VDV utilizing the «Курьер» UGV to ensure rapid breaching of Phase Line BRAVO.

• The primary objective will be speed and avoiding operational delay.
• The 38th GMRB will intensify flanking pressure at Dobropillya/Chervone to force UAF reserves to commit laterally, preventing reinforcement of the main breach.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

COA: Synchronized C2 Decapitation and Rapid Operational Encirclement. (Confidence: MEDIUM) RF uses the distraction of the MLD to launch a high-supersonic precision strike (e.g., Kinzhal) on the Dnipro Operational HQ/Forward C2 node while simultaneously escalating the flanking force. The 38th GMRB exploits the P1 gap NW of Dobropillya, capitalizing on the UAF reserve deployment delay/misplacement, resulting in operational depth penetration and potential encirclement of forces in the Huliaipole salient.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operational Maneuver (J3)

ACTION: IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF PROTOCOL "BRAVO-BLOCK" (NLT 041800Z DEC).

1. Risk-Accepting Deployment: Given the VDV involvement and the imminent H-Hour, the delay caused by the P1 gap is unacceptable. Commit the designated operational reserve now to established blocking positions NW of Huliaipole, prioritizing depth defense against a potential 38th GMRB bypass/encirclement vector (MDCOA).
2. Counter-UGV Force Protection (CRITICAL): Stepnohorsk defenders must immediately implement the revised Counter-UGV Hard-Kill Doctrine. Reallocate Heavy Machine Guns (HMG), Automatic Grenade Launchers (AGL), and specific drone teams to prioritize neutralization of the small, low-profile «Курьер» robotic platforms before they engage the main mine belt.

7.2. Fires and Targeting (J3/J2)

ACTION: MAXIMIZE KACHA AD GAP EXPLOITATION (IMMEDIATE).

1. Time-Sensitive Targeting (Logistics): Utilize the temporary degradation of RF Southern AD (Kacha) to launch deep strikes against P3 high-confidence rail interdiction points and suspected rail-tanker staging yards. This must occur within the next six hours.
2. C2 Node Stress: Maintain high-tempo drone activity (e.g., Requiem Group Balista actions) to stress internal RF C2/security in depth, forcing resources away from the Stepnohorsk main effort.

7.3. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (STRATCOM/NCA)

ACTION: COUNTER-NARRATIVE ON COMMAND AND DOMESTIC STABILITY (IMMEDIATE).

1. Rebuttal of C2 Friction: Issue immediate, high-level statements emphasizing the unity of command (Commander-in-Chief, General Staff, Parliament) and denying/downplaying Russian IO claims regarding Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiisk. The narrative must stress that RF disinformation is a desperate attempt to distract from their kinetic failures.
2. Amplify Prisoner Testimonial: Immediately publicize the video testimonial of the captured Russian soldier (Danilov Evgeny, Call Sign "Rocker") regarding the RF use of prisoners as "cannon fodder." This directly attacks RF morale and internal mobilization efforts just before the MLD casualty surge.
3. Address Domestic Threats: Use the Patriot aid package and the Kacha strike successes to reinforce the government’s operational capability and international backing, directly counteracting the Lviv incident reports and general narratives of domestic instability.