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Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-04 15:04:30Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-04 15:00:24Z)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP) 25-12-04/005

TIME: 041700Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD INITIATION CONFIRMED; EXPLOITATION OF KACHA AD GAP AND IMMEDIATE BRAVO-BLOCK RESERVE COMMITMENT REQUIRED. PRIORITY: CRITICAL - IMMEDIATE ACTION


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity (COG) remains the Zaporizhzhia Axis, specifically the Stepnohorsk sector, where Russian Forces (RF) have initiated active kinetic preparation for the Main Land Drive (MLD).

  • Stepnohorsk Sector (CRITICAL): High-volume preparatory Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) strikes targeting UAF defensive positions and C2 nodes are sustained (041600Z ongoing). RF messaging confirms ground activity by the 5th Combined Arms Army in the vicinity of Huliaipole (041500Z), validating the planned pressure on Phase Line BRAVO.
  • Crimea: UAF deep strikes have achieved localized air defense (AD) degradation with the destruction of a MiG-29 and damage to the "Irtysh" radar complex at Kacha Airfield. This creates a temporary but critical window for UAF deep strike operations in the Southern logistics rear.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The residual Geomagnetic Storm continues to impact GPS accuracy and C2 resilience. This factor is assessed as having minimal deterrent effect on the imminent MLD due to the confirmation of the low-signature, locally controlled "Kuryer" UGV, which relies on line-of-sight (LOS) links.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are in high alert along Phase Line BRAVO, absorbing the preparatory KAB fire. The immediate execution of Protocol "BRAVO-BLOCK" (Reserve commitment) is pending confirmation of the 38th GMRB exploitation vector, but the threat timeline mandates immediate action.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Intention: RF intends to achieve a rapid, synchronized mechanized breakthrough at Stepnohorsk (37th GMRB) supported by the flanking fixation force (38th GMRB) on the Huliaipole axis. The objective is to penetrate Phase Line BRAVO and exploit the resulting operational depth. (Confidence: HIGH)

Capabilities:

  1. Kinetic Synchronization: Effective integration of high-volume KAB strikes (preparatory fire) with mechanized assets.
  2. UGV Integration (CRITICAL): The "Kuryer" UGV integration minimizes RF risk exposure in mine-breaching operations, allowing assault echelons to maintain tactical momentum under conditions where conventional forces would stall.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF continues to maintain diplomatic and IO pressure (Putin in India) to divert international attention during the operational shift to the active MLD phase. There are no new kinetic adaptations beyond the accelerated timeline confirmed by the sustained KAB barrage.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Ammunition throughput (Score 26.12) remains adequate to support the initial 48-hour MLD assault. The destruction of static fuel depots necessitates a greater reliance on rail logistics (rail-tanker staging). The window provided by the Kacha AD degradation offers a targeting opportunity to disrupt this supply chain.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains successful in synchronizing strategic political actions (India visit) with immediate operational deployment (KAB initiation, UGV fielding). The reported successful deep strike by UAF deep in the Kursk region (Requiem Group Balista) demonstrates that UAF still maintains the capability to stress RF internal security and C2, but this is a shaping effort, not the main effort.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are postured for active defense. Readiness is high, but the effective prosecution of the counter-UGV doctrine requires immediate, decentralized dissemination and training adaptation at the squad level (J7 requirement).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Success (Deep Strike): GUR confirmed the destruction of a Russian MiG-29 fighter jet and damage to the associated "Irtysh" radar at Kacha Airfield (Crimea). (FACT) This temporarily degrades RF Southern air defense coverage. (Confidence: HIGH)
  • Success (Shaping): The Requiem Group Balista confirmed drone strikes in the Kursk region (RF territory). (FACT) This maintains psychological pressure and forces RF commanders to divert resources to internal security. (Confidence: HIGH)
  • Success (Strategic/Diplomatic): Securing the $500M Patriot missile package directly counters the RF narrative of Western policy friction. (FACT)

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Resource Constraint: The P1 Intelligence Gap concerning the precise exploitation vector of the 38th GMRB near Chervone constrains the optimal placement of the operational reserve designated for Protocol "BRAVO-BLOCK." Commanders face an immediate risk/reward decision regarding pre-emptive deployment.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

The Information Environment is characterized by synchronized RF narrative control designed to mask the kinetic MLD and destabilize UAF political will.

DomainFinding (FACT/Observation)ConfidenceAssessment (JUDGMENT)
Strategic Comms (RF)Continuous state media focus on Putin's visit to India (041502Z).HIGHAIM: Project diplomatic indispensability and global stability, framing the conflict as a local issue rather than a strategic failure, thus supporting internal Russian mobilization.
Hybrid Operations (RF)Ongoing high-volume disinformation campaigns targeting US/NATO policy friction (e.g., "US peace plan split").HIGHAIM: Exploit domestic friction within NATO/Kyiv decision-making bodies during the critical kinetic phase (MLD).
Hybrid Operations (UAF Counter)UAF messaging claiming responsibility for the successful Kacha strike and deep strikes in Kursk.HIGHAIM: Directly counter the RF narrative of battlefield dominance and demonstrate UAF kinetic reach and operational capacity across multiple domains.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

The MLD timeline is accelerated due to confirmed KAB preparation. The Geomagnetic storm is not assessed as a constraint.

COA: UGV-Enabled Mechanized Assault at Stepnohorsk.

  1. Phase I (041700Z - 041930Z): Sustained KAB/artillery fires focused on C2 suppression and soft targets across the Stepnohorsk breach sector.
  2. Phase II (H-Hour NLT 042000Z DEC): 37th GMRB launches the Main Assault, spearheaded by "Kuryer" UGVs to execute mine clearance and initial strongpoint reduction. Mechanized echelons follow rapidly.
  3. Flank Fixation: 38th GMRB increases pressure on the Dobropillya/Chervone axis, attempting to force UAF reserves to commit prematurely or incorrectly.
  • Confidence: HIGH (All observed indicators align: KAB initiation, UGV confirmation, 5th Army activity).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

COA: C2 Decapitation and Rapid Operational Encirclement. RF exploits the Geomagnetic Storm’s C2 volatility to mask the launch of a high-supersonic precision strike (e.g., Kinzhal) on the Dnipro Operational HQ/Forward C2 node. Simultaneously, the 38th GMRB successfully exploits the P1 gap NW of Dobropillya while UAF C2 is paralyzed, leading to the encirclement of UAF forces in the Huliaipole salient.

  • Confidence: MEDIUM (Requires confluence of successful kinetic and C2 disruption, but the threat remains active).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Time FrameDecision Point
Stepnohorsk MLD H-HourNLT 042000Z DECInitiate final alert and full manning of all forward anti-armor and counter-UAS positions.
Reserve Commitment (BRAVO-BLOCK)IMMEDIATE (NLT 041730Z DEC)Execute Protocol "BRAVO-BLOCK." Reserves must be moved now, accepting the risk of imperfect positioning due to the P1 gap.
Kacha AD ExploitationIMMEDIATE (Next 6 hours)Prioritize deep strike target selection and launch to capitalize on the degraded "Irtysh" radar coverage.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionRequired ActionConfidence Impact
P1 (CRITICAL)Current tactical status and exploitation vector of the 38th GMRB near Chervone (Are they bypassing or consolidating?).IMMEDIATE ISR TASKING (High-resolution EO/IR/SAR) covering Phase Line BRAVO and potential bypass routes NW of Dobropillya.HIGH on reserve placement and MDCOA viability.
P2 (TECH/EW)Specific C2 structure and frequency resilience of the UGV "Kuryer."SIGINT/ELINT focused on 37th GMRB assault routes and staging areas. Capture and reverse-engineer control links.HIGH on UGV countermeasure effectiveness.
P3 (TARGETING)Identification of critical RF rail-tanker staging yards replacing destroyed stationary fuel depots (Tambov/Voronezh).IMINT/HUMINT tracking of rolling stock movement patterns via Rostov/Crimea routes, utilizing the Kacha AD degradation window.MEDIUM on deep strike effectiveness against logistics.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operational Maneuver (J3)

ACTION: IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF PROTOCOL "BRAVO-BLOCK" (NLT 041730Z DEC).

  1. Risk-Based Reserve Commitment: Given the confirmed KAB preparation, waiting for P1 gap resolution is operationally unacceptable. Immediately commit the designated operational reserve to established blocking positions NW of Huliaipole to contain the 38th GMRB threat.
  2. Counter-UGV Force Protection: Frontline units at Stepnohorsk must implement the revised Counter-UGV Hard-Kill Doctrine. Reallocate Heavy Machine Guns (HMG) and Automatic Grenade Launchers (AGL) assets to prioritize neutralization of robotic platforms ahead of the main mechanized columns.

7.2. Fires and Targeting (J3/J2)

ACTION: MAXIMIZE KACHA AD GAP EXPLOITATION (IMMEDIATE).

  1. Time-Sensitive Targeting (Logistics): Utilize the temporary degradation of RF Southern AD (Kacha) to launch deep strikes against high-confidence rail interdiction points and suspected rail-tanker staging yards (P3 requirement).
  2. Counter-Air Platform Targeting: Immediately adjust long-range fires and specialized drone assets to target suspected RF KAB launch aircraft operating zones over the Sea of Azov/Crimean peninsula. This is the only kinetic means to degrade the effectiveness of the preparatory fire.

7.3. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (STRATCOM/NCA)

ACTION: STRATEGIC NARRATIVE COUNTER-PUNCH (NLT 041800Z DEC).

  1. Amplify Successes: Focus immediate strategic communication efforts on the $500M Patriot aid package and the Kacha Airfield strike. Frame these as decisive, synchronized Western support and UAF military competence, directly challenging the RF diplomatic narrative (India visit) and claims of battlefield superiority.
  2. Domestic Morale: Use footage of the successful deep strike in Kursk (Requiem Group Balista) to reinforce the narrative of UAF reach and the inability of RF forces to guarantee security within their own borders, boosting internal morale before the MLD impact.
Previous (2025-12-04 15:00:24Z)

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