Sitrep 2025-12-04 13:34:30

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (MISREP)

TIME: 041400Z DEC 2025 SUBJECT: Escalated Kinetic Activity and Critical Information Warfare Threat – Zaporizhzhia/Zelenskyy Axes

This report updates the operational picture regarding the RF dual-axis offensive on the Zaporizhzhia Axis and evaluates the impact of an immediate, high-confidence RF disinformation campaign targeting the UAF diplomatic mission. The critical P1 intelligence gap regarding the 38th GMRB exploitation remains open.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational gravity remains centered on the Zaporizhzhia Axis, specifically the Huliaipole salient, following the confirmed RF breakthrough at Chervone.

Zaporizhzhia (Confirmed Kinetic Activity): UAF Air Force reports active enemy use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) targeting the region (041307Z DEC). This kinetic preparation supports the previously predicted Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): the Main Land Drive (MLD) by the 37th Guards MRB at Stepnohorsk.
Contested Area: UAF General Staff denies Russian claims of seizing Dobropolye (041325Z DEC). Dobropolye is assessed to be a forward contact point either near the 38th GMRB exploitation axis or a subsidiary objective near the main Stepnohorsk effort. (Analytical Judgment: Contestation over Dobropolye suggests RF attempts to expand the Chervone breach or test UAF defenses along Phase Line BRAVO.)
Northern Fixation (CONFIRMED): RF forces continue active artillery strikes in the Kharkiv direction, utilizing the 245th Motorised Rifle Regiment (Sever Group). This confirms RF intent to keep UAF northern reserves fixed and unavailable for deployment south.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No new updates regarding the geomagnetic storm's impact. The previously identified window for EW exploitation remains relevant, especially given the confirmed KAB usage, which requires reliable guidance systems.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control

UAF forces are under increasing pressure across multiple axes due to RF deep strike preparation (KABs) and continued high-intensity contact in the North. The success of Protocol "BRAVO-BLOCK" remains unconfirmed due to the persistent P1 intelligence gap on the 38th GMRB’s status (ADVANCE or CONSOLIDATE).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capabilities: Confirmed capability for widespread KAB employment across four key regions (Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Kharkiv, Donetsk). Artillery capabilities on the Kharkiv axis remain highly effective. Intentions:

Tactical: Synchronize ground maneuver (38th/37th GMRB) with overwhelming air support (KABs) to achieve a decisive breakthrough in Zaporizhzhia NLT 042100Z DEC.
Strategic: Sustain pressure on the Northern axis to prevent UAF reserve rotation.
Cognitive: Utilize immediate, high-impact disinformation to fracture international support and destabilize UAF diplomatic efforts.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed targeting of Sumy and Donetsk oblasts with KABs (041308Z DEC, 041329Z DEC) suggests that air assault preparation is now synchronized across the entire Eastern Front, not just the primary Zaporizhzhia axis.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The UAF strategic deep strikes on RF fuel infrastructure have drawn international attention. Turkey's appeal to avoid striking energy infrastructure (041327Z DEC) validates the strategic impact of the UAF campaign. While the GRAU ammunition score remains critical (26.12), the pressure on fuel distribution is increasing.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the synchronization of artillery (Kharkiv) and precision air assets (KABs) across multiple fronts simultaneously. C2 in the Information Domain is highly effective and immediate, evidenced by the rapid global amplification of the "US betrayal" narrative.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Tactical readiness is challenged by the need to counter KAB strikes across four key regions simultaneously, potentially diluting UAF air defense capacity needed to protect forward logistics and C2 nodes on the Zaporizhzhia Axis.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setbacks (Tactical): Confirmed KAB strikes across multiple oblasts increase logistical and C2 vulnerability. Successes (Strategic/Diplomatic):

Successful hosting of Cypriot President Nikos Christodoulides (041328Z DEC).
Cyprus explicitly commits to supporting Ukraine's EU integration path (041314Z DEC).
Cyprus confirms that any peace plan must be based on the principles of the UN Charter, sovereignty, and territorial integrity (041312Z DEC). This directly counters RF maximalist demands and strengthens the UAF position prior to the US delegation meetings.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint remains the lack of confirmed tactical intelligence (P1 Gap) necessary for decisive reserve deployment to Phase Line BRAVO.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (CRITICAL THREAT)

The Information Environment is dominated by a critical, high-volume RF disinformation attack designed to cause cognitive friction and diplomatic failure.

Domain	Finding	Confidence	Assessment
Transatlantic Cohesion (DISINFO)	Immediate and massive amplification (by multiple key RF and proxy channels) of the alleged "Der Spiegel transcript" claiming US "betrayal" of Ukraine and Europe, falsely quoting President Macron.	HIGH	CRITICAL THREAT. This surge is perfectly timed to undermine the Umerov/Hnatov delegation's meetings in the US. The campaign seeks to instill panic in Kyiv and distrust among Western allies. Requires immediate, high-level counter-action.
UAF Diplomatic Narrative	Successful State visit by Cypriot President, yielding assurances on EU membership and commitment to sovereignty-based peace talks.	HIGH	SUCCESSFUL COUNTER-IO. This visit is a strong, tangible rebuttal to the overall RF narrative of dissolving international support. It must be utilized immediately in the counter-disinformation effort.
RF Domestic Messaging	TASS promotes the upcoming "Direct Line with Putin" via a submission chatbot.	HIGH	Reinforces the RF narrative of Putin's direct, democratic connection with the populace, maintaining internal stability despite military actions.
Internal Discord PSYOP	RF channels (Colonelcassad) circulate unsubstantiated claims of internal armed conflict between GUR and UAF in Kyiv, and violence against recruitment officers (Lviv).	MEDIUM	Standard RF PSYOP aimed at degrading internal cohesion and recruiting legitimacy. Should be addressed via local UAF public information officers (PIO).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF will execute the synchronized offensive, utilizing KAB strikes as the final preparation for the ground assault.

COA: Dual-Axis Breakthrough, Preceded by Massed KAB.

Preparation (Immediate): RF tactical aviation will sustain massed KAB strikes (Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Donetsk) to suppress UAF Air Defense and degrade forward command structures until the tactical window opens (NLT 041800Z DEC).
Exploitation/Penetration: Assuming the 38th GMRB is consolidating (based on lack of confirmed P1 kinetic contact since last report), the 37th GMRB will launch the main mechanized assault at Stepnohorsk NLT 042100Z DEC, capitalizing on KAB-softened defenses and forcing UAF to respond to the flanking threat simultaneously.

Confidence: HIGH

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

COA: KAB-Enabled Deep Assault and Encirclement. RF exploits the confirmed KAB strikes on Zaporizhzhia by immediately launching Special Forces (SpN) insertion (airborne or fast-moving mechanized) behind the primary Phase Line BRAVO defenses. This deep penetration, coordinated with the 38th GMRB advance from Chervone, aims to seize key infrastructure behind Huliaipole (e.g., ammunition storage or C2 hub), inducing full operational chaos and requiring UAF forces to fight rearward.

Confidence: MEDIUM

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Event	Estimated Time Frame	Decision Point
KAB Pre-Assault Peak	Next 2-4 hours (041400Z - 041800Z DEC)	Increased AD readiness and dispersal of vulnerable assets in targeted regions (Zaporizhzhia, Sumy, Kharkiv).
Stepnohorsk MLD	NLT 042100Z DEC	Commitment of deep reserves (if held back from Bravo Line) to prevent main line breach.
Information Warfare Response	IMMEDIATE (NLT 041600Z DEC)	Successful public deflection and neutralization of the "US Betrayal" disinformation campaign.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Required Action
P1 (CRITICAL)	Current tactical status and disposition of the 38th GMRB near Chervone. (Are they advancing or consolidating/re-arming?)	IMMEDIATE ISR TASKING (High-resolution EO/IR/SAR) covering the sector NW of Chervone and along Phase Line BRAVO. No change from previous report—this remains the most critical kinetic gap.
P2 (KINETIC)	Identification of specific KAB target areas in Zaporizhzhia to confirm MLD penetration vector (Stepnohorsk vs. Dobropolye subsidiary).	Rapid BDA via UAV/HUMINT following KAB strikes. Correlate with RF UAV reconnaissance routes.
P3 (C2/IO)	Detailed attribution and dissemination metrics for the "US Betrayal" transcript campaign (Primary originator, scale of amplification, engagement metrics).	SIGINT/OSINT monitoring (S2/S7) focused on key RF Telegram, Twitter, and fringe media networks.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operational Maneuver (J3)

ACTION: IMMEDIATE RESERVE COMMITMENT ON PHASE LINE BRAVO.

Risk Mitigation: Given the high confidence in the MLCOA and confirmed KAB preparation, the lack of P1 intelligence on the 38th GMRB must be viewed as an increased risk of immediate exploitation. Commit the designated reserve to anti-armor blocking positions on Phase Line BRAVO immediately, without waiting for P1 confirmation. Better to be prepared for an exploitation push than delay reaction time.
AD Dispersal: Increase readiness levels and deploy mobile air defense assets (MOGs) to counter the confirmed KAB surge, focusing primarily on protecting identified deep C2 nodes and forward logistics hubs in the Zaporizhzhia AO.

7.2. Fires and Targeting (J3/J2)

ACTION: TARGETING KAB LAUNCH PLATFORMS.

Prioritize counter-air tasking for HIMARS/ATACMS/UAVs targeting confirmed or suspected forward RF tactical airfields (e.g., Rostov-on-Don area, Crimea) used for KAB launch sorties. Disruption of the KAB cycle will significantly degrade the MLD effectiveness.
Maintain high priority on Rail Interdiction targeting (as per previous report) to amplify the strategic fuel shortage validated by the Turkish diplomatic message.

7.3. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (STRATCOM/NCA)

ACTION: DUAL-AXIS COUNTER-DISINFORMATION STRIKE (NLT 041600Z DEC).

Immediate Deflection: President Zelenskyy or a high-ranking MoD official must immediately issue a statement linking the successful diplomatic visit of the Cypriot President (EU support, sovereignty guarantee) directly to the ongoing US delegation visit.
Irrefutable Rebuttal: The official statement must explicitly name the alleged "Der Spiegel transcript" as a malicious, high-impact Russian PSYOP designed to create division and sabotage the UAF mission in Washington. Frame the campaign as evidence that UAF diplomatic progress is actively succeeding and threatening the Kremlin.
Strategic Focus: Utilize Cypriot assurances (UN Charter/Territorial Integrity) to shift the global narrative away from "betrayal" and toward shared European resolve.

Situation Report