Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) UPDATE 04 DEC 2025

DTG: 041134Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL FOCUS: The kinetic threat remains centered on the Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole) dual-axis squeeze. New intelligence confirms RF forces are simultaneously utilizing localized low-visibility conditions (fog) to execute minor mechanized assaults on the Donetsk Axis (Myrnohrad), likely attempting to fix UAF reserves and deny flexible movement. The immediate operational priority is defining the 38th GMRB's exploitation vector from Chervone while maintaining vigilance against weather-leveraged attacks elsewhere.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

FACT: The Zaporizhzhia Oblast Military Administration (ZOA) issued multiple high-priority alerts (11:05Z, 11:09Z), consistent with expected kinetic pre-assault fire preparation related to the 37th/38th GMRB threat. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

FACT: A Russian mechanized assault attempt utilizing heavy fog was detected and repelled near Myrnohrad (Donetsk Axis). This suggests RF is actively adapting tactics to leverage transient weather conditions for localized tactical gains. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

FACT: RF forces in Crimea continue to report repelling Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) attacks on Sevastopol and Unmanned Surface Vehicle (USV) attacks near Mezvodnoye, indicating continued UAF deep strike pressure on RF naval and C2 infrastructure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

FACT: Localized heavy fog in the Donetsk operational area was exploited by RF mechanized units near Myrnohrad. This low-visibility environment provides concealment for RF maneuver elements attempting to bypass surveillance assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

JUDGMENT: The persistent Geomagnetic Storm continues to complicate high-precision GPS targeting (KABs) and satellite-dependent C2, forcing both sides to rely more heavily on terrestrial links and optical sensors.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces maintained defensive integrity against the fog-supported mechanized push in Donetsk. Reserve forces for the Huliaipole axis remain in staging areas but must be prepared for immediate deployment to Phase Line BRAVO (Chervone flank) as planned.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION: RF kinetic intent is to maintain overwhelming pressure across multiple axes, leveraging the primary breakthrough at Chervone while using secondary attacks (Myrnohrad) and environmental factors (fog) to fix UAF local reserves.

CAPABILITIES: RF maintains the capability to execute complex, weather-dependent tactical assaults and simultaneously launch synchronized IO campaigns. The confirmed focus on displaying older robotic systems (11:13Z) and criticism of previous MoD leadership suggests continued attempts to improve technology integration and battlefield efficiency. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

FACT: The shift to utilizing localized heavy fog for mechanized assault execution near Myrnohrad is a tactical adaptation, confirming RF intent to exploit visibility constraints to minimize exposure to UAF FPV/recon assets. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

JUDGMENT: RF IO is aggressively maximizing claims of High-Value Target (HVT) destruction (e.g., "rare Western MLRS" destroyed, repeated by multiple sources at 11:21Z and 11:27Z) to suppress allied confidence and justify the high cost of the current offensive.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Logistics remain focused on ammunition and fuel throughput, despite previous UAF deep strikes. RF state media projecting global financial and defense stability (India submarine lease, $2B) is a clear indicator that the Russian strategic narrative aims to decouple domestic perception from tactical sustainment concerns. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains capable of coordinating kinetic action (Myrnohrad assault) with immediate, high-volume IO dissemination (MLRS claims, TASS positive reports). The internal focus on elite stability (Kadyrov aide birthday tribute) suggests continuous efforts to project political and military unity domestically. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness remains high, bolstered by successful UAF STRATCOM efforts celebrating Artillery Day (11:30Z) and confirming successful neutralization of six RF officers (11:10Z). The successful defense near Myrnohrad demonstrates tactical resilience against weather-based attacks.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Successful defense against fog-leveraged mechanized assault near Myrnohrad.
2. Continued operational progress in mine clearance in Kharkiv Oblast (194 hectares cleared).
3. Effective morale campaign reinforcement via Artillery Day celebrations and tactical victory reports (officer casualties).

Setbacks:

1. Reported civilian casualties in Nikopol following RF fire (11:15Z).
2. Continued requirement to commit resources to deep strikes in Crimea to counter RF naval/C2 assets.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the urgent need for definitive kinetic BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) on the 38th GMRB exploitation vector at Chervone to enable the critical operational reserve commitment before the estimated enemy launch time (NLT 041500Z).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The cognitive domain is highly contested:

1. RF Strategic Normalization: TASS is used to push non-military news (Alligator death, commemorative coins) alongside reports of high-level geopolitical deals (India nuclear sub lease, Putin interview), aiming to project stability and global importance to the domestic audience.
2. RF De-legitimization: Aggressive claims of destroying "rare Western MLRS" aims to undermine the effectiveness of UAF external resource utilization.
3. UAF Identity Defense: UAF media is pivoting to a proactive identity defense strategy, using the defection of athlete Lyskun to advocate for "identity politics" as a core component of national defense. This counters RF IO targeting internal cohesion.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian public morale is actively reinforced by institutional messaging (General Staff, 3rd Assault Brigade public outreach), balancing the strategic stress from the Zaporizhzhia offensive.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

FACT: The US is actively pressuring Greece to participate in arms procurement for Ukraine, confirming continuous, high-level diplomatic efforts to sustain military aid volume and efficiency. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

JUDGMENT: This external push directly counters RF narratives of diminishing Western financial and material resolve.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Dual-Axis Squeeze and Localized Fog Exploitation (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Zaporizhzhia Main Effort (NLT 041500Z): The 38th GMRB will commence synchronized mechanized movement from Chervone, timed to draw the UAF operational reserve. The 37th GMRB MLD from Stepnohorsk will follow shortly thereafter, maximizing psychological and kinetic impact.
2. Diversionary/Fixation Attacks: RF forces will continue to exploit environmental factors (fog, low cloud cover) along the Donetsk and Kharkiv axes to launch limited, mechanized thrusts (like the one near Myrnohrad) to pin down UAF local reserves and prevent lateral reinforcement to Huliaipole.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Kinetic Decapitation and Operational Penetration (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1. RF uses the persistent geomagnetic storm to mask the launch of a high-precision strike (Iskander-K/Kinzhal) targeting the primary UAF C2 node controlling the operational reserve near Huliaipole.
2. The resulting C2 paralysis allows the 38th GMRB to achieve a breakthrough toward the rear operational area, leading to a catastrophic collapse of the Huliaipole grouping.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL UPDATE)

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Operational Maneuver and Fire Support (J3/J4)

1. Prioritize Chervone Block: Execute the reserve commitment decision NLT 041300Z to establish a blocking force at Phase Line BRAVO (NW of Huliaipole). This prevents the 38th GMRB from turning the Huliaipole defense.
2. Counter-Fog Doctrine: Disseminate immediate guidance requiring forward units to deploy thermal/acoustic sensors and maintain high alertness during periods of localized fog or low visibility, anticipating further RF mechanized feints/assaults (Myrnohrad Tactic).
3. Kinetic Response: Prioritize counter-battery fire against confirmed RF artillery positions supporting the Myrnohrad assault attempt to discourage further tactical testing of the line.

6.2. Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (J2)

1. P-1A CHERVONE/38th GMRB (Priority 1 - KINETIC): Sustain maximum ISR focus on Phase Line BRAVO. Failure to confirm the exploitation depth of the 38th GMRB remains the single highest operational risk.
2. P-1B ZELENY GAI/37th GMRB (Priority 2 - KINETIC): Increase SIGINT focus on 37th GMRB launch preparations, correlating comms chatter with anticipated NLT launch window (041500Z).
3. P-21 MLRS Claim Verification (Priority 3 - IO/TARGETING): Task IMINT assets to verify RF claims of destroying a "rare Western MLRS." If false, this provides immediate UAF STRATCOM leverage. If true, identify the likely RF strike asset used.

6.3. Information Operations (J7/STRATCOM)

1. Counter MLRS Claim: If P-21 BDA confirms the MLRS claim is false, J7 must rapidly deploy visual counter-proof to allied media sources NLT 041500Z.
2. Internal Resilience Narrative: Amplify the successes of UAF forces (officer kills, successful defense at Myrnohrad) and link them directly to the identity defense narrative currently circulating, portraying the UAF as a unified, lethal force capable of tactical adaptation.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)