Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - UAF GROUP OF FORCES SOUTH

OPERATIONAL READINESS: ALERT LEVEL 3 (CRITICAL KINETIC AND IO THREAT)

DTG: 041105Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL FOCUS: The threat on the Zaporizhzhia Axis has escalated from a single-axis breach preparation (37th GMRB, Stepnohorsk/Zeleny Gai) to a Confirmed Dual-Axis Offensive Threat, driven by the 38th GMRB breakthrough at Chervone. This flank pressure requires immediate, decisive UAF reserve commitment. Concurrently, the enemy has intensified the strategic Information Operation (IO) campaign, focusing on internal security fragmentation (Lviv TCC) and undermining international financial support (EU asset dispute). The immediate operational priority is defining the 38th GMRB’s exploitation vector and executing synchronized kinetic-IO counter-actions.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation on the Southern Front remains critical, demanding rapid defensive reorientation:

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole CRITICAL): RF forces are executing a Dual-Axis Squeeze. The 37th GMRB remains poised for the Main Land Drive (MLD) at Stepnohorsk/Zeleny Gai. Critically, the 38th GMRB has confirmed control of Chervone (Vysokoye) and is positioned to flank Huliaipole’s primary defensive lines, bypassing established minefields. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Zaporizhzhia AD/ISR: Confirmed incoming UAV activity detected traveling from the East toward the Zaporizhzhia operational area (10:51Z). This is likely pre-assault reconnaissance or targeted attack on C2/AD nodes preceding the mechanized push. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk): UAF General Staff explicitly confirms UAF forces are holding the northern part of Pokrovsk (10:56Z). This directly contradicts widespread RF propaganda claiming capture of the city (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad). This area remains kinetically sensitive due to continued RF long-range strike capability. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The confirmed Geomagnetic Storm persists. This interference continues to degrade GPS precision (affecting KAB accuracy) and complicates secure C2 and satellite-linked drone operations for both sides.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are actively maintaining defensive lines under heavy fire preparation (KABs/Drones). Defensive command elements must urgently manage the commitment of the operational reserve to counter the Chervone flank threat, which is now more immediate than the Stepnohorsk MLD.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Overall Intent: Achieve operational breakthrough on the Zaporizhzhia Axis by leveraging the Chervone flank exploitation to force a disorganized withdrawal from Huliaipole defenses, while simultaneously using IO to paralyze UAF internal cohesion.

• Kinetic Intent: Immediate tactical intent is to launch synchronized mechanized attacks from Chervone and Stepnohorsk NLT 041400Z. The 38th GMRB exploitation is the critical initial maneuver intended to fix UAF reserve commitment. RF is actively framing this as the decisive "Battle for Huliaipole" (10:46Z) to maximize cognitive impact upon success. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Cognitive Intent (Strategic Sabotage): RF IO is focusing efforts on two main vectors:
  1. Internal Fragmentation: Aggressive re-amplification of the Lviv TCC murder, framing it as proof that "Westerners do not intend to fight" (10:41Z), targeting mobilization efforts.
  2. External Erosion: Amplifying reports of internal EU divisions (Belgium, FT) regarding the use of frozen Russian assets (10:45Z, 11:00Z), aiming to sow doubt among allies. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift to a dual-axis threat structure (37th and 38th GMRBs) is the most significant tactical adaptation, designed to maximize pressure on UAF reserve allocation. Additionally, the FPV targeting of RF logistics personnel (10:52Z) suggests enemy sustainment efforts are relying increasingly on vulnerable, low-caste personnel ("Karavanovich"), indicating potential stress on standard military logistics capabilities.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Logistics remain capable of sustaining high-volume KAB and drone strikes. However, the identification and targeting of vulnerable dismounted logistics personnel suggest either a local supply deficiency or a deliberate acceptance of high losses to maintain forward throughput under the continued pressure of UAF deep strikes (Tambov/Voronezh).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 maintains robust synchronization across the kinetic and information domains, evidenced by the immediate IO amplification of the "Battle for Huliaipole" coinciding with pre-assault UAV deployment. Internal RF information control is escalating (Facetime, VPN blocking 10:41Z, 11:01Z), indicating proactive measures to maintain domestic narrative control ahead of high-casualty operations. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensively prepared to meet the MLD, but the rapid development of the Chervone flank threat demands immediate reassessment of reserve deployment plans. Readiness is bolstered by highly effective internal communication efforts. The widespread commemoration of the Day of Missile Forces and Artillery (10:43Z, 10:48Z, 10:49Z) is a successful STRATCOM effort reinforcing fighting spirit and national resilience.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Kinetic-IO): UAF General Staff rapidly countered RF claims by confirming control of Northern Pokrovsk (10:56Z).
• Success (Tactical): Successful FPV strike on RF logistics column ("Karavanovich," 10:52Z) confirms localized tactical superiority in the drone domain.
• Success (Legal/Moral): The Prosecutor General’s Office (PGO) forwarding the case against RF commanders responsible for the Chernihiv massacre (11:00Z) maintains essential legal pressure.
• Success (Cyber Defense): Proactive cyber/IO defense measure launched in Zaporizhzhia ("Stop Scam," 11:00Z) addresses domestic vulnerabilities targeted by enemy IO/scams.
• Setback (Information Vulnerability): The Lviv TCC incident remains highly potent and is successfully being weaponized by RF media to drive internal division.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the time window for decision-making regarding the operational reserve deployment under the dual-axis threat. CRITICAL BDA Requirement is now focused on the 38th GMRB vector from Chervone, not just the 37th GMRB staging area at Zeleny Gai.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The IO environment is characterized by synchronous external and internal sabotage:

1. Kinetic Justification: RF sources are framing Huliaipole as a decisive "Battle" (10:46Z), setting conditions for claiming a major tactical victory.
2. Internal Cohesion Attack: The Lviv TCC murder remains a central IO focus, weaponized to suggest Ukrainian internal political divisions and systemic failure of mobilization (10:41Z).
3. Allied Division: RF IO aggressively highlights the internal EU dispute over utilizing frozen Russian assets, attempting to create fissures in the Western financial front (10:45Z, 11:00Z).
4. Domestic Narrative Control: Russia tightens internal media controls by blocking FaceTime and intensifying VPN crackdown (10:41Z, 11:01Z) and pushing positive economic reports (10:56Z) to stabilize the home front.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian morale benefits significantly from high-level institutional affirmation (Artillery Day celebrations) and verified frontline performance (Pokrovsk holding). However, the ongoing TCC narrative and the high kinetic stress in Zaporizhzhia require constant counter-narrative reinforcement.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

International support appears firm, but diplomatic efforts must proactively counter RF IO regarding financial divisions. The UAF must use the confirmed UAF control of Pokrovsk and the Chernihiv legal action to maintain moral authority against Russian strategic claims.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Dual-Axis Squeeze and Fixation Attack (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Chervone Exploitation (NLT 041330Z): The 38th GMRB will commence mechanized movement NW from Chervone toward Phase Line BRAVO (Huliaipole flank). This initial push is designed to force UAF J3 to commit the operational reserve prematurely or out of position.
2. Stepnohorsk MLD (NLT 041500Z): Once UAF reserves are committed to the Chervone flank, the 37th GMRB will launch the main, heavy mechanized assault from Zeleny Gai/Stepnohorsk to exploit the now-thinned primary defenses.
3. IO Support: Simultaneous release of high-production media claiming successful encirclement or capture of UAF forward positions to generate immediate tactical paralysis and media frenzy.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Kinetic Decapitation and Operational Penetration (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1. RF uses the geomagnetic storm interference (previously noted) to mask a high-precision strike (Iskander-K or Kinzhal) targeting the primary UAF J3 C2 node controlling the operational reserve, successfully neutralizing the command element.
2. The 38th GMRB, having secured the Chervone flank, then exploits the resulting C2 chaos to conduct a deep penetration maneuver aimed at the rear of the Huliaipole grouping, forcing disorganized collapse and potential seizure of key logistic infrastructure before the reserve can be repositioned.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL UPDATE)

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Operational Maneuver and Fire Support (J3/J4)

1. Reserve Prioritization (Chervone): Reallocate the immediate operational reserve to counter the confirmed 38th GMRB flank threat at Phase Line BRAVO. Deployment must commence immediately upon confirmation of 38th GMRB advance toward Huliaipole NLT 041300Z.
2. C2 Protection (Geomagnetic Risk): Due to the MDCOA and persistent geomagnetic storm, J6 must implement mandatory dispersed C2 protocols and deploy localized high-powered jamming/EW assets near critical command posts (including reserve staging areas) to mitigate potential precision strikes masked by AD degradation.
3. Deep Strike Amplification: Prioritize long-range artillery and drone strikes against confirmed RF C2/logistics nodes supporting both the 37th GMRB (Zeleny Gai) and the 38th GMRB (Chervone), capitalizing on the vulnerability of RF logistics personnel observed in theater.

6.2. Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (J2)

1. P-1 DUAL-AXIS BDA (Priority 1 - KINETIC): Focus all available ISR (Manned SAR, UAV, SIGINT) on determining the current forward line of advance (FLOT) and unit identification of the 38th GMRB exploiting the Chervone breakthrough. NLT 041230Z.
2. P-13 Pokrovsk C2 Validation (Priority 2 - IO Validation): J2 must provide immediate, verifiable IMINT or tactical video proof (via C2 channels) of UAF control over northern Pokrovsk for use by J7 (STRATCOM) by NLT 041400Z.
3. P-15 Deportation Verification (Priority 3 - STRATEGIC): Continue efforts to verify the DPRK child deportation report, coordinating with international partners for rapid legal mobilization.

6.3. Information Operations (J7/STRATCOM)

1. De-escalate TCC Narrative: Leverage the National Police "Stop Scam" initiative and the PGO Chernihiv indictments to pivot the public narrative toward UAF commitment to internal security, transparency, and justice, contrasting with the RF narrative of internal chaos.
2. Counter Huliaipole Defeatism: Use confirmed enemy losses and the Pokrovsk holding counter-narrative to frame the current RF efforts as a costly, failed attempt to generate a decisive victory before the winter. Use the "Battle for Huliaipole" framing against the enemy by highlighting the high cost of their initial breakthrough.
3. Address EU Asset Division: STRATCOM should proactively coordinate with the Ministry of Finance to release a statement that reframes the EU division as a demonstration of the complexity of international law, not a failure of will, while highlighting the tangible success of the recent Tambov/Voronezh strikes.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)