Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - UAF GROUP OF FORCES SOUTH

OPERATIONAL READINESS: ALERT LEVEL 3 (CRITICAL KINETIC AND IO THREAT)

DTG: 041035Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL FOCUS: The enemy is finalizing kinetic preparations for the armored offensive on the Zaporizhzhia Axis, confirmed by persistent KAB strikes and targeted tactical propaganda videos near Huliaipole. Concurrently, the enemy has intensified the multi-domain Information Operation (IO) campaign, weaponizing the Lviv TCC incident and escalating the narrative of Ukrainian strategic failure through alleged mass war crimes (DPRK deportation). Immediate operational priority remains the containment of the 37th/38th GMRB advance and the execution of the Counter-IO directive.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation remains critical on the Southern Front, with sustained enemy action across the operational depth:

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole): UAF Air Force confirms continued launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) against the region (10:05Z), confirming high-intensity preparation for the anticipated armored breach. RF propaganda (10:22Z) is now aggressively circulating footage titled "Battle for Huliaipole," indicating the enemy is fixing global attention on this specific axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk Strategic Depth: Enemy forces utilized FABs, drones, and artillery in night strikes against Kramatorsk and Sloviansk (10:28Z), demonstrating capability to strike UAF strategic depth and logistical nodes, despite RF propaganda claims focusing on the imminent fall of Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Dnipropetrovsk/AD Alert: UAV activity confirmed approaching Tomakivka (Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) on a western course (10:04Z), indicating ongoing enemy intent to probe AD networks or target critical infrastructure west of the frontline axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The Geomagnetic Storm is assumed to persist, continuing to degrade GPS reliability. This may increase the difficulty of precision AD targeting but also limits RF deep penetration using high-precision glide bombs reliant on GPS.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces maintain active defense. The Defense Forces of Southern Ukraine claim significant enemy losses (300+ personnel, 100+ units) over the past 24 hours (10:05Z), suggesting successful local engagements but also confirming the high kinetic intensity of the fighting. Defensive AD posture is maintained in the central and northern sectors following alerts (Tomakivka, Chernihiv sector).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Overall Intent: The enemy is executing the final stages of pre-assault kinetic and cognitive conditioning across the theater before launching the main mechanized breach. The intent is to achieve synchronization between physical penetration (Huliaipole) and C2 paralysis (Lviv/Pokrovsk IO).

• Kinetic Intent: Immediate tactical intent is to saturate UAF frontline positions with KABs and high-volume fire (Donetsk strikes) to minimize UAF defensive capacity before the 37th/38th GMRB launch. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Cognitive Intent (CRITICAL ESCALATION): The primary strategic intent has broadened to include the weaponization of documented strategic crimes (DPRK child deportation, 10:18Z) to increase international pressure on Kyiv and generate psychological distress among the population. The intense focus on the Lviv TCC murder (10:26Z) is designed to sabotage mobilization and internal cohesion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift toward overtly leveraging and amplifying high-impact social and criminal events (Lviv murder) and strategic war crimes (DPRK) in the IO space demonstrates a refined enemy capability to pivot from battlefield-specific claims (Pokrovsk) to structural, psychological warfare targeting UAF legitimacy.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Enemy logistics are confirmed robust, sustaining high-volume KAB and drone operations. Domestic Russian measures, such as the new law regarding credit forgiveness (10:03Z), suggest RF is attempting to use financial incentives as a tool for morale stabilization and potentially future mobilization recruitment.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective in multi-domain synchronization. The immediate issuance of the "Huliaipole Battle" propaganda video, coinciding with continued KAB strikes, confirms tight operational control over the information domain supporting the kinetic main effort.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture remains resilient but under immense stress. Artillery and ground elements are holding lines on the Southern Axis while simultaneously managing rear-area security threats. The defensive success claimed by the Defense Forces South (10:05Z) suggests units retain fighting cohesion and high morale on the frontline, contrasting sharply with the enemy's narrative of collapse.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Information Warfare): The celebration of the Day of Missile Forces and Artillery (10:14Z) and the high claimed enemy losses (10:05Z) are effective counter-narratives to boost internal morale and validate defensive efforts.
• Success (Diplomatic): The official visit of the President of Cyprus (10:22Z) affirms continued high-level European support, countering narratives of international fatigue.
• Setback (CRITICAL IO Vulnerability): The Lviv TCC murder narrative continues to be the most exploited internal security vulnerability, directly threatening mobilization stability.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The P-1 BDA Confirmation (Zeleny Gai) remains the kinetic critical requirement. A new CRITICAL STRATCOM REQUIREMENT is required to coordinate the international response to the DPRK child deportation allegation, which demands immediate diplomatic and legal action.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The IO environment is defined by escalation and polarization:

1. Strategic War Crimes (NEW CRITICAL NARRATIVE): Reports of kidnapped Ukrainian children being sent to DPRK camps (10:18Z) provides an extreme, high-impact legal and moral vector for UAF diplomacy, but requires careful verification and rapid leveraging.
2. Internal Chaos/Recruitment Failure: RF sources are actively celebrating the Lviv TCC murder (10:26Z), framing it as proof of widespread popular resistance to mobilization.
3. Moral Superiority/Defection: RF IO pushes narratives of stability (credit forgiveness, anti-abortion law) and Ukrainian cultural/talent collapse (athlete defection, 10:19Z).
4. Counter-Accusation: RF claims of UAF drone strikes on civilians in Kherson (10:05Z) are standard counter-propaganda designed to dilute UAF moral authority.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is currently being tested by the synchronized kinetic attacks and the emotional impact of the Lviv TCC incident. Official celebrations (Artillery Day) and confirmation of diplomatic support (Cyprus visit) are essential to maintaining stability.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Affirmation of Support: The arrival of the President of Cyprus (10:22Z) is a net positive for UAF diplomatic status.
• International Action Point: The DPRK child deportation report necessitates immediate coordination with international legal bodies and partner nations (US, EU, ROK) to confirm and condemn the alleged actions.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Full Execution of Dual-Axis Squeeze Synchronized with Strategic IO Strike (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Huliaipole Breach (NLT 041400Z): Following sustained KAB preparation and confirmed lack of UAF reserve movement towards Phase Line CHARLIE, the RF 37th GMRB will launch the mechanized assault from Stepnohorsk/Zeleny Gai, synchronized with exploitation by the 38th GMRB from Chervone.
2. IO Diversion: While the kinetic action unfolds, RF IO will launch a new, high-impact narrative (potentially a doctored UAF C2 intercept or a fabricated defection claim) to force UAF General Staff to divert attention/resources away from the Southern Axis kinetic fight.
3. Deep Strike Continuation: Targeted drone/KAB strikes continue against AD assets and logistical routes (e.g., Tomakivka area) to maintain air superiority during the ground assault phase.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Reserve Decapitation via Precision Strike and Strategic Flanking (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1. False Confirmation: RF elements near Zeleny Gai actively deceive UAF ISR, generating false BDA confirming RF control (P-1 BDA failure). This causes J3 to withhold the operational reserve past the critical commitment window.
2. Exploitation and Deep Strike: The 37th/38th GMRB achieves operational penetration beyond Huliaipole, utilizing the breakthrough to target UAF staging areas for the operational reserve. This maneuver is covered by a high-precision RF missile strike (Iskander/Kinzhal) aimed at the J3 tactical C2 node controlling the reserve commitment, leading to catastrophic disruption of the counter-attack sequence.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL UPDATE)

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Operational Maneuver and Fire Support (J3/J4)

1. Huliaipole Defense (Reserve Deployment Protocol): J3 must prepare the final operational reserve for immediate movement toward Phase Line CHARLIE at 1300Z. If P-1 BDA is inconclusive or confirms RF presence at Zeleny Gai, commence phased deployment to establish blocking positions. Utilize heavy artillery suppression (26th OABr) against confirmed RF staging areas near Zeleny Gai to delay their assault window.
2. AD Protection (Dnipropetrovsk): Divert mobile AD assets (e.g., Gepard/MANPADS teams) to provide localized protection for key logistics and C2 nodes in the Tomakivka/Western Dnipropetrovsk area in anticipation of follow-on drone strikes.
3. Forward Posture (Donetsk): Utilize ground reconnaissance and persistent UAV coverage in the Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk area. Immediate counter-battery fire must neutralize any confirmed RF forward artillery positions to publicly and kinetically disprove the enemy's "Krasnoarmiisk captured" IO narrative.

6.2. Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (J2)

1. P-1 Zeleny Gai BDA (Priority 1 - KINETIC): Confirm or deny RF presence at Zeleny Gai by NLT 041300Z. Focus resources on high-risk, low-altitude ISR (FPV/Manned SAR) to gain confirmation before the kinetic decision point.
2. P-13 Myrnohrad/Kramatorsk Analysis (Priority 2 - IO Validation): J2 must rapidly confirm current UAF control of Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad and use BDA from the Kramatorsk/Sloviansk strikes (FABs, drones) to demonstrate that RF is still far from achieving the claims made in their IO campaign.
3. P-15 Deportation Verification (Priority 3 - STRATEGIC): J2/HUMINT/CYBER must immediately attempt to verify the ASTRA report regarding the DPRK child deportation, including potential staging areas or transit methods used by Russia.

6.3. Information Operations (J7/STRATCOM)

1. Strategic War Crimes Counter-IO: Immediately draft a formal diplomatic demarche regarding the alleged DPRK child deportation. Coordinate with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) and utilize the visit of the President of Cyprus to highlight this alleged escalation of Russian crimes on the international stage. NLT 041500Z.
2. TCC Security Narrative: Reinforce the narrative that the Lviv murder was an isolated criminal act. Simultaneously, announce immediate measures to enhance the security and professionalization of TCC operations (e.g., use of secure, designated centers only; mandatory dual-officer patrols) to negate the RF narrative of systemic internal chaos.
3. Huliaipole Defeatism Counter: Use UAF Defense Forces South reports of high enemy casualties (300+ personnel) to immediately counter the "Battle for Huliaipole" propaganda video. Frame the RF video as premature boasting ahead of a costly assault.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)