Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - UAF GROUP OF FORCES SOUTH

OPERATIONAL READINESS: ALERT LEVEL 3 (ESCALATED IO/KINETIC THREAT)

DTG: 041200Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL FOCUS: The enemy is synchronizing kinetic actions on the Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia KAB strikes) with a high-impact tactical Information Operation (IO) campaign aimed at generating panic and distrust in the Donetsk sector (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad). The immediate priority is maintaining defensive integrity on the Huliaipole axis and immediately countering the enemy's rapidly escalating cognitive attack targeting UAF C2 effectiveness. The critical P-1 BDA requirement for Zeleny Gai remains the kinetic decision trigger.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation remains critical on the Zaporizhzhia Axis and is rapidly deteriorating in the Information Environment concerning the Donetsk front.

• Zaporizhzhia Front (CRITICAL): UAF Air Force confirms continued launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) by tactical aviation against the Zaporizhzhia region (09:53Z), confirming sustained preparation for the 37th/38th GMRB ground offensive. The Dual-Axis threat (Chervone/Stepnohorsk) is confirmed as the immediate main effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk Axes (High Fixation/IO Target): RF sources are making highly aggressive claims of seizing Krasnoarmiisk and encircling Dimitrov (the operational area encompassing Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad). This kinetic claim is designed to amplify the existing "surrender" IO narrative. The loss of Krasnoarmiisk, if confirmed, would represent a significant setback. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for the claims; LOW for factual confirmation of control).
• Northern Axis (AD Alert): An incoming wave of UAVs/drones has been confirmed approaching Chernihiv from the north (10:00Z), indicating RF intent to disrupt rear-area logistics and potentially divert AD assets from the main effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The Geomagnetic Storm persists, potentially degrading GPS accuracy, which may encourage continued RF reliance on unguided KABs and high-volume, area-effect artillery. RF reports (TASS 09:58Z) mention waiting for fog conditions to launch the alleged Krasnoarmiisk assault, confirming enemy efforts to leverage environmental opacity for tactical maneuver, particularly near forward contact lines.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF elements continue active defense. The 26th Separate Artillery Brigade (26 ОАБр) has demonstrated effective firing of AHS Krab systems, confirming artillery readiness despite adverse weather. However, the requirement to manage kinetic pressure in the South, combined with a significant internal security breach in the West, is placing severe stress on C2 prioritization.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Overall Intent: The enemy is executing the predicted synchronized action: kinetic destruction (KABs, drone strikes) combined with a high-stakes, real-time IO attack designed to create the illusion of collapse and force premature UAF reserve commitment.

• Kinetic Intent (Zaporizhzhia): Immediate intent is to suppress UAF defenses near Huliaipole using mass KAB preparation to facilitate the mechanized breakthrough of the 37th/38th GMRBs. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Cognitive Intent (Donetsk/National): The immediate operational objective is to weaponize the claim of UAF strategic failure (Pokrovsk lost) and internal collapse (TCC murder) to fracture UAF domestic morale and degrade command trust. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Adaptation (Tactical): RF is demonstrating tactical flexibility by leveraging specific environmental factors (fog/visibility) to support ground maneuver where GPS/C2 reliance is high due to the Geomagnetic Storm.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The most significant adaptation is the immediate, surgical deployment of the allegedly manipulated video featuring MP Bezuhla (10:00Z) to amplify the "Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad lost" narrative. This confirms an agile, high-readiness IO apparatus capable of exploiting domestic political vulnerabilities in near real-time.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains robust. The previous assessment of the 260th GRAU Arsenal Score (26.12) persists, confirming the enemy's capacity to continue high-volume artillery, drone, and KAB usage necessary for the Dual-Axis offensive and continued infrastructure strikes (Kherson TPP).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in multi-domain synchronization. The coordination between kinetic KAB strikes, ground maneuver timing, and the specific, high-impact IO campaign (Bezuhla video) demonstrates a centralized, effective military-information command structure.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture remains defensive and adaptive, with artillery units (26th OABr) demonstrating operational resilience. However, readiness is being severely tested by:

1. The immediate kinetic threat on the Huliaipole Axis.
2. The ongoing logistical/humanitarian response required for the Kherson TPP loss.
3. The critical internal security failure related to the fatal TCC incident in Lviv, a key mobilization and rear-area hub.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Internal Security - CRITICAL): The fatal stabbing of a TCC officer in Lviv (09:45Z) represents an extreme internal security threat and provides immediate, high-value propaganda material to the enemy.
• Setback (Cognitive Domain): The enemy's ability to immediately circulate high-impact (and potentially falsified) claims of battlefield collapse (Pokrovsk lost) utilizing Ukrainian political figures poses an immediate threat to morale and C2 stability in the Donetsk sector.
• Success (Operational Resilience): UAF artillery forces are confirmed capable of sustained operation in adverse environmental conditions, mitigating the effects of the Geomagnetic Storm on fire support.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT (P-1 remains): Immediate BDA confirmation of RF ORBAT and control at Zeleny Gai (NLT 041300Z). CRITICAL REQUIREMENT (NEW - J4/J7): Allocation of SBU/National Guard resources to secure high-priority TCC centers and mobilization routes, combined with a robust STRATCOM message to counter the enemy exploitation of the Lviv incident.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The enemy is maximizing three concurrent narratives:

1. Tactical Defeatism (Pokrovsk): The use of the MP Bezuhla video/claims (10:00Z) directly supports the narrative that UAF C2 is failing and major territorial losses (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad) have occurred. (D-S Belief: Propaganda Effort by Russia 0.128)
2. Internal Chaos (TCC): Immediate exploitation of the Lviv TCC murder (09:59Z) to reinforce narratives of popular resistance to mobilization and state authority. (D-S Belief: Internal Security: Insurgent Activity in Lviv 0.106)
3. Diplomatic Fissures: Reports sourced from NYT alleging the US peace plan is highly segmented, potentially designed to sow distrust regarding international resolve.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment in rear areas is under extreme pressure due to the Lviv incident and the looming heating crisis (Kherson TPP). Government attempts to project stability (e.g., budget announcements for teacher salaries) are critical but may be undermined by the intensity of the kinetic and IO threat.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Positive Support Confirmed: Poland, Germany, and Norway announced an additional $500 million joint procurement for Patriot missile interceptors (09:50Z), confirming robust, long-term commitment to UAF air defense capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Peace Process Uncertainty: Media reports regarding the compartmentalization of the US peace plan (09:46Z) require careful monitoring to ensure enemy manipulation does not affect perception of unity among allies.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Full Execution of Dual-Axis Squeeze and C2 Decapitation Attempt (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Immediate Ground Push (NLT 041400Z): RF 37th GMRB launches the Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) from Stepnohorsk (Zelyony Gai area), leveraging the continued KAB softening, synchronized with the 38th GMRB's exploitation drive from Chervone.
2. Targeted IO Escalation (Immediate): RF IO assets will flood the Donetsk front lines with the Bezuhla video and Pokrovsk claims, specifically targeting UAF units in the Hryshyne/Myrnohrad area via intercepted radio channels and frontline social media platforms.
3. Targeted AD Diversion (Ongoing): UAV/drone incursions towards Chernihiv and potentially other rear oblasts continue through the evening to fix UAF AD assets away from the Southern/Eastern axes.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 Paralysis via Strategic Flanking and Reserve Misdirection (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1. Deception and Deep Flank: RF utilizes a small, high-mobility element (likely Spetsnaz/recon) in the Zeleny Gai area to simulate a larger advance, causing the UAF J3 to commit the final operational reserve prematurely to Phase Line CHARLIE.
2. Exploitation of Misdirection: While UAF attention and reserves are locked onto the Zaporizhzhia axis, RF commits significant breakthrough resources (e.g., 506th Guards MR P Regiment, cited at Krasnoarmiisk) to exploit a thinned sector near Pokrovsk or Kostiantynivka, achieving a significant operational depth breakthrough that fragments the Eastern grouping.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL UPDATE)

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Operational Maneuver and Fire Support (J3/J4)

1. Huliaipole Defense (Phase Line CHARLIE Preparation): Upon P-1 BDA confirmation (or lack of confirmation by 1300Z), assume hostile control of Zeleny Gai. Position the operational reserve to establish blocking positions along Phase Line CHARLIE. DO NOT commit the reserve fully until 37th GMRB main elements are visually confirmed advancing beyond Zeleny Gai.
2. Donetsk Fire Denial: Immediately increase counter-battery fire in the Hryshyne/Dimitrov area to deny RF forces the opportunity to consolidate and validate their aggressive claims. Prioritize neutralization of confirmed mortar/artillery positions (e.g., as claimed by DNR/Sparta unit).
3. Chernihiv AD Alert: Raise AD readiness to level RED in the Chernihiv sector to intercept incoming UAVs/drones, prioritizing the protection of critical infrastructure and rear-area C2 nodes.

6.2. Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (J2)

1. P-1 Zeleny Gai BDA (Priority 1 - KINETIC): Confirm or deny RF presence at Zeleny Gai by NLT 041300Z. If traditional ISR assets fail due to weather/jamming, task specialized FPV-equipped reconnaissance teams operating at ultra-low altitude.
2. P-13 Krasnoarmiisk/Dimitrov BDA (Priority 2 - URGENT): Immediately task persistent surveillance (SAR/IMINT) of the Krasnoarmiisk and Dimitrov areas to verify the highly concerning RF control claims. Deny RF the ability to establish a permanent fire sack in this critical fixation area.
3. P-14 Bezuhla Source Analysis (Priority 3 - IO/HUMINT): J2/J7 must immediately analyze the source and potential manipulation of the MP Bezuhla video to identify the specific vulnerability or channel used for its rapid amplification by RF sources.

6.3. Information Operations (J7/STRATCOM)

1. Immediate Counter-IO (C2/Morale): Issue an immediate, unified response from the General Staff/MoD. 1) Decisively deny the fall of Pokrovsk and Myrnohrad, showing specific footage of UAF defense in those sectors. 2) Condemn the RF manipulation of internal political processes (Bezuhla video) as proof of enemy desperation. NLT 041330Z.
2. Internal Security Stabilization: Launch a high-visibility, national campaign emphasizing the arrest of the Lviv attacker and expressing solidarity with the TCC community. Frame the incident as a tragic, isolated criminal act, not indicative of societal breakdown, directly countering the RF narrative.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)