INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - UAF GROUP OF FORCES SOUTH / DECISIVE ACTION
DTG: 041100Z DEC 25
OPERATIONAL FOCUS: The enemy sustains high-intensity kinetic pressure on the Zaporizhzhia front (Huliaipole) and has expanded its strategic goal to paralyze critical civilian infrastructure, evidenced by the severe strike against the Kherson Thermal Power Plant (TPP). UAF must maintain defensive integrity on the Southern Axis while managing the humanitarian fallout of infrastructure loss. The P-1 BDA requirement for Zeleny Gai remains critical and overdue.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)
1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
The situation remains critical on the Zaporizhzhia Axis. RF focus remains on achieving operational isolation of Huliaipole.
- Zaporizhzhia Front (CRITICAL): Clashes confirmed near Zatyshshya and Huliaipole. Sustained RF use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) reported against the Zaporizhzhia District, targeting rear area staging points. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Donetsk Axes (High Fixation): GSZSU reports confirm intense defensive battles near Chasiv Yar (Kramatorsk Direction) and extensive clashes across the Pokrovsk direction, specifically near Hryshyne and Myrnohrad. This confirms continued RF effort to fix UAF Eastern reserves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Kherson Sector (New Criticality): The complete destruction of the Kherson TPP by sustained RF strikes (drones, artillery) introduces a severe humanitarian and logistical crisis, affecting over 40,000 residents and demanding immediate rear-area resource allocation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Northern Axes (Stabilized Defense): UAF forces confirmed repelling 4 Russian assaults along the Kursk/North Slobozhansky axes, indicating successful fixation and denial of breakthrough. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations
The Geomagnetic Storm continues to impact reliable C2/GPS systems. This environmental volatility likely contributes to both RF continued reliance on KAB (less reliant on precision GPS near the target) and UAF difficulty in achieving immediate high-fidelity reconnaissance (P-1 BDA).
1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
UAF forces are engaged in active defense on all major contact lines. The General Staff confirms UAF units defending in depth across Kupyansk, Lyman, Sloviansk, and the critical southern axes. Resource commitment remains strained due to the unconfirmed status of Zeleny Gai (P-1 Gap).
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)
2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
RF Overall Intent: Achieve military objectives in Donbass/Novorossiya while simultaneously degrading Ukraine's economic and infrastructural resilience ahead of winter, leveraging the tactical situation on the Southern Front to force UAF operational overextension.
- Kinetic Intent (Infrastructure): Immediate intent is confirmed to destroy Ukrainian energy/heating capacity, as demonstrated by the strikes that neutralized the Kherson TPP, directly targeting civilian morale and governance capacity. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Tactical Intent (Zaporizhzhia): Continuation of the dual-axis squeeze on Huliaipole. RF forces utilize heavy KAB preparation (Zaporizhzhia District) before committing mechanized units (37th/38th GMRBs). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Fixation Intent (Pokrovsk): The high volume of clashes reported near Pokrovsk (Hryshyne, Myrnohrad) is intended to hold UAF reserves in place, preventing reinforcement of the critical Southern Axis. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations
RF continues to synchronize aerial attacks (KABs) with high-intensity drone/FPV strikes (confirmed by recent propaganda videos). The reported shift to prioritizing softer, critical infrastructure targets (TPP) reflects a renewed strategic emphasis on achieving non-kinetic paralysis.
2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status
RF sustainment remains robust despite UAF deep strikes against fuel depots (Tambov/Voronezh). The previously confirmed 260th GRAU Arsenal Score (26.12) indicates RF ammunition production and distribution is maintaining a critical pace, allowing for sustained high-volume artillery and KAB use. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 is demonstrating effective multi-domain synchronization, coordinating ground maneuver (Huliaipole), strategic kinetic strikes (Kherson TPP), and deep information warfare (Pokrovsk surrender claims). Strategic C2 is focused on hardening the domestic information front and neutralizing international financial threats (frozen assets). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)
3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
UAF readiness remains high, confirmed by GSZSU reports of repelling numerous assaults. However, the requirement to divert resources to manage infrastructure collapse (Kherson) competes directly with the immediate need for kinetic crisis response on the Huliaipole axis.
3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- Setback (Strategic): Operational halt of the Kherson TPP, affecting vital winter heating for 40,000 subscribers. This is a severe setback for civil-military coordination and resilience planning. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Setback (Tactical): The overall tactical situation on the Southern Front remains precarious due to the sustained Dual-Axis threat and the persistent P-1 Intelligence Gap (Zeleny Gai).
- Success (Tactical/Defense): Successfully repelling multiple RF ground assaults on the Northern Axes (Kursk/Sumy), confirming effective defensive planning and execution in those sectors.
3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints
CRITICAL REQUIREMENT (P-1 remains): Immediate, confirmed BDA regarding RF control and ORBAT at Zeleny Gai to enable J3 maneuver decisions regarding the final reserve commitment.
CRITICAL REQUIREMENT (NEW): Technical and logistical assessment of the Kherson TPP damage to prioritize material procurement and repair timelines (J4/CIMIC).
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)
4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
- Defeatism/Decapitation Narrative (RF IO): RF sources are actively pushing a high-level disinformation campaign claiming "Pokrovsk surrendered, Myrnohrad encircled," specifically calling for the removal of the UAF Commander-in-Chief. This is a targeted cognitive attack designed to generate internal political dissent and military distrust during a critical operational period. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- NK Children Allegation (High Sensitivity): The highly inflammatory allegation regarding the forced transfer of Ukrainian children to military camps in DPRK (North Korea) is now being amplified by prominent Ukrainian military reporters. This requires immediate, official, high-level verification and action. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - based on increased domestic amplification; still LOW for factual confirmation).
4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
Ukrainian public morale will be heavily impacted by the loss of heating infrastructure in Kherson in winter conditions. This must be immediately countered by high-visibility Government/Military support efforts. RF morale is bolstered by continued state media promotion of combat victories and high-profile diplomatic obstacles for Ukraine (frozen assets).
4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments
- Frozen Assets Impasse: TASS reports confirm significant legal and political obstacles within the EU regarding the seizure of frozen Russian assets, confirming the effectiveness of RF counter-IO aimed at slowing financial support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Transnistria Geopolitical Shift: Moldova, in coordination with the EU and US, is developing a plan for the reintegration of Transnistria. (D-S belief: 0.074428).
- Analytical Judgment: This development, while non-kinetic, is a long-term strategic positive for Ukraine by potentially stabilizing the Southwestern border and placing indirect political pressure on Moscow. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)
5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)
MLCOA: Sustained Infrastructure Degradation and Huliaipole Isolation (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Continued Infrastructure Attacks (NLT 050000Z): RF maintains kinetic pressure on non-military targets (e.g., civilian power generation, heating, transportation nodes) in preparation for deep strikes, aiming to maximize internal pressure on the UAF government.
- Synchronized Ground Push: RF 37th GMRB commits to a full-scale mechanized assault from the Stepnohorsk axis (Zeleny Gai area), leveraging the KAB-softened defenses, synchronized with the 38th GMRB's exploitation drive from Chervone.
- IO Escalation: Aggressive dissemination of the Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad "surrender" narrative to maximize disruption of UAF C2 and political processes during the Southern crisis.
5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)
MDCOA: C2/Logistics Paralysis via Deep Strike and Flanking Maneuver (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
- Deep Strike on Logistics Hub: RF exploits the current operational focus on Kherson/Zaporizhzhia by executing precision long-range strikes (e.g., Kinzhal, Iskander) against the Pavlohrad logistics hub or critical rail chokepoints in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, crippling the supply chain for the entire Southern Front.
- Northern Rupture Attempt: RF launches a calculated, high-risk ground offensive on the fixed Northern Axes (e.g., Vovchansk or Kupiansk) following a massive artillery preparation, designed to force the redeployment of UAF reserves currently holding the South.
5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL UPDATE)
| Event | Estimated Time (Z) | Criticality | Decision Point |
|---|
| P-1 BDA Confirmation (Zeleny Gai) | NLT 041300Z (Urgent Retask) | KINETIC CRITICAL (J2/J3) | If confirmed lost, J3 must immediately release the final operational reserve elements to establish Phase Line CHARLIE (Huliaipole North). |
| Huliaipole Withdrawal Decision | NLT 041600Z (Unchanged) | KINETIC CRITICAL (J3) | If RF achieves fire control linkage over Northern MSRs, J3 must initiate phased, controlled withdrawal. |
| Kherson TPP Damage Assessment | NLT 041800Z | LOGISTICS CRITICAL (J4/CIMIC) | J4 must confirm material requirement (e.g., boilers, transformers) and establish a clear timeline for temporary/emergency heat supply to civilians. |
6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS
6.1. Operational Maneuver and Fire Support (J3/J4)
- Huliaipole Defense (Phase Line BRAVO): The reserve element must be prepared for immediate maneuver toward Phase Line CHARLIE upon ANY confirmed RF unit presence within 2km of Zeleny Gai (P-1 BDA). Do not wait for complete conquest confirmation.
- Kherson TPP Crisis Response: J4/CIMIC must immediately implement emergency procedures (Protocol INFRA-RED) to establish mobile heating points and temporary power generation to mitigate the humanitarian impact of the TPP loss.
- Counter-Infra Targeting: Task long-range reconnaissance/strike assets to identify and target RF missile/UAV launch preparation sites and the supporting rail infrastructure feeding the relevant launch corridors used for the Kherson strike.
6.2. Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (J2)
- P-1 Zeleny Gai BDA (Priority 1 - REDUNDANT ASSETS): Re-task ground reconnaissance teams (if available) under cover of the Geomagnetic Storm volatility to penetrate the Zeleny Gai AO immediately. Supplement with additional drone runs utilizing low-altitude or terrain-following profiles to evade jamming. NLT 041300Z.
- P-9 NK Children Allegation (Priority 2 - NCA ACTION): Elevate this collection requirement to the National Command Authority (NCA). Initiate formalized diplomatic outreach via established channels (US, Turkey, UN) to use their diplomatic/intelligence networks to verify the DPRK connection. This is a matter of international law and extreme propaganda sensitivity.
- P-10 Pokrovsk ORBAT & Intent: Increase SIGINT analysis focusing on RF unit callsigns and command frequencies in the Pokrovsk-Hryshyne area to definitively confirm if the Center Grouping is postured for an exploitation (MDCOA) or is strictly performing fixation duties.
6.3. Information Operations (J7/STRATCOM)
- Counter-Defeatism Narrative: Immediately and forcefully counter the Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad surrender claims. Utilize GSZSU reports confirming active defensive battles and show specific UAF tactical unit successes in those sectors. Focus on maintaining confidence in military leadership.
- Kherson Resilience Narrative: Launch an immediate campaign highlighting the rapid humanitarian response to the TPP attack, emphasizing RF war crimes against civilian infrastructure, contrasting UAF support with RF kinetic terror.
7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence Assessment |
|---|
| P-1 (ZELENY GAI) | Confirmation of RF control, unit identification (37th GMRB), and extent of deployment in Zeleny Gai. | IMINT/SAR/GRD RECON: BDA NLT 041300Z; SIGINT: Direction finding/comms intercepts. | LOW |
| P-9 (NK CHILD CAMPS) | Verification of the transfer and treatment of Ukrainian children in DPRK military camps. | HUMINT/OSINT/DIPLOMATIC: Formal inter-governmental intelligence sharing request and focused OSINT on DPRK/RF media. | LOW |
| P-12 (Kherson TPP Damage) | Detailed BDA and technical assessment of the damage to critical systems (boilers, transformers) at Kherson TPP. | TECHNICAL RECON/CIMIC REPORTING: Site assessment NLT 041800Z to determine required material resources. | N/A (Technical) |
| P-10 (HRYSHYNE ORBAT) | Identification of specific RF units and their tactical objective near Hryshyne (Pokrovsk direction) to forecast the next move of the "Center" Grouping. | SIGINT/IMINT: ORBAT analysis and persistent surveillance of the Hryshyne combat zone. | MEDIUM |