Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - UAF GROUP OF FORCES SOUTH / DECISIVE ACTION

DTG: 041000Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL FOCUS: The enemy is executing a coordinated Dual-Axis Offensive on the Zaporizhzhia Front (Huliaipole/Stepnohorsk), aiming for operational rupture. Kinetic efforts are synchronized with deep strategic Information Warfare targeting C2 integrity and international resolve. Immediate BDA on the Stepnohorsk axis is required to prevent a flank collapse.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Southern Axis remains the decisive effort theater, specifically the approaches to Huliaipole.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Critical): UAF defenses are under sustained, high-tempo kinetic pressure. RF continues to utilize Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) against targets in the Zaporizhzhia District (Confirmed by ZAP OVA).
  • Analytical Judgment: This sustained KAB application indicates RF forces are attempting to degrade rear area staging points and local C2 while ground units (37th/38th GMRBs) maneuver for the link-up operation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk/Northern Axes (Fixation): Confirmed KAB launches against Kharkivshchyna. Active combat operations are reported near Hryshyne, northwest of Pokrovsk. These actions confirm the continued RF intent to fix UAF Northern reserves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Central Region (Recon/Threat): Hostile UAV activity confirmed over Eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. RF propaganda claims the "Center" Grouping is advancing and assaulting Myrnohrad. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for UAV activity; LOW for Myrnohrad claim, likely disinfo targeting strategic depth).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The persistent Geomagnetic Storm continues to complicate reliable GPS-guided munition delivery and may interfere with RF UAV/drone C2 links (e.g., Gerbera/Lancet). This variable creates tactical volatility for both sides.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are defensively committed to Phase Line BRAVO (Huliaipole NW) following the Chervone breakthrough (38th GMRB). The unconfirmed status of Zeleny Gai (37th GMRB axis) means UAF must maintain readiness for an immediate tactical withdrawal to avoid encirclement.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Overall Intent: Achieve the maximalist geopolitical goal of "liberation" (armed conquest) of Donbass and Novorossiya (including Kherson and Zaporizhzhia), as reiterated by Putin, while simultaneously pursuing operational rupture on the Southern Front.

• Ground Intent: Complete the synchronization and link-up of the 37th and 38th GMRBs to isolate Huliaipole NLT 050600Z.
• C2/Information Control Capability: Roskomnadzor (RKN) officially blocked FaceTime and is increasing controls over communication platforms (VPNs) citing counter-terrorism/fraud justifications.
  • Analytical Judgment: This aggressive RKN action is a clear strategic move to prevent internal dissent, consolidate information control within the RF mobilization base, and restrict high-speed, secure, encrypted communications used by operatives and dissidents. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF forces continue to rely heavily on KABs for softening defenses ahead of ground assaults, a standard, high-attrition preparatory fire tactic.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are resilient, but decentralized support remains critical. Multiple RF fundraising appeals (e.g., VDV quadcopters, "SVO" support) were observed, indicating that tactical resource gaps (drones) are still being addressed through popular initiatives rather than solely centralized state supply. (Confirmed by D-S belief: 0.527760).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF operational C2 remains effective, evidenced by the synchronized pressure on multiple axes (Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Pokrovsk). Strategic C2 is focused on hardening the domestic information space.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high, focusing on immediate crisis response on the Southern Axis. Morale campaigns continue to emphasize high kinetic success (e.g., Minister Fedorov reporting high Russian losses to the "Army of Drones").

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Southern Front): The tactical situation remains precarious following the Chervone breakthrough. Confirmation bias risk regarding the Zeleny Gai loss is high.
• Success (Tactical): Continued effective use of FPV/loitering munitions and Counter-UAS capabilities by specialized units (DPSU "Phoenix" claiming over 100 UAVs shot down).
• Constraint (Economic): Kyivstar announced price hikes due to operational costs, indicating the war's economic strain continues to impact critical civilian infrastructure.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Confirmation of RF Order of Battle (ORBAT) and position at Zeleny Gai to inform the decision to commit the final reserve elements before 041100Z. CONSTRAINT: Maintaining operational tempo while managing domestic economic and infrastructural stability (Kyivstar/power outages).

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Maximalism Confirmation: Putin’s statement that Russia will "in any case liberate Donbass and Novorossiya" (including Kherson and Zaporizhzhia) by military or other means, explicitly confirming the zero-sum nature of the conflict and rejecting any peace deal short of territorial surrender. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• EU Fracture Narrative: RF IO is actively promoting narratives surrounding the EU's difficulty in reaching consensus on seizing frozen RF assets, aiming to erode confidence in Western unity and financial support mechanisms.
• Cognitive Attack (High Sensitivity): Reportedly, Russian forces are sending Ukrainian children to military camps in North Korea (DPRK). This highly inflammatory allegation, if confirmed, is a severe violation of international law and a potent psychological weapon aimed at maximizing domestic fear and international condemnation. (CONFIDENCE: LOW, requires urgent investigation).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian morale is bolstered by reported battlefield successes (Fedorov's drone statistics) but is strained by economic instability (Kyivstar) and potential infrastructural vulnerability (KAB strikes on Zaporizhzhia). RF morale shows signs of sustained commitment, reinforced by state media control (FaceTime block).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Energy Moratorium Proposal: French President Macron proposed a winter moratorium on Russian strikes against Ukrainian energy infrastructure.
  • Analytical Judgment: While favorable to UAF infrastructure, the proposal is likely to be rejected by the RF given Putin's maximalist statements and the current RF kinetic strategy of infrastructure degradation. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Strategic Dialogue: Defense Minister Umerov's planned US negotiations remain critical for future resource allocation.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Exploitation and Operational Isolation of Huliaipole (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Immediate Exploitation (041000Z - 041600Z): The RF 37th GMRB, capitalizing on the claimed Zeleny Gai position (or establishing control shortly), initiates the rapid mechanized push Northeast. This drive is timed to exploit the UAF reserve commitment currently dedicated to blocking the 38th GMRB's advance from Chervone.
2. Fire Sack Formation (041600Z - 050600Z): RF forces establish coordinated indirect fire and air superiority over the main northern MSRs into Huliaipole, effectively isolating forward UAF defense units and forcing a decision for withdrawal under fire.
3. Sustained Fixation: RF continues KAB strikes on Kharkiv/Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia GLOCs to ensure UAF central command cannot rapidly shift required reserves South.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Southern C2 Decapitation and Central Penetration (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1. C2 Decapitation: RF utilizes the Geomagnetic Storm environment to execute a high-speed, low-observable precision strike (e.g., Kinzhal) against a pre-identified UAF Southern Front C2 node (e.g., 5th Assault Brigade HQ).
2. Strategic Shift: Following the expected operational success in Zaporizhzhia, RF shifts the "Center" Grouping's focus (currently focused near Pokrovsk/Hryshyne) into a deep penetration drive toward the Pavlohrad logistics hub, leveraging the chaos created by the Southern crisis and challenging UAF control over critical logistics infrastructure in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)

---

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Operational Maneuver and Fire Support (J3/J4)

1. Prioritize Interdiction Fire: Immediately task long-range and mobile fire groups to concentrate attrition fires on the anticipated link-up corridor between Chervone and Zeleny Gai. Focus specifically on identified RF armored and logistics columns NLT 041200Z.
2. Reserve Activation: Execute the deployment of the designated reserve (Protocol BRAVO-BLOCK) to Phase Line BRAVO to anchor the defense against the 38th GMRB exploitation, irrespective of Zeleny Gai status, but with a contingency plan for rapid redeployment to Phase Line CHARLIE if Zeleny Gai is confirmed lost.
3. Dnipropetrovsk AD Enhancement: Increase AD posture and EW density in the Eastern Dnipropetrovsk region to mitigate the threat of UAV reconnaissance and possible follow-on deep strikes against the Pavlohrad GLOC, countering the potential MDCOA.

6.2. Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (J2)

1. P-1 Zeleny Gai BDA (Priority 1 - CRITICAL REMAINS): Re-task all available IMINT/SAR assets to achieve clear BDA on Zeleny Gai NLT 041100Z. If satellite/air assets are hindered by weather/EW, task long-range terrestrial reconnaissance teams (if available).
2. P-9 NK Children Allegation (Priority 2 - URGENT NEW CR): Task HUMINT/OSINT to collaborate immediately with trusted international NGOs and governments (e.g., Turkey/US) to verify the extremely high-sensitivity claim regarding the transfer of Ukrainian children to North Korean military camps. This information is vital for future NCA international actions.
3. P-10 Pokrovsk/Hryshyne Assessment: Increase SIGINT/IMINT focus on the Hryshyne combat zone to assess the ORBAT and true objective of the RF forces operating near Pokrovsk, providing early warning against a potential shift toward the Dnipropetrovsk region (MDCOA).

6.3. Information Operations (J7/STRATCOM)

1. Maximize Maximalism Leverage: Immediately leverage Putin’s confirmation of "armed liberation" demands (including Kherson/Zaporizhzhia) in all diplomatic and public communication. Frame US/Western aid not as supporting negotiations, but as essential for preventing total conquest.
2. Counter-Hardening IO: Utilize the RKN block of FaceTime/VPNs to highlight RF information oppression and domestic insecurity, contrasting it with UAF promotion of digital transparency ("Budget" system).
3. Fundraising Amplification: Integrate the need for specific unit support (e.g., 95th ODShBr) into national messaging, linking public generosity directly to documented kinetic success (e.g., Fedorov's November drone results).

---

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)