Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - UAF GROUP OF FORCES SOUTH

DTG: 040930Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL FOCUS: The enemy is pursuing a synchronized Dual-Axis Offensive on the Zaporizhzhia Front (Huliaipole/Stepnohorsk), coupled with persistent deep strikes against UAF rear area infrastructure and an aggressive information campaign aimed at undermining international support and domestic morale.

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The critical center of gravity remains the Zaporizhzhia Axis.

• Stepnohorsk/Zeleny Gai Sector: RF military media claims the "liberation of Zeleny Gai." This location was previously identified as the staging ground for the RF 37th GMRB's Main Effort Land Drive (MLD).
  • Analytical Judgment: If confirmed, the loss of Zeleny Gai significantly compromises the UAF defense of Stepnohorsk and creates an immediate secondary flanking threat to Huliaipole, complementing the existing pressure from the 38th GMRB at Chervone. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Based on high-value RF operational claim matching previous MLCOA).
• Huliaipole Sector: RF sources confirm the ongoing high-intensity "Battle for Huliaipole," sustaining the high-attrition engagement tempo (20-40 assaults per day) noted in the previous report. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Northern Fixation (Kharkiv/Donetsk): Confirmed continued RF use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) against Kharkivshchyna and Donetsk sectors, ensuring UAF Northern reserves remain fixed.
• Sumy/Chernihiv Sector: RF claims destruction of a special company group of the 225th Separate Assault Regiment near Alekseevka, Sumy Oblast. Hostile UAV activity confirmed near Sedniv, Chernihiv region. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH for UAV activity; MEDIUM for RF kinetic claim).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The Geomagnetic Storm remains active, degrading GPS-dependent precision munitions (UAF counter-fire and RF deep strike BDA) and complicating reliable VHF/UHF C2 for both sides.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are defensively committed across the Southern Axis. The dual-axis threat (Chervone/Zeleny Gai) demands the immediate activation of contingency maneuver elements to prevent operational rupture. The widespread power outages (110k+ consumers) necessitate prioritizing C2 link redundancy and stabilization of Odesa/Donetsk logistics hubs.

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Overall Intent: Achieve operational rupture on the Zaporizhzhia Axis via simultaneous pressure on the Chervone and Stepnohorsk axes, creating a strategic salient that collapses UAF defenses in the South. This kinetic effort is backed by the intent to enforce maximalist territorial demands ("armed liberation" or withdrawal) as stated by Putin.

• Ground Capability: Confirmed high operational tempo and local synchronization between the 38th GMRB and the 37th GMRB (Stepnohorsk axis). The deployment of new RF educational standards (10-11 grade military training) and the continued high GRAU score (26.12, previous report) suggest preparation for sustained long-term conflict and mobilization. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Information Warfare Capability: RF regulatory bodies (Roskomnadzor) are actively increasing control over communication platforms (VPN, FaceTime), prioritizing information security within Russia over international access.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift from staging to execution (confirmed or claimed) of the Stepnohorsk MLD validates the predicted RF strategy of achieving operational rupture by splitting UAF reserves between the Chervone flanking threat and the MLD. This is a critical transition from attrition warfare to maneuver warfare, locally.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF tactical logistics support the current high-tempo assaults. Strategic logistics are being defended by proactive diplomatic engagement (India) and compensated by domestic media control/economic narratives. The previous UAF deep strikes on Tambov/Voronezh (fuel) are not yet impacting frontline kinetic capacity, but the vulnerability remains high.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF operational C2 is effective, demonstrated by the synchronized ground and deep strike efforts. The alleged capture of "Krasnoarmiisk" (Pokrovsk) is highly unlikely to be factual but serves as an effective information marker of RF maximalist territorial ambition. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH on C2 effectiveness; LOW on Krasnoarmiisk claim).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high, but the commitment depth is being severely tested by the dual-axis attack geometry. The celebration of Missile Forces and Artillery Day serves to reinforce internal morale and professional identity amidst high kinetic strain.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Critical, Pending Confirmation): The claimed loss of Zeleny Gai (Stepnohorsk axis) represents the realization of the predicted MLCOA and an immediate deterioration of the Southern Front defensive depth.
• Success: Continued lethality of UAF FPV drone teams against RF personnel, serving as the primary kinetic counter-attrition mechanism.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The allocation of reserves to address the Stepnohorsk breach while maintaining holding power at Phase Line BRAVO (Huliaipole).

Immediate Requirement: Precision BDA tools (IMINT/SAR) to confirm the status of Zeleny Gai and the alleged destruction of the 225th Assault Regiment element.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Maximalism: Putin’s statement to India Today (ASTRA message) clarifies the ultimate RF war aim: total Ukrainian withdrawal from occupied territories or "armed liberation." This confirms RF will not accept a negotiated settlement based on the 1991 borders. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• IO Target: Humanitarian Programs: A concentrated RF campaign is attacking the credibility of Ukrainian humanitarian efforts, specifically the evacuation of children to Turkey, using highly inflammatory and unverified allegations of sexual misconduct to undermine trust in the First Lady's foundation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• IO Target: International Peace Efforts: The US peace plan is being framed by TASS as a complex "four-package" deal, suggesting complexity and difficulty in achieving consensus, potentially lowering expectations for UAF success at the diplomatic level.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is affected by the severe power outages (Odesa/Donetsk) and the constant pressure of KAB strikes. UAF StratCom must link the professional celebrations (Artillery Day) and the upcoming high-level negotiations (Umerov in US) to projected strength and lethality.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• High-Level Engagement: Ukrainian Defense Minister Umerov's planned negotiations in Miami with US officials (Whitkoff/Kushner) confirm ongoing strategic dialogue, likely focused on Q1/Q2 2026 resource allocation and operational strategy. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Mediation Dynamics: Macron’s proposal for an energy strike moratorium is a positive development for UAF infrastructure, but Putin's stated maximalist intent suggests that any peace deal short of territorial concession is non-starter for the RF.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Operational Collapse of the Southern Salient (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Exploitation: RF 37th GMRB (Stepnohorsk axis) will exploit the claimed capture of Zeleny Gai to drive Northeast, attempting to link up with forces pressuring Huliaipole from the South/Southeast (Chervone, 38th GMRB).
2. Encirclement Attempt: NLT 050600Z, RF will attempt to establish fire control over the main supply routes (MSRs) leading into Huliaipole, transforming the forward defenses into an isolated salient and forcing a rapid, costly UAF withdrawal.
3. Sustained Deep Strike: RF will launch follow-on saturation deep strikes targeting the energy infrastructure supporting the Kharkiv/Kupiansk GLOCs to further degrade Northern C2 and limit the ability to redeploy reserves south.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Decisive Operational Breakthrough (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

1. C2 Paralysis / Exploitation: A critical UAF Frontline HQ or AD command center, previously damaged or relocated due to the 2x Iskander strikes (previous report), suffers a secondary strike (Missile/KAB).
2. Rapid Penetration: The resulting C2 gap allows the synchronized 37th and 38th GMRBs to achieve an immediate, deep tactical penetration (10-15 km) toward strategic logistics depots or river crossings NLT 042000Z, initiating a full operational crisis on the Southern Front.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)

---

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Operational Maneuver and Fire Support (J3/J4)

1. Immediate Threat Mitigation (Stepnohorsk): J3 must treat the Zeleny Gai claim as confirmed hostile control until proven otherwise. Immediate deployment of mobile fire groups and long-range fires to interdict the advance corridor between Zeleny Gai and Huliaipole to disrupt the RF link-up operation.
2. Maneuver Defense: Implement troop rotation and heavy FPV support on the Huliaipole defense perimeter to sustain the high attrition rate while simultaneously fortifying Phase Line CHARLIE to act as a potential final stabilization line.
3. Counter-Reconnaissance: Increase EW/AD vigilance in the Chernihiv region (Sedniv area) to counter hostile UAV reconnaissance aimed at identifying C2 nodes or deep rear logistics.

6.2. Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (J2)

1. P-1 Zeleny Gai BDA (Priority 1): Immediately task all available IMINT/SAR assets to confirm the extent of RF control and unit identification in Zeleny Gai NLT 041100Z. (CRITICAL REMAINS)
2. P-7 Diplomatic Interrogation: Direct OSINT/HUMINT focus on the specific content and framing of the US "four-package" peace proposal. Determine which package contains the most favorable/unfavorable territorial proposals for Ukraine.
3. P-8 Northern Vulnerability: Prioritize reconnaissance (UAV/SIGINT) to confirm the status and material losses of the 225th Assault Regiment element near Alekseevka (Sumy Oblast) to prevent undetected RF infiltration in that sector.

6.3. Information Operations (J7/STRATCOM)

1. Counter-Maximalist Narrative: Utilize Putin’s "armed liberation" statement to mobilize international support, framing the war not as a negotiation but as a fight against existential RF aggression and maximalist demands.
2. Proactive Diplomatic IO: Publicly frame Umerov’s talks in the US as critical planning for future strategic defense and resource acquisition, focusing on lethal aid, not simply negotiation. Avoid signaling weakness or desperation regarding the alleged UAF budget deficit (previous report).
3. Targeted Counter-Disinformation: Prepare rapid, official rebuttals to the inflammatory RF narratives regarding the Turkish child evacuation program, utilizing third-party verification (e.g., Turkish officials or international NGOs) to establish credibility and minimize domestic panic.

---

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)