Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - UAF GROUP OF FORCES SOUTH

DTG: 040830Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL FOCUS: UAF forces are currently engaged in a critical high-attrition defense on the Zaporizhzhia Axis, synchronized with a multi-Oblast energy infrastructure degradation campaign executed by the Russian Federation (RF).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture confirms the convergence of kinetic and deep strike pressure, validating the RF dual-axis strategy.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole): The threat has materialized into relentless, high-tempo combat. Reports indicate UAF forces are defending against 20 to 40 RF assaults per day near Huliaipole (CONFIDENCE: HIGH). This pressure directly stems from the 38th GMRB exploitation of the Chervone breakthrough toward Phase Line BRAVO, seeking operational exhaustion of UAF defenders.
• Deep Rear Interdiction (Energy Sector): Confirmed successful kinetic effects from the overnight saturation strike. Critical power outages impact:
  • Donetsk Oblast: Over 60,000 consumers blacked out.
  • Odesa Oblast: Over 51,000 consumers blacked out (result of the confirmed Iskander/UAV strike on DTEK infrastructure).
  • Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: 1,600 consumers blacked out.
  • Total consumers affected exceed 110,000. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH, Confirmed by MinEnergy)
• Northern Axis (Kharkiv Fixation): RF is sustaining fixation efforts. Confirmed use of TOS-1A thermobaric systems (via Colonelcassad video) and repeated KAB launches near Vovchansk/Kharkivshchyna. This locks down UAF Northern reserves. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The Geomagnetic Storm remains a persistent factor. This continues to degrade GPS accuracy and reliable high-frequency C2 links, favoring localized RF heavy fire (TOS-1, KAB) over precision UAF counter-fire requiring stable satellite connectivity.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces on the Southern Axis are defensively committed and demonstrating high resolve, evidenced by the defense holding against 20-40 daily assaults. The widespread, simultaneous power outages necessitate immediate resource allocation for energy stabilization (J4 focus) to maintain C2 and logistics throughput, particularly in the Odesa corridor.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Overall Intent: Achieve operational rupture on the Zaporizhzhia Axis by forcing UAF attritional exhaustion, synchronized with the rapid degradation of UAF national energy resilience via targeted deep strike.

• RF Ground Capability: The 38th GMRB is demonstrating high-tempo, persistent attack capability (20-40 assaults/day). This indicates strong local tactical C2 and adequate immediate logistical resupply near Chervone. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Strategic Intent (Logistics): The visit of RF Defence Minister Belousov to India confirms an active diplomatic effort to secure continued military-technical cooperation and supply lines, counteracting Western sanctions pressure and preparing for sustained high-intensity conflict. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

1. High Attrition Doctrine: The high volume of assaults (20-40) near Huliaipole confirms that RF is now applying overwhelming, continuous local pressure, seeking to achieve breakthrough through shear operational exhaustion rather than reliance on a single, massive mechanized spearhead.
2. Targeted Thermobaric Use: Confirmation of TOS-1 use near Vovchansk indicates RF is prioritizing high lethality, psychological weapons to fix UAF forces in the North.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF tactical logistics are robust enough to sustain the current 20-40 daily assault tempo near Huliaipole. Strategic fuel reserves are still leveraged despite previous UAF deep strikes on Tambov/Voronezh. The primary vulnerability remains RF reliance on continuous rail throughput.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the seamless synchronization of high-tempo ground operations with geographically dispersed deep strikes and the coordination of high-value diplomatic maneuvers (India visit). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high, defined by aggressive, distributed defense. The commitment of forces like the Khartia Corps (NGU) to FPV drone operations confirms effective decentralized combat capability but highlights the heavy strain on local tactical reserves.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: UAF defensive lines, supported by lethal FPV drone units, are holding against extreme assault rates, preventing the 38th GMRB from achieving an immediate deep penetration beyond Phase Line BRAVO.
• Setback: The confirmed loss of power to over 110,000 consumers across key Oblasts is a severe strategic setback, jeopardizing winterization efforts and logistical C2 continuity.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: AD/EW assets remain overstretched, unable to simultaneously defend critical infrastructure against Iskander/UAV saturation strikes and support the frontline against KAB/MLRS/TOS fire.

Immediate Requirement: Resources must be prioritized for rapid energy restoration (mobile generation units) in Odesa and Donetsk to stabilize critical logistics and civilian morale.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Diplomatic IO: RF media is amplifying comments from Belgian politicians suggesting the return of frozen Russian assets, attempting to fracture European unity and signal Western legal fatigue. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• RF Internal IO: RF media is pushing narratives of rapid, sudden socio-economic stability (e.g., fast loan pay-offs) to project domestic resilience and distract from the human and economic costs of the war.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is stressed by widespread power outages across Odesa and Donetsk. UAF StratCom must rapidly counter the negative effects of the outages with positive combat footage (e.g., Khartia Corps FPV successes) to maintain internal morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Critical Mediation Attempt: French President Macron proposed a moratorium on RF strikes targeting Ukrainian energy infrastructure to Chinese President Xi Jinping. Xi responded by endorsing a peace deal "acceptable to all parties."
• Analytical Judgment: Macron’s proposal is favorable for UAF immediate kinetic protection but Xi’s vague "acceptable to all" statement is highly concerning, likely accommodating RF maximalist territorial objectives (Novorossiya). (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
• Strategic Alignment: Belousov's visit to India solidifies RF efforts to bypass Western sanctions and secure long-term military/economic partners.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Attritional Breakthrough via Huliaipole and Energy Paralysis (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Huliaipole Attrition: RF 38th GMRB will sustain the current rate of 20-40 assaults per day for the next 48 hours (NLT 0600Z DEC 06). The intent is to achieve critical operational fatigue and force an unscheduled UAF tactical withdrawal or costly commitment of strategic reserve elements.
2. Sustained Deep Strike (Phase II): Following BDA on current outages, RF will launch a follow-on saturation deep strike (Missile/UAV) targeting the logistics chain that supplies Odesa (rail/port) and the remaining power generation/transmission hubs in the Mykolaiv/Dnipro corridor NLT 041800Z.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Strategic Decapitation via Ballistic Strike (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. C2 Paralysis: BDA confirms that the 2x unintercepted Iskander-M hits targeted a critical UAF Frontline HQ or major EW/AD system complex supporting the Southern Axis.
2. Exploitation: The resulting operational blindness prevents timely allocation of tactical reserves to the Huliaipole sector. The 38th GMRB, utilizing the persistent high-tempo pressure, executes a rapid, deep penetration (8-10 km) towards Huliaipole NLT 041500Z, isolating and destroying UAF forward defensive belts, creating an operational crisis on the Southern Front.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Operational Maneuver and Fire Support (J3/J4)

1. Immediate Counter-Attrition (Huliaipole): J3 must manage troop rotation and fire support to maintain holding power against the 20-40 daily assaults. Prioritize long-range fires and high-volume FPV drone support (Khartia Corps template) against RF dismounted assault elements and their immediate fire support positions (e.g., TOS/MLRS launchers).
2. Energy Stabilization: J4 must immediately prioritize the deployment of mobile power generation assets to sustain military C2 nodes and critical logistics depots in Odesa and Donetsk Oblasts, minimizing reliance on the compromised fixed grid.
3. Counter-Fixation Fire: Allocate maximum available CBR assets to locate and neutralize the confirmed TOS-1A system operating near Vovchansk to relieve pressure on the Northern Axis and potentially free up limited reserves.

6.2. Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (J2)

1. P-1 BDA (Ballistic Strike): Immediately prioritize IMINT/SAR collection over areas proximate to the Iskander-M flight path endpoints to identify the type and extent of damage (C2, logistics, or AD system) NLT 040900Z. (CRITICAL REMAINS)
2. P-4 RF Ground Sustainability: Direct SIGINT/IMINT efforts to monitor logistics flow (fuel, ammunition) near Chervone to assess the sustainability of the 38th GMRB's current 20-40 assault per day tempo.
3. P-5 Chinese Intent: Direct HUMINT/OSINT efforts to clarify the strategic meaning of Xi Jinping’s "acceptable to all parties" peace statement. Determine if Beijing is signaling acceptance of RF territorial gains or simply diplomatic neutrality.

6.3. Information Operations (J7/STRATCOM)

1. Counter-Infrastructure IO: Launch a StratCom campaign immediately detailing the extent of the power outages caused by the RF strikes, framing the attacks as war crimes against winterization efforts. Use the high civilian impact (110,000 consumers) to generate maximum international diplomatic pressure.
2. Exploit Defensive Success: Maximize the visibility of drone combat footage (e.g., Khartia Corps) to project UAF lethal capability and reinforce the message that despite RF saturation fire, UAF tactical units are holding the line.
3. Counter-Fatigue Narrative: Directly address the Belgian asset seizure narrative, emphasizing that international law requires Russia to pay for the damage caused and that asset retention is a necessary component of economic warfare.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)