Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - UAF GROUP OF FORCES SOUTH

DTG: 040730Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL FOCUS: Immediate response to confirmed, executing RF multi-domain offensive characterized by saturation deep strike (Missile/UAV) synchronized with a localized ground penetration attempt on the Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The enemy is sustaining the multi-domain pressure campaign identified in previous reports, successfully translating the deep strike effort into confirmed damage on critical infrastructure while maintaining kinetic pressure on the Southern Axis.

• Deep Rear Interdiction (Critical Infrastructure): A large-scale overnight aerial attack involving 2x Iskander-M SRBMs and 138x UAVs (approx. 85x Shaheds) was confirmed. Crucially, an energy infrastructure object belonging to DTEK in the Odesa region was successfully struck and suffered significant damage. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Kinetic Continuation): RF offensive preparations continue. The 35th Army (Vostok Group of Forces) is utilizing Grad MLRS to soften UAF temporary deployment areas (TDPs) near Huliaipole. Ground engagements are also confirmed near Prymorske. The threat remains the consolidation and exploitation of the Chervone breakthrough toward Huliaipole (Phase Line BRAVO). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Donetsk Axis (Fixation Effort): RF ground forces maintain high-tempo fixation via drone-supported strikes targeting UAF 32nd Mechanized Brigade elements near Pokrovsk. This successfully ties down UAF resources. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The Geomagnetic Storm persists.

• Impact: A confirmed M-class solar flare occurred 04 Dec, indicating continued instability and degradation of high-frequency communications, GPS/GNSS integrity, and precise satellite guidance systems. This environmental factor continues to complicate UAF precision targeting and deep strike coordination while favoring RF reliance on heavy, often less precise, fire (KABs/MLRS). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are engaged in the most complex, distributed defense posture since the initiation of the previous campaign. AD/EW assets were heavily utilized in the overnight engagement. The successful strike on Odesa energy infrastructure, in addition to the previous threats to Pavlohrad (pending BDA), validates the RF doctrine of prioritizing AD saturation over centralized tactical reserve protection. UAF AD is overstretched.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Overall Intent: Achieve operational rupture on the Zaporizhzhia Axis while simultaneously creating strategic economic and societal instability through coordinated, high-volume deep strikes against energy and logistics infrastructure across multiple Oblasts.

• Deep Strike Capability: The synchronization of 2x Iskander-M with 138x UAVs demonstrates Russia's continued ability to project high-saturation air attacks, despite UAF AD density. The Iskander launch is a critical indicator of RF willingness to expend high-value assets to achieve precision strikes. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Strategic Political Intent: President Putin reiterated his non-negotiable, maximalist territorial objectives: "Russia in any case will liberate Donbas and Novorossiya—military or other means." This signals the conflict's strategic endgame remains tied to territorial gain, irrespective of diplomatic efforts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

1. Iskander Use: The deployment of 2x Iskander-M confirms that RF targeting priorities included high-value, fixed targets that required ballistic speed (e.g., C2 nodes or key logistical chokepoints, pending BDA). This represents a commitment to hitting targets considered too critical for slow-moving UAVs.
2. KAB Focus: Confirmed continued use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) against Huliaipole, suggesting aerial softening remains the primary precursor for the 38th GMRB's decisive push.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF tactical logistics are focused on sustaining the push on the Zaporizhzhia front, evidenced by the 35th Army's heavy fire support use. Strategic logistics for fuel remain challenged due to previous UAF deep strikes (Tambov/Voronezh), necessitating high operational tempo before that shortage impacts the frontline.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective, demonstrated by the seamless synchronization of ground maneuver elements (MLRS support near Huliaipole) with a successful, geographically dispersed saturation deep strike (Odesa, plus UAVs directed elsewhere). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensively engaged on the contact line. Readiness is high, but strategic reserves (AD/EW assets) are currently degraded by mandated dispersion.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: UAF reports a high UAV neutralization rate (114/138 suppressed or destroyed), limiting the overall damage from the saturation strike.
• Setback: The confirmed successful impact of the 2x Iskander-M missiles and the significant damage to the Odesa DTEK energy node are critical setbacks, confirming an ongoing vulnerability to precision ballistic attack.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint remains the AD/EW gap against high-speed ballistic threats (Iskander) and the necessity to protect critical infrastructure (Pavlohrad GLOC, now Odesa energy). Immediate prioritization for kinetic AD (e.g., PATRIOT, SAMP/T) must focus on protecting the operational C2 nodes supporting the Southern Axis defenses and critical energy generation/transmission hubs.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Diplomatic IO (High Impact): RF channels are aggressively amplifying Putin’s meeting with US proxies (Witkoff/Kushner), claiming discussion of a "27-point peace plan" and projecting legitimacy as a key negotiator. This is designed to sow doubt in Kyiv and amongst NATO allies regarding the durability of future US support.
• Western Alliance Cracks: Statements from the Belgian PM (suggesting frozen assets might be returned) and the Finnish President (stating "just peace is unlikely") are immediately exploited by RF sources to project Western fatigue and indecision.
• Deportation Narrative (UAF IO Opportunity): The unconfirmed but highly alarming report of deporting Ukrainian children to DPRK military camps provides UAF with a critical human rights IO vector to pressure international bodies and reinforce the image of RF state criminality.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF, DShV, General Staff) launched a robust, synchronized IO campaign commemorating the Day of Rocket Forces and Artillery. This internal messaging successfully reinforces the professionalism and lethal capability of a key strategic force component, counteracting the stress of the deep strikes.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Asset Warfare: Dmitry Medvedev threatened "reparations in kind" (seizure of Western assets in Russia) if the EU proceeds with the confiscation of Russian frozen assets. This escalates the economic-diplomatic conflict and raises the stakes for European political decision-making. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Geopolitical Signal: Putin flatly rejected returning to the G8 format, signaling a complete shift in RF strategic alignment away from Western-dominated international structures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Localized Penetration and Logistical Attrition (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Huliaipole Assault: Following sustained KAB/MLRS softening (confirmed 35th Army involvement), the 38th GMRB will intensify its push from Chervone NLT 041200Z, forcing UAF reserves to commit immediately to Phase Line BRAVO under adverse weather conditions.
2. Sustained Deep Strike: RF will prioritize BDA on the Odesa strike and, if successful in causing sustained blackouts or GLOC interruption, will immediately launch follow-on strikes on regional logistical/energy hubs (e.g., Mykolaiv, Dnipro) to prevent rapid UAF recovery and further disperse AD assets.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Ballistic C2 Decapitation (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The 2x unintercepted Iskander-M hits, currently unassessed, successfully targeted a critical UAF Operational C2 node (e.g., Frontline HQ or major EW/AD system complex) on the Southern Axis. The subsequent collapse of C2 resilience leads to disorganized command of the reserves, allowing the 38th GMRB to achieve a deep tactical breakthrough (4-8 km penetration) beyond Phase Line BRAVO NLT 041800Z, creating conditions for the rapid operational isolation of UAF frontline elements.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Operational Maneuver and Fire Support (J3/J4)

1. PRIORITY ONE: Iskander BDA and C2 Hardening: If BDA confirms C2/EW/AD nodes were targeted by the Iskanders, immediately implement the Contingency Command Relay Protocol (CCRP). Relocate all vulnerable high-value assets and disperse staff elements.
2. Counter-KAB/MLRS Operations (Zaporizhzhia): Prioritize immediate SEAD/EW suppression of RF MLRS units (35th Army confirmed) and launch decoy operations near Huliaipole to draw KAB strikes away from UAF strongpoints and tactical reserves.
3. Logistical Hardening (Odesa/Pavlohrad): Re-route non-critical rail and road logistics around the damaged Odesa hub. Immediately reinforce the AD/EW umbrella protecting the Pavlohrad GLOC, which remains susceptible to follow-on attacks.

6.2. Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (J2)

1. P-1 BDA (Ballistic Strike): Immediately prioritize IMINT/SAR collection over areas proximate to the Iskander-M flight path endpoints to identify the type and extent of damage (C2, logistics, or AD system) NLT 040900Z.
2. P-2 RF Intent (Diplomatic IO): Direct HUMINT/OSINT efforts to gauge the genuine scope (if any) of the "27-point peace plan" discussed with US proxies to determine if it contains viable negotiation vectors or is purely an IO measure.
3. P-3 DPRK Deportation Verification: Initiate collection on the alleged transfer of Ukrainian children to DPRK military camps. If verifiable, prepare this information for immediate international legal action.

6.3. Information Operations (J7/STRATCOM)

1. Counter-Diplomatic IO: Launch a StratCom campaign that explicitly frames the RF "27-point peace plan" as a negotiation tactic designed to distract from the ongoing ground offensive and civilian targeting (Odesa strike). Emphasize that peace is impossible while Putin demands non-negotiable territorial maximalism (Donbas/Novorossiya).
2. Exploit RF Vulnerabilities: Maximize the exposure of the unconfirmed DPRK deportation report to international media, linking RF actions directly to North Korean human rights violations to increase pressure on international partners.
3. Halt Alliance Cracks: Issue statements reinforcing the strategic commitment of key European allies (specifically Belgium and Finland) and directly counter the narratives of Western fatigue.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)