Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

DTG: 040704Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL FOCUS: Immediate response to confirmed, executing RF ground offensive on the Zaporizhzhia Axis (Huliaipole) synchronized with the RF strategy of distributed deep rear C-UAS/logistical targeting. REFERENCE: Previous SITREP 040645Z DEC 25; DAILY INTEL SUM 031500Z DEC 25

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The situation on the Southern Axis is deteriorating from a preparatory phase into a full-scale kinetic engagement.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Kinetic Initiation): RF sources confirm the "Battle for Huliaipole" (0700Z) is underway, confirming the Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA) is executing. Kinetic pressure is also confirmed near Prymorske (0634Z). The focus remains Phase Line BRAVO, threatened by the 38th GMRB.
• Donetsk (Fixation Effort): Combat intensity remains HIGH on the Pokrovsk Direction (Krasnoarmiysk), with UAF General Staff reporting 45/170 engagements. This effort successfully fixes UAF reserves needed on the Southern front.
• Deep Rear Interdiction (Critical Vulnerability Expansion): The original UAV threat to the Pavlohrad logistical hub is now compounded by a new hostile UAV detected approaching Sumy from the Southeast (0657Z). This validates the RF strategy of forcing UAF AD/EW dispersion.
• Kharkiv: Confirmed sustained RF strikes across the Oblast over the past 24 hours (0639Z).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The Geomagnetic Storm persists.

• Impact: Continued degradation of GPS and C2 links favors the RF ground assault (38th GMRB) which relies heavily on mass and aerial softening (KABs), while complicating UAF precision targeting and coordination of dispersed C-UAS responses. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are now engaged in simultaneous battles on multiple axes while attempting to contain deep strikes. The requirement to defend Pavlohrad, while managing the new Sumy threat, critically compromises the AD umbrella necessary to protect reserves moving toward Huliaipole.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Overall Intent: Achieve operational rupture at Huliaipole while functionally paralyzing UAF logistics and C2 resilience through multi-domain, distributed attacks.

• Ground (38th GMRB): Intent is immediate penetration and capture of Huliaipole. Kinetic activity is confirmed as initiated. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Deep Strategy: Intent is to overwhelm UAF AD/EW by generating multiple simultaneous, dispersed UAV threats (Pavlohrad, Sumy, Chernihiv).
• Strategic Political Intent: RF President Putin has unequivocally declared the intent to "liberate Donbas and Novorossiya" through "military or other means" (0651Z), signaling a non-negotiable, maximalist territorial objective that undercuts any immediate diplomatic de-escalation effort. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

1. UAV Operator Mobilization: The "Somali" Battalion is actively recruiting UAV operators (0637Z). This confirms that RF/proxy forces recognize UAV superiority as the primary asymmetric tactical advantage and are actively scaling up FPV/reconnaissance capability to sustain high kinetic tempo.
2. Fiber-Optic Deployment: Mentions of "Fiber-optic revolution" (0641Z) suggest continued RF investment in hardened, non-air-gapped communications infrastructure to mitigate the C2 effects of UAF deep strikes and the ongoing geomagnetic storm. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF tactical logistics remain functional but rely increasingly on decentralized, crowd-funded support, particularly for the high-intensity Zaporizhzhia front (0659Z). This model sustains the immediate tactical offensive but indicates centralized supply chains are under stress (due to previous UAF deep strikes on Tambov/Voronezh).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, demonstrated by the synchronization of the Huliaipole kinetic push with multiple, deliberate deep UAV vectors (Pavlohrad/Sumy). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high on the contact line (Pokrovsk engagements, Hryshyne close combat successes). However, the posture is highly vulnerable due to resource overstretch. The requirement to defend the deep rear (Pavlohrad/Sumy) is cannibalizing high-end AD assets needed at the front.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Successful close-quarters defensive engagement by a UAF paratrooper near Hryshyne, Donetsk (0648Z), demonstrating resilient unit-level fighting capability.
• Setbacks: AD/EW system dispersion is now mandatory due to four geographically distinct, concurrent UAV threats (Pavlohrad, Chernihiv, S Kharkiv, Sumy). The critical threat to Pavlohrad remains unresolved.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the geographical dispersion of AD/EW resources relative to the RF distributed UAV threat doctrine. URGENT requirement to allocate low-cost, high-mobility C-UAS systems to the Sumy and Chernihiv axes immediately to free up SHORAD for Pavlohrad and the Huliaipole reserves.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Diplomatic Amplification: TASS is exploiting President Putin's meeting with Trump associates (Witkoff, Kushner), using it to project political leverage and create a narrative that Russia is a capable negotiator engaging in "complex work" on peace plans (0646Z, 0647Z, 0700Z).
• Territorial Maximalism: Putin’s declaration of mandatory "liberation" of Donbas and Novorossiya (0651Z) is designed to signal non-compliance with any peace plan that demands territorial concession and to solidify domestic support for the war aim.
• Internal Control (ESCALATION): Roskomnadzor is intensifying the block of VPN protocols and advancing electronic passports (0639Z, 0653Z). This is a strong indicator of the Kremlin's intent to tightly control the internal information space and enforce citizen digital identity, potentially in preparation for future mobilization or heightened internal security measures. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian authorities (KMVA, General Staff) are effectively utilizing synchronized commemorative events (Minute of Silence, Artillery Day) to maintain high morale and professionalism amidst the severe kinetic threat. However, the external perception of US political support is fragile, amplified by Trump's public statements claiming Ukraine rejected peace and facing "very much" against it now (0650Z).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The high-profile RF amplification of the meetings with Trump proxies (Witkoff/Kushner) represents a successful RF Information Operation (IO) designed to undermine confidence in UAF planning stability and long-term US support guarantees ahead of a potential US administration change. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Exploitation and Logistical Paralysis (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Huliaipole Breach: The RF 38th GMRB will breach Phase Line BRAVO NLT 040900Z, forcing the committed UAF reserve to fight a defensive delaying action at a disadvantage.
2. Pavlohrad Strike Success: Given the persistent threat and high AD saturation requirements, the hostile UAV successfully strikes a critical logistics node or rail staging area in Pavlohrad NLT 040800Z, achieving operational paralysis of sustainment for the Southern Grouping.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 Decapitation and Cordon Completion (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The distributed reconnaissance effort identifies critical regional C2 nodes (e.g., brigade HQ or regional EW asset) in both the Pavlohrad sector and the newly targeted Sumy region. Synchronized deep precision strikes (Iskander/Kinzhal or modified UAVs) decapitate coordination, preventing effective commitment of the UAF strategic reserve to contain the Huliaipole breach, leading to an operational collapse on the Zaporizhzhia Axis.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (CRITICAL)

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6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Operational Maneuver and Fire Support (J3/J4)

1. PRIORITY ONE: AD/EW Asset Prioritization (Pavlohrad): Re-task all available SHORAD assets to the Pavlohrad GLOC defense. The logistical hub's protection takes precedence over non-critical sectors.
2. SUMY/CHERNIHIV C-UAS: Immediately deploy low-cost, high-mobility Mobile Fire Groups (MOGs) utilizing crew-served weapons and short-range jammers to the Sumy and Chernihiv threat axes to provide deterrent/harassment coverage, preventing further resource diversion from the Southern front.
3. HULIAIPOLE COUNTER-MOBILITY: J3 must verify that the reserve is executing Protocol "BRAVO-BLOCK" and that pre-placed minefields and anti-armor defenses on Phase Line BRAVO are activated to maximize friction on the 38th GMRB advance.

6.2. Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (J2)

1. P-1 LOGISTICS BDA: Confirm the success/failure of the intercepts against the Pavlohrad and Sumy UAVs. If successful, assess remaining RF deep strike capability in the sector. If unsuccessful, immediate BDA on logistics infrastructure required.
2. ENEMY FORCE TRACKING: Dedicate persistent ISR (IMINT/SAR) to monitor the Rate of Advance (ROA) of the 38th GMRB lead elements on the Huliaipole vector.
3. IO MONITORING: Focus HUMINT/OSINT on internal RF chatter regarding the UAV Operator Recruitment (Somali Battalion) to gauge the urgency and scale of this effort.

6.3. Information Operations (J7/STRATCOM)

1. DIPLOMATIC RISK MITIGATION: Immediately launch a cohesive StratCom campaign emphasizing the strength of European and PURL (Partner Under Review List) support. Directly counter RF/Trump narratives by highlighting that strategic aid is multi-lateral and not dependent on any single political figure.
2. INTERNAL CONTROL EXPLOITATION: Use the increased RF internal control (VPN blocks, electronic passports) as evidence of the Kremlin's fear of its own population and the success of UAF deep strike actions that necessitate internal tightening.

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7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)