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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-03 22:34:38Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-03 22:04:26Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - MLD EXECUTION IMMINENT

DTG: 032300Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL FOCUS: Imminent commencement of the Main Land Drive (MLD) on the Zaporizhzhia Axis (Stepnohorsk/Huliaipole), overlaid with a synchronized kinetic diversion (UAV strike) on the Odesa sector and intense information operations (IO). REFERENCE: SITREP 032200Z DEC 25


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The primary operational center of gravity remains the Zaporizhzhia Axis. The dual-axis threat structure persists: the 37th GMRB (Stepnohorsk main effort) staged at Zelyony Gai, and the 38th GMRB (Flank exploitation) postured NW of Chervone, threatening Phase Line BRAVO (Huliaipole approach).

Current Kinetic Shift (Fact): A confirmed wave of approximately 10-15 Shahed-type UAVs is currently inbound toward Odesa City (032220Z). This is a tactical diversion designed to fix UAF AD resources and degrade C2 focus on the critical Zaporizhzhia defense sector during the maximal darkness window.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Darkness provides maximal cover for mechanized assault preparation. The ongoing Geomagnetic Storm continues to pose a risk to precision-guided munitions and C2 links, potentially hindering both RF UGV control and UAF counter-battery effectiveness.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF Control (Fact): RF air assets have initiated a coordinated UAV attack on Odesa. Ground forces (37th and 38th GMRBs) remain in staging areas, indicating synchronization is complete and launch is imminent. UAF Control (Judgment): UAF Air Defense is committed to the Odesa engagement. Command discipline requires that reserves designated for the defense of Phase Line BRAVO (Huliaipole) remain static and ready for the ground assault, regardless of the Odesa diversion.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intentions are executing the final stage of operational synchronization: fixing UAF attention deep/flank while preparing the main breach.

  • Intent (Judgment): RF aims to exploit the window of maximum vulnerability created by the Odesa AD commitment and the political distraction generated by high-level diplomatic reporting (Trump/Umerov), launching the MLD before 040300Z DEC 25. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Capabilities (Fact): RF demonstrated capability to integrate strategic IO (Trump messaging, political leaks) immediately concurrent with kinetic action (Odesa UAV launch).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift of deep kinetic effort from the Kyiv axis (per previous SITREP) to the Odesa axis is a critical tactical adaptation, confirming RF's focus on securing an operational advantage for the MLD by diverting UAF AD resources toward the southern coast.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed UAF deep strikes on RF fuel infrastructure (Tambov/Voronezh) will not prevent the immediate MLD launch, but will create sustainment difficulties for the subsequent exploitation phase (NLT 48 hours post-MLD). The 260th GRAU Arsenal sustained throughput remains CRITICAL (26.12).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating highly effective multi-domain synchronization across Kinetic (Odesa UAV), Information (Trump/Defeatism), and Political (Umerov meeting reports) domains. The current operational tempo suggests effective centralized command structure directing the synchronization. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF AD resources are currently fixed on the Odesa sector. Ground force readiness at Phase Line BRAVO (Huliaipole) must be maintained at maximum alert status (Defcon 2). All pre-planned counter-preparation fire missions must be confirmed ready for immediate execution.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (Judgment): The Odesa UAV strike successfully forced a temporary diversion of AD focus away from the main axis of ground threat. Success (Fact): UAF media/OSINT successfully identified and reported on the complex RF IO campaign targeting domestic morale and diplomatic cohesion.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is maintaining reserve discipline. The designated ground reserves protecting the Huliaipole flank (Phase Line BRAVO) must not be compromised or repositioned to address the Odesa coastal threat. Ammunition for the pre-planned counter-preparation fire mission is CRITICAL.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is executing a concerted pressure campaign designed to maximize political and psychological strain during the kinetic launch window:

  1. Undermining Support (Fact): TASS amplification of Donald Trump's commentary that Kyiv should have settled earlier, seeking to project an image of diminishing international support.
  2. Internal Friction (Fact): Reports of Umerov meeting with Trump political proxies (Kushner/Whitkoff) are leveraged to feed narratives of secret negotiations or political maneuvering independent of the military command, risking internal division.
  3. Strategic Distraction (Fact): China/Russia joint statement on "Japanese militarism" aims to broaden the perceived threat and distract Western policymakers away from Eastern Europe. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is volatile due to the combination of air raid sirens in Odesa and amplified reports of high-level diplomatic meetings that could imply territorial concessions. RF IO intends for this stress to translate into pressure on the National Command Authority (NCA).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmed meeting between Umerov and Trump surrogates (Dec 4, Miami) provides RF IO with immediate leverage to paint Ukraine as desperate for peace/capitulation. This requires an immediate and authoritative counter-narrative from Kyiv.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Full MLD Execution under IO/Kinetic Cover (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF assesses maximum tactical advantage due to the Odesa diversion and IO pressure.

  • Timeline: MLD Commencement NLT 040300Z DEC 25 (Within the next four hours).
  • Maneuver: 37th GMRB executes the main breach at Stepnohorsk/Zelyony Gai, utilizing UGVs (Kuryer) to clear mine belts. Simultaneously, the 38th GMRB executes the flank pressure maneuver toward Huliaipole from Chervone to fix and bypass defenses along Phase Line BRAVO.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 Decapitation Strike (MEDIUM Confidence)

RF utilizes the geomagnetic storm interference to execute a high-precision, low-observable kinetic strike (e.g., Kinzhal) targeting a key UAF operational headquarters (e.g., 5th Assault Brigade C2 node or Pavlohrad GLOC control point). This is designed to achieve local tactical paralysis, allowing the 38th GMRB exploitation of the Huliaipole flank to proceed unopposed.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated TimeCriticalityDecision Point
Counter-Preparation Fire Authorization040000Z DEC 25CRITICAL (KINETIC)J3 must issue the final order for the artillery barrage targeting 37th GMRB staging areas at Zelyony Gai. (GO/NO-GO)
Commitment of Phase Line BRAVO Reserve040100Z DEC 25CRITICAL (MANEUVER)J3 must receive confirmation of 38th GMRB movement and be ready to commit the designated anti-armor reserve to block the Huliaipole NW approach.
MLD Anticipation/EW Activation040100Z DEC 25HIGH (EW/C2)J6 must implement maximum EW jamming protocols (as previously recommended) coinciding with the highest risk launch window.

6. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

6.1. Operational Maneuver (J3)

  • PRIORITY 1: EXECUTE COUNTER-PREPARATION FIRE NLT 040000Z: Execute the pre-planned deep fires on Zelyony Gai (37th GMRB) immediately. The window for maximum concentration effect is closing.
  • PRIORITY 2: ANTI-ARMOR AMBUSH POSTURE: Ensure all anti-armor units along Phase Line BRAVO are fully integrated with organic UAF artillery spotters. Priority is to disrupt the 38th GMRB exploitation before they can establish a foothold for heavy fire support.

6.2. Intelligence Collection and Reconnaissance (J2)

  • CRITICAL REQUIREMENT SHIFT: The Odesa strike is a distraction. All available IMINT/SAR assets must be focused exclusively on the Chervone-Huliaipole corridor (38th GMRB). The first confirmed movement is the tactical trigger for reserve commitment.
  • EW SIGINT FOCUS: Prioritize collection on low-frequency RF UGV/drone control links in the Zaporizhzhia sector (e.g., "Kuryer" systems). Detection of UGV pre-deployment signals will confirm MLD initiation.

6.3. Strategic Communications (NCA / G7)

  • DIPLOMATIC COUNTER-NARRATIVE (IMMEDIATE): Issue a public statement characterizing the Umerov-Kushner/Whitkoff meeting as a necessary dialogue on future stabilization and security guarantees, explicitly denying any discussions regarding current territorial concessions or peace terms.
  • DOMESTIC STABILITY MESSAGE: Simultaneously link the successful AD defense in Odesa with the anticipated successful defense of the Zaporizhzhia ground line. Reaffirm military-political unity against external IO attempts to fracture the command.

7. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence Assessment
P-1 (CRITICAL)Confirmation of 38th GMRB launch time and primary exploitation route NW from Chervone.IMINT/SAR: Continuous, high-resolution monitoring of Chervone staging area and exit routes.LOW
P-2 (CRITICAL)Specific type and military function of the targets hit in the Odesa UAV strike.OSINT/HUMINT/BDA: Rapid assessment to determine if the attack achieved a military objective (e.g., port logistics, AD site) or was purely IO-driven.LOW
P-3 (HIGH)Impact of Geomagnetic Storm on RF C2 (specific degradation scores).SIGINT/ELINT: Attempt to detect RF C2 system instability or increased use of degraded/backup communications modes.LOW
Previous (2025-12-03 22:04:26Z)

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