Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 031735Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SOUTHERN AXIS: KINETIC STRIKE SYNCHRONIZATION CONFIRMED. BALLISTIC THREAT TO MYKOLAIV/DNIPRO LOGISTICS AXIS. STEPNOHORSK MLD IMMINENCE REMAINS CRITICAL.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is currently defined by synchronized deep strike kinetics aimed at disrupting UAF operational reserves and the imminent decisive ground offensive on the Southern Axis.

1. Huliaipole/Stepnohorsk (CRITICAL): The dual-axis threat remains the operational center of gravity. RF forces (38th GMRB) are fixed in Huliaipole (urban fighting confirmed, previous SITREP). The Stepnohorsk MLD (RF 37th GMRB at Zelyony Gai) is the dominant immediate kinetic threat (Fact, HIGH Confidence based on previous staging confirmation).
2. Deep Strike Axis: RF is executing a coordinated follow-up strike campaign. Confirmed ballistic missile strikes occurred in the Mykolaiv region (Bashkanka) and high-speed targets were tracked toward the area (Fact). Furthermore, a loitering munition/UAV is confirmed tracking toward Pavlohrad (Fact, AFU), directly threatening a major logistics and C2 hub.
3. Kryvyi Rih Strike Aftermath: The previous Iskander-M strike resulted in updated civilian casualties (three injured, including a 3-year-old child).

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The active Geomagnetic Storm continues to introduce unpredictable EW and communications interference, likely being exploited by RF forces to mask tactical ballistic missile launches and UAV infiltration routes.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are in a heightened state of alert due to the renewed ballistic threat aimed at operational rear areas. Control measures are focused on maintaining cohesion along the Stepnohorsk defense line while simultaneously managing casualty evacuation and recovery operations in Kryvyi Rih.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT-ASSESS)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intention is to execute the Stepnohorsk MLD, synchronized with kinetic strikes that achieve C2/logistics paralysis in the UAF operational depth.

• Kinetic Synchronization (Confirmed): The timing of the ballistic launches toward Mykolaiv (Bashkanka) and the UAV tracking toward Pavlohrad confirms the enemy's intention to simultaneously hit GLOCs and C2 nodes during the critical 031700Z-032000Z window preceding the anticipated Stepnohorsk MLD. This confirms high-level C2 effectiveness in coordinating multi-domain strikes (Fact, HIGH Confidence).
• Ballistic Munition Type: Reporting of a potential cluster munition warhead used in the Bashkanka strike (Fact, MEDIUM Confidence from local reports) indicates an enemy focus on broad area denial and personnel/vehicle damage on routes, rather than precise bunker-busting.
• Information Warfare Adaptation: RF IO is actively leveraging captured UAF personnel (POW Sergei Kostetsky) to generate propaganda videos alleging poor UAF command planning. This is a direct attempt to degrade tactical morale and encourage surrender (Fact, HIGH Confidence).

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The immediate GRAU Score remains 26.12 (CRITICAL). Despite confirmed UAF deep strikes on RF fuel depots (Tambov/Voronezh, previous reports), the ground assault forces (37th/38th GMRBs) are assessed as adequately stocked for the immediate 24-hour push.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, as demonstrated by the rapid, targeted resumption of the deep strike campaign (Pavlohrad UAV vector, Mykolaiv TBM) immediately following the initial Kryvyi Rih strike. The enemy is aggressively pursuing tactical disruption to prevent UAF reserves from reaching the Southern front.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE-FORCE)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are technically prepared but remain under severe operational strain from the dual ground threat and intensified rear-area targeting. Readiness levels are high among frontline units, but reserves are critically exposed to the renewed ballistic threat.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Special Operations): Special Operations Forces (SSO) confirmed successful neutralization of an enemy group in the Donetsk direction (Fact). This maintains pressure and demonstrates tactical superiority in localized engagements.
• Success (Technology/Personnel): The 92nd Brigade is actively promoting the successful use of Unmanned Robotic Complexes (NRK/UGVs) and their operators (Fact). This provides a needed morale boost and validates investment in remote/robotic warfare.
• Setback (Deep Strike Impact): Confirmed casualties and infrastructure damage in Kryvyi Rih and explosions in Mykolaiv region from the ongoing deep strike campaign.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint shifts from generalized ISR coverage to Air Defense (AD) assets capable of intercepting TBMs and high-speed UAVs threatening the logistics axis (Dnipro/Pavlohrad). Current AD posture is insufficient to provide continuous, high-confidence coverage of all critical operational depth targets.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is intensifying morale-targeting narratives:

1. POW Exploitation: Utilizing POW testimony to argue UAF command incompetence, directly targeting the confidence of junior officers and enlisted personnel (HIGH Confidence).
2. Internal Dissolution Narratives: RF state media is actively amplifying the confirmed dissolution of the Russia-NATO Council (Fact, ASTRA/Operatsiya Z). The narrative intent is to portray Russia as having achieved a strategic severance and to confirm the "irreconcilable differences" that necessitate RF military action.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is likely highly agitated by the updated casualty reports in Kryvyi Rih, especially the injury to a child. Domestically, there is a risk of morale degradation if the RF narratives (POW, poor conditions) gain traction, particularly following the ongoing political crisis (MP salaries, previous SITREP).

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The formal dissolution of the Russia-NATO Council is a major strategic development. While it confirms NATO's unified hard line against Russia, it simultaneously removes a formal channel for future de-escalation discussion, hardening the geopolitical stance of both blocs (HIGH Confidence).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Full Execution of Synchronized Ground and Deep Strike Offensive. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1. Logistics Softening (Immediate): RF continues to prosecute deep strikes, focusing on the Pavlohrad GLOC intersection/C2 nodes using the confirmed UAV vector (NLT 031830Z).
2. Huliaipole Fixation (031800Z - 031900Z): RF 38th GMRB maintains high pressure in Huliaipole to fix UAF reserves and fire support.
3. Stepnohorsk MLD Initiation (NLT 031930Z): RF 37th GMRB launches the main assault on Stepnohorsk, capitalizing on UAF reserve diversion and C2 disruption from the deep strikes. The timing will maximize the effects of the geomagnetic storm on counter-artillery and AD systems.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Ballistic Decapitation Strike on Operational Command. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1. RF uses a high-precision TBM (Iskander or Kinzhal) to target a confirmed or suspected location of a Brigade or Corps-level C2 node (e.g., 5th Assault Brigade HQ or adjacent field command post) in the Dnipro/Pavlohrad area, synchronized with the Stepnohorsk breach.
2. The resulting command paralysis prevents the timely activation of the CHARLIE-FLANK reserve package, leading to an operational breakthrough at Stepnohorsk and uncontrolled withdrawal from the Southern Front.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS (ACTION-INTEL)

1. Immediate Counter-Ballistic and C2 Protection (J3/J6):

   • AD Prioritization: Immediately divert available short-range AD assets (e.g., MANPADS, mobile AD systems) to establish a hardened perimeter defense around Pavlohrad and key road/rail intersections south of Dnipro to counter the confirmed UAV and subsequent TBM threat (CR Priority 1).
   • C2 Dispersal: EXECUTE PROTOCOL GHOST-SHIFT. All Corps and Brigade level C2 in the Dnipro/Pavlohrad sector must immediately implement high-frequency displacement (30-minute shifts) to pre-surveyed alternative sites (hardened/underground facilities) to mitigate the MDCOA decapitation strike.
   • Anti-MLD Fire Planning: Re-confirm pre-targeting authorization for Zelyony Gai (37th GMRB staging) with massed artillery on 30-minute standby, ready for immediate execution upon confirmation of movement toward Stepnohorsk (NLT 031930Z).

2. Tactical Containment (J3/J5):

   • Huliaipole: Maintain PROTOCOL "BRAVO-BLOCK". The mission remains fixation and containment of the 38th GMRB urban penetration. Do not commit high-value reserves (e.g., CHARLIE-FLANK) to Huliaipole; reserves must be held for the Stepnohorsk MLD breach.
   • Cluster Munition Warning: Issue immediate force protection warning to all units operating near Mykolaiv GLOCs regarding potential enemy use of cluster munitions (HIGH threat to exposed personnel and logistics columns).

3. Strategic Communications and Morale Defense (NCA/G7):

   • Counter-Propaganda: Launch an immediate information campaign highlighting the tactical successes of UAF forces (SSO, 92nd Brigade GRCs) to neutralize the impact of the RF POW propaganda video (Sergei Kostetsky). Focus the narrative on UAF resilience and technological superiority.
   • Domestic Response: Reiterate the urgency for the NCA to address the MP salary crisis (NLT 031800Z) to prevent internal fracture from jeopardizing military mobilization efforts.
   • Diplomatic Framing: G7 must immediately frame the dissolution of the Russia-NATO Council as a positive development, confirming Russia's isolation and NATO's unwavering commitment to Ukraine's defense.