Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 031700Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SOUTHERN AXIS CRITICALITY WORSENS: IMMEDIATE HULIAIPOLE CONTAINMENT AND STEPNOHORSK MLD IMMINENCE. SECONDARY DIPLOMATIC RISK FROM BLACK SEA MARITIME INCIDENT.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment remains defined by the critical dual-axis threat on the Zaporizhzhia front.

1. Huliaipole (CRITICAL): Fighting remains confirmed within the city limits (Fact, Previous SITREP). This urban penetration by elements of the RF 38th GMRB continues to draw UAF resources and validates the enemy's flanking maneuver strategy.
2. Stepnohorsk Axis: RF 37th GMRB is confirmed staged at Zelyony Gai, poised for the Main Effort Land Drive (MLD). The MLD initiation is anticipated to be synchronized with the peak commitment of UAF reserves to Huliaipole containment.
3. Deep Strike Area: The confirmed Iskander-M strike on the administrative building in Kryvyi Rih serves to demonstrate strategic reach and C2 disruption capability.
4. Northern Front (Kharkiv): Confirmed sighting of a UAV (likely Shahed variant) in Lozivskyi Raion (Fact, Air Force of Ukraine), indicating continued RF reconnaissance and harassment operations designed to fix UAF Northern reserves.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The active Geomagnetic Storm continues to introduce volatility to GPS guidance and communications, which RF is exploiting to mask operations.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF defense remains committed, but the immediate threat of operational collapse on the Southern Axis is compounded by significant non-kinetic threats: the unresolved domestic political crisis and a newly confirmed diplomatic friction point in the Black Sea.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT-ASSESS)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intention is to achieve a decisive breakthrough on the Southern Axis by NLT 032000Z DEC 25.

• Kinetic Capability (Deep Strike): Confirmed high-precision Iskander-M usage (Fact). This capability will be leveraged again to target critical UAF reinforcement axes, logistics hubs (e.g., Pavlohrad), or C2 nodes to prevent effective response to the MLD.
• Information Warfare (Escalation Signaling): Pro-Kremlin figures (Kadyrov_95) are utilizing the deep strike success to aggressively signal high confidence and inevitable, swift victory, intended to demoralize UAF forces and fracture domestic cohesion.
• Technological Projection: RF IO is promoting a narrative of increased UAF maritime and air activity (BECs/drones), likely pre-positioning justification for further RF escalation or preemptive strikes.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The immediate GRAU Score of 26.12 (CRITICAL) indicates continued high ammunition throughput despite UAF deep strikes on fuel depots. The immediate tactical sustainment of the 37th and 38th GMRBs is assessed as adequate for the anticipated 24-hour offensive push. (Confidence: MEDIUM)

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated effective tactical synchronization by timing the Iskander-M strike (Kryvyi Rih) to coincide precisely with the critical ground exploitation phase at Huliaipole. This confirms the enemy's ability to coordinate multi-domain operations effectively.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE-FORCE)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF defense is under immediate operational strain. Readiness is degraded by the ongoing internal political crisis (MP salaries).

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Tactical Success (Technology): UAF 93rd Brigade confirmed use of advanced Ground Robotic Complexes (GRCs) for forward logistics, casualty evacuation, and recovery of damaged robotic assets (Fact). This indicates a successful, high-risk operational adaptation, reducing risk to life on the Line of Contact (LOC).
• Setback (Kinetic): Confirmed structural damage and casualties from the Iskander-M strike in Kryvyi Rih (Fact).
• Setback (Diplomatic/Naval): Confirmed loss of a Sea Baby drone, reportedly destroyed by Romanian naval forces in the Black Sea (Fact, Pro-RF reporting/D-S belief 0.000762). This raises immediate diplomatic complications regarding UAF freedom of action in the Black Sea and could lead to pressure from NATO Allies to restrict future UAF maritime drone operations.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most critical constraint remains the insufficient ISR capability to simultaneously track all critical kinetic threats (Huliaipole depth, Stepnohorsk staging, Myrnohrad encirclement).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is actively leveraging external friction points to undermine the UAF strategic position.

• Narrative Focus: RF sources are amplifying NATO's dissolution of the Russia-NATO Council as confirmation of irreconcilable differences, justifying further aggression (Fact).
• Diversionary Focus: RF is utilizing non-related geopolitical stories (Guinea-Bissau coup, Georgian migration policy) and high-value cultural news (Bolshoi ballet tickets) to saturate the media space and distract from domestic losses.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The critical domestic vulnerability remains the MP salary scandal. This is an immediate Information Operation (IO) target for the RF, threatening to convert public duress into active hostility against the government and military leadership.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The strategic diplomatic environment is hardening: NATO's institutional severance with Russia is positive. However, two high-risk friction points exist:

1. Peace Terms Divergence: Finnish President Stubb's "unflattering forecast" regarding a peace deal introduces narrative fragmentation within the NATO/EU coalition, potentially signaling an international willingness to accept a less-than-ideal settlement for Kyiv. (D-S belief 0.027944).
2. Black Sea Incident: The destruction of the UAF maritime drone by a NATO member (Romania) creates an urgent internal diplomatic constraint on future operational planning.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Synchronization and Decisive MLD Initiation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1. Huliaipole Consolidation (031700Z - 031900Z): RF 38th GMRB elements aggressively consolidate their urban positions to fix UAF anti-armor reserves and maximize the "flank distraction."
2. Stepnohorsk MLD (NLT 031930Z DEC 25): RF 37th GMRB initiates the main mechanized assault from Zelyony Gai, focusing on breaking the thinned Stepnohorsk defense line while UAF fire support is diverted to Huliaipole.
3. Targeted Deep Strike Follow-up: A second TBM/cruise missile strike targets a major UAF logistics/C2 hub (e.g., Dnipro rail center or Pavlohrad C2 element) immediately preceding or during the Stepnohorsk MLD breach phase.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Southern Front Operational Collapse and Political Crisis Exploitation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

1. RF achieves a deep penetration at Stepnohorsk, creating a salient that forces the Protocol CHARLIE-FLANK reserve package to be committed prematurely or piecemeal.
2. The operational setback coincides with the inability of the NCA to neutralize the MP salary crisis, leading to mass media exploitation by RF IO and potential disruption of civil-military coordination for reserve mobilization.
3. The combined military failure and internal disunity prompt a NATO/EU review of strategic commitment, potentially leveraging the Finnish President's comments to pressure Kyiv toward ceasefire negotiations under unfavorable terms.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS (ACTION-INTEL)

1. Immediate Operational Containment (J3/J5):

   • Huliaipole Defense: EXECUTE PROTOCOL "BRAVO-BLOCK" with immediate reinforcement of the NW blocking line (e.g., 82nd AAB elements) to contain the 38th GMRB penetration.
   • Anti-MLD Fire Planning: J3 must pre-target all confirmed 37th GMRB staging areas (Zelyony Gai) with massed artillery and guided munitions (HIMARS, etc.) on a 30-minute standby, authorized for immediate engagement upon confirmation of MLD movement.
   • GRC Leverage: J4/J3 must formally integrate the GRC capabilities demonstrated by the 93rd Brigade into the Huliaipole defense logistics and casualty evacuation plan to minimize operational exposure during the urban fight.

2. Strategic Communications and Diplomatic Mitigation (NCA/G7 - URGENT):

   • Neutralize MP Salary Crisis (DOMESTIC): The NCA must issue a public statement NLT 031800Z freezing the implementation of the MP salary increase. This message must be paired with official recognition of the bravery of the personnel affected by the Kryvyi Rih strike.
   • Manage Romanian Incident (DIPLOMATIC): G7 must initiate immediate, high-level diplomatic channels with Bucharest to determine the circumstances of the drone loss (CR Priority 3). The objective is to secure an agreement that prevents future kinetic engagement against UAF assets and preserves operational space in the Black Sea.
   • Counter Peace Narrative: G7 must preemptively counter the "unflattering peace terms" narrative (Finnish President) by reiterating the non-compromise stance on sovereignty, linking the current military defense (Huliaipole) directly to the preservation of maximal peace terms.

3. Electronic Warfare and Counter-TBM (J6):

   • Continue to prioritize EW jamming (EW/SIGINT units) against loitering munitions, leveraging the Geomagnetic Storm environment.
   • Reissue dispersal orders for all C2 and high-value maintenance facilities in the Pavlohrad/Dnipro area, establishing hard-sheltered alternatives (30-minute displacement) to counter the confirmed Iskander-M deep strike threat.