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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-03 16:34:35Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-03 16:04:30Z)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 031645Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL DUAL-AXIS THREAT ESCALATION; CONFIRMED ISKANDER-M STRIKE ON KRYVYI RIH; URGENT HULIAIPOLE CONTAINMENT PRIORITY SHIFT.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains critically strained across the Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk axes, characterized by synchronized deep strikes and accelerating ground exploitation.

  1. Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia): The dual threat is immediately critical.
    • Huliaipole (CRITICAL, Escalated): RF propaganda claims (Voins DV) indicate assault groups of the Vostok Group (likely 38th GMRB elements) are engaged in fighting within Huliaipole. This is an acceleration of the exploitation vector from Chervone and necessitates treating the flanking maneuver as immediate urban penetration, not merely a preparatory threat.
    • Stepnohorsk: RF 37th Guards MRB remains staged at Zelyony Gai, poised for Mechanized Land Drive (MLD). Synchronization of this MLD with the Huliaipole urban fight is highly probable.
  2. Eastern Axis (Donetsk/Pokrovsk): Pressure continues across the main GLOCs.
    • Myrnohrad: Status remains unverified (Priority 1 Intelligence Gap).
    • Konstantinovka: RF forces (Dnevnik Desantnika) confirm active military focus on the Konstantinovka direction, indicating broad-front pressure to fix UAF reserves.
  3. Operational Depth Strike (CONFIRMED): Confirmed hit on an administrative building in Kryvyi Rih. Local authority reports confirm the use of an Iskander-M tactical ballistic missile, resulting in significant structural damage to high-rise civilian infrastructure.
  4. Air Defense: UAF 10th Mountain Assault Brigade (OGShBr) confirmed interception of two "Italmas" (Shahed variant) drones, demonstrating localized AD effectiveness against loitering munitions.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Geomagnetic Storm remains active. No change to assessment: RF is operating through electronic interference.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The air raid alert for Zaporizhzhia has been cleared, and power has been restored to affected consumers in the Zaporizhzhia district, confirming robust UAF infrastructure repair capabilities. However, the confirmed Iskander-M strike and the claimed Huliaipole penetration demand an immediate and decisive shift in reserve allocation and C2 prioritization.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT-ASSESS)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intention is to achieve tactical paralysis by synchronizing deep kinetic shock (Iskander-M) with immediate flanking ground exploitation (Huliaipole).

  • Ballistic Capability (Fact): Confirmed use of Iskander-M TBM. This missile provides high precision against fixed, high-value C2/administrative targets (e.g., Kryvyi Rih city administration) and confirms RF capability to strike deep within the Operational Area (OA) with minimal warning.
  • Ground Maneuver (Judgment - HIGH CONFIDENCE): The aggressive propaganda push claiming forces in Huliaipole suggests the 38th GMRB exploitation is proceeding faster than the previous MLCOA estimate (031700Z). The enemy seeks to draw UAF armor and fire support away from the critical Stepnohorsk axis before the 37th GMRB initiates MLD.
  • Technological Focus: Continued use of Shahed/Italmas variants confirms persistence in degrading UAF AD and softening targets ahead of ground operations.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The long-term economic constraint on Russia is increasing. The impending EU decision to list Russia as a high-risk jurisdiction for money laundering/terror financing (ASTRA report) will significantly complicate global financial transactions for procurement and resource acquisition, though the immediate tactical GRAU Score remains 26.12 (CRITICAL).

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated effective tactical synchronization by timing the Iskander-M deep strike (031620Z P/A) to coincide with the critical tactical window of the dual-axis ground threat.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE-FORCE)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensively committed but highly vulnerable to domestic political destabilization. The government restructuring (dissolving energy company supervisory boards) is a positive, responsive action.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Setback (Kinetic/Infrastructure): Confirmed Iskander-M hit on Kryvyi Rih administrative infrastructure.
  • Setback (Domestic/Moral): Reports of MPs voting to increase their own supplemental pay up to 199,000 UAH create an immediate, severe domestic morale crisis and an ideal RF Information Operation (IO) target, directly undercutting frontline sacrifice. (CRITICAL INTERNAL THREAT)
  • Success (Diplomatic): NATO Ministerial meeting yields public affirmation of Ukraine's non-compromise stance on sovereignty and borders, reinforcing international support.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

ISR capacity is insufficient to simultaneously confirm the Myrnohrad encirclement, track 37th GMRB preparation, and verify/track the 38th GMRB penetration into Huliaipole. Reserve commitment decision must prioritize Huliaipole defense based on the highest perceived threat of operational collapse.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO strategy has achieved maximum friction by exploiting confirmed domestic setbacks while escalating military claims.

  • Primary Vector (Internal Friction): RF channels are already heavily amplifying the MP salary increase, framing it as elite corruption and contrasting it sharply with frontline hardships.
  • Secondary Vector (Societal): Exploitation of minor domestic incidents (Ternopil burger chaos, alleged UAF soldier TCC attack plan) to undermine morale and readiness.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is transitioning from duress to potential internal hostility due to the perceived political inequity of the MP salary increase amidst national sacrifice and infrastructure attacks (Kryvyi Rih/blackouts). This is a critical vulnerability that must be managed immediately.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Strategic diplomatic position is strong: NATO support confirmed, and the EU is advancing financial isolation measures against Russia. The focus remains on containing the previous Sea Baby incident while leveraging the new EU financial pressure point.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Accelerated Southern Front Breakthrough Synchronization. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

  1. Huliaipole Penetration: RF 38th GMRB elements attempt to consolidate positions within Huliaipole (urban fight), maximizing the tactical pressure on UAF GLOCs and forcing immediate commitment of local reserves. (Immediate 031645Z - 031800Z).
  2. Stepnohorsk MLD Initiation: Once UAF reserves are visibly committed to counter the Huliaipole urban fight, RF 37th GMRB initiates the main mechanized assault from Zelyony Gai (Stepnohorsk) to achieve a decisive breakthrough. (NLT 031900Z DEC 25).
  3. Deep Strike Follow-up: Limited deep strikes (loitering munitions or TBMs) target reinforcing GLOCs (e.g., Pavlohrad area) to hinder UAF reserve movement toward the Southern Axis.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Dual-Axis Collapse and Political Decapitation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

  1. UAF forces are successfully expelled from Huliaipole, exposing the Eastern flank of the Stepnohorsk defense line.
  2. The resulting operational chaos coincides with a successful RF deep strike on a critical UAF strategic C2 node (e.g., Dnipro/Pavlohrad).
  3. The combined kinetic failure and operational disorientation triggers widespread public outrage over the MP salary controversy, leading to civil-military friction that prevents effective reserve mobilization and forces an unplanned strategic retreat.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence Impact
PRIORITY 1 (KINETIC/EASTERN AXIS)Verification of RF presence, maneuver elements, and UAF status (encirclement/disengagement) in the Myrnohrad (Dimytrov) area.URGENT HUMINT/IMINT (SAR/Electro-Optical) missions targeting the T-0515 GLOC. (70% ISR Resource Allocation)HIGH
PRIORITY 2 (KINETIC/SOUTHERN AXIS)Verification of RF forces depth of penetration and disposition within Huliaipole.IMMEDIATE short-range UAV/RECON missions focusing on Huliaipole's NW and SE approaches to confirm urban fighting scope. (30% ISR Resource Allocation)HIGH
PRIORITY 3 (KINETIC/RF DEEP STRIKE)Identification of the specific Iskander-M launch site (P/A Crimea or Kursk/Belgorod region) to determine launch velocity and range trajectory for subsequent AD pre-positioning.J2/J6 analysis of BDA and radar traces from the Kryvyi Rih strike.MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS (ACTION-INTEL)

  1. Immediate Operational Containment (J3/J5):

    • Huliaipole Immediate Defense: Assume RF forces have successfully penetrated Huliaipole (CR Priority 2). EXECUTE PROTOCOL "BRAVO-BLOCK" with immediate effect, reinforcing anti-armor screening forces (e.g., 82nd AAB elements) to establish a firm blocking line NW of Huliaipole to prevent breakthrough toward Pokrovske.
    • Reserve Posturing: J5 must order the Protocol CHARLIE-FLANK reserve package to immediately enter full readiness status at the designated staging area west of Pokrovsk, prepared for a rapid response to either the Myrnohrad GLOC threat or a Stepnohorsk MLD breach.
    • Iskander Threat Mitigation: J3/J6 must issue orders for immediate dispersal and hardened sheltering of mobile command and repair assets in the Dnipro/Pavlohrad area, anticipating follow-on Iskander targeting.
  2. Strategic Communications and Morale Stabilization (IMMEDIATE - NCA/G7):

    • Neutralize MP Salary Crisis: The National Command Authority (NCA) must immediately issue a clear directive freezing the implementation of the MP salary increase pending review and audit. This action must be publicly announced within 60 minutes alongside a statement explicitly praising the sacrifice of frontline troops and linking their welfare to national security. Failure to contain this IO vulnerability will compromise military effectiveness.
    • Leverage EU Sanctions: G7 must aggressively amplify the EU's financial action against Russia to domestic and international audiences, shifting focus from internal friction points to external strategic successes.
  3. Electronic Warfare and Intelligence Tasking (URGENT - J2/J6):

    • Prioritize CR 1 & 2: J2 must redeploy existing IMINT assets from fixed positions to exclusively cover Myrnohrad and Huliaipole until verification is achieved.
    • Counter TBM Threat: J6 to task AD units operating Patriot/SAMP-T systems with standby posture (2-minute reaction time) focusing on the vector identified during the Kryvyi Rih BDA (CR Priority 3) to minimize reaction time for subsequent ballistic attacks.
Previous (2025-12-03 16:04:30Z)

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