Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 031600Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: POKROVSK STABILIZATION CONFIRMED (DELAY); CRITICAL NEW THREAT VECTOR (MYRNOHRAD) EMERGES AMID SIMULTANEOUS ZAPORIZHZHIA MLD THREAT.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The critical threat profile remains triple-axis, but the immediate crisis concerning the Pokrovsk seizure has stabilized following UAF counter-reporting.

1. Zaporizhzhia ME (Stepnohorsk): RF 37th Guards MRB remains staged at Zelyony Gai for the Mechanized Land Drive (MLD). (UNCHANGED - CRITICAL)
2. Zaporizhzhia Flank (Chervone/Huliaipole): RF 38th Guards MRB continues exploitation toward Huliaipole; UAF Protocol BRAVO-BLOCK remains engaged to stabilize the breach. (CRITICAL)
3. Donetsk Eastern Axis (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad):
   • Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmiisk): UAF 7th DShV Corps confirms RF 30th SMRB is "stuck in the battles for Pokrovsk" and not in control of the vital rail hub. The RF offensive is currently stalled at the city perimeter/outskirts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE JUDGMENT - STABILIZATION)
   • Myrnohrad (Dimytrov) Threat: RF sources claim 1,000 UAF troops are encircled in Myrnohrad (~25 km SE of Pokrovsk). If true, this represents a rapid, high-impact flanking maneuver threatening the rear GLOCs supporting Pokrovsk. (LOW CONFIDENCE FACT - NEW CRITICAL VECTOR/GAP)
4. Northern Fixation: Continued RF pressure fixes UAF reserves between Vovchansk and Kupiansk.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

The active Geomagnetic Storm is ongoing. New intelligence indicates RF loitering munitions ("Geran") are achieving successful kinetic engagements against UAF Mobile Fire Groups (MOGs), suggesting RF C2/guidance systems (likely adapting frequency hopping or alternative links) are resilient to the storm's electromagnetic interference. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE JUDGMENT - ADAPTATION CONFIRMED)

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are successfully delaying the RF main effort at Pokrovsk but must immediately divert ISR capacity to verify the Myrnohrad encirclement claim, which threatens to unhinge the entire Eastern Command defense posture if accurate. Strategic reserves remain precariously balanced between the Zaporizhzhia (Huliaipole/Stepnohorsk) and Donetsk (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad) crises.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT-ASSESS)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent has shifted from immediate seizure of Pokrovsk (front-door kinetic) to flanking the Pokrovsk defense via the Myrnohrad area, leveraging combined arms pressure to create operational confusion.

• Logistics Focus: The 260th GRAU Arsenal Score remains high (26.12), confirming continued high ammunition throughput despite UAF deep fuel strikes.
• Technological Adaptation (Counter-UAS/UGV): RF has demonstrated successful engagement and destruction of a UAF UGV (Kuryer/similar), indicating rapid development and deployment of counter-ground-robotics tactics. This degrades a key UAF technological advantage for logistics and reconnaissance. (HIGH CONFIDENCE FACT)
• C2 Resilience: The successful use of "Geran" against MOGs during the geomagnetic storm suggests RF has maintained or rapidly recovered crucial operational C2 links, negating a potential UAF EW advantage.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The Myrnohrad encirclement claim is the most significant tactical change. This maneuver, if confirmed, demonstrates RF capability to execute complex, deep flanking operations while simultaneously conducting main effort (Zaporizhzhia) and fixing operations (Pokrovsk center).

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain robust regarding ammunition. UAF interdiction of rail assets remains the highest priority to amplify the effects of the previous fuel strikes.

D. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective, managing high synchronization across three divergent axes (Vostok, Tsentr, Sever Groups). The continued effective deployment of loitering munitions during environmental stress supports this assessment.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE-FORCE)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high, but the strategic reserve pool is now under severe internal political pressure. The successful denial of the Pokrovsk claim has bought limited time (4-6 hours) to reallocate ISR and reserves.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success: UAF 7th DShV successfully defended the critical infrastructure in Pokrovsk, forcing RF into a propaganda campaign. Diplomatic success with EU blacklisting RF.
• Setback: Loss of a UAF Sea Baby drone in the Black Sea to Romanian forces (a NATO ally), creating unnecessary diplomatic friction. RF successfully neutralized a UAF logistics UGV. Morale risk due to domestic political narratives (military pay budget).

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint is the verification timeline for the Myrnohrad threat. If confirmed, UAF must have a pre-planned force package ready for deployment (e.g., Protocol CHARLIE-FLANK) within the next 2 hours, likely pulling from reserves intended for Stepnohorsk follow-on defense.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO focuses on two vectors:

1. Military Decisiveness: Amplifying the Myrnohrad (Dimytrov) encirclement claim and successful strikes (Geran, FPV) to demonstrate momentum despite the failed Pokrovsk seizure claim.
2. Internal Dissension: Aggressive exploitation of the Rada vote to remove Russian language protections and the lack of military salary increases in the budget to fracture domestic unity and undermine troop morale.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale faces significant risk from internal factors. The failure to include military salary increases in the budget is an immediate concern requiring official communication to manage expectations and counter RF IO exploitation.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Positive: EU blacklisting of Russia is a significant financial sanction win.
• Negative: The Sea Baby incident with Romania requires immediate diplomatic clarification to prevent erosion of regional cooperation. RF is actively promoting the narrative that Kyiv is a US proxy, weakening Ukraine's international standing ahead of crucial meetings.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Pivoted Eastern Flank Threat synchronized with Zaporizhzhia MLD. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. Myrnohrad Exploitation: RF shifts the Eastern main effort from direct assault on Pokrovsk center (now stalled) to rapid exploitation of the Myrnohrad/Dimytrov area to cut the vital T-0515 GLOC supporting Pokrovsk. (NLT 031800Z DEC 25).
2. Huliaipole Draw: RF 38th GMRB maintains pressure at Chervone/Huliaipole to fix Southern reserves.
3. Stepnohorsk MLD (Timing Confirmed): RF 37th GMRB initiates the final mechanized breach at Stepnohorsk, still timed for peak UAF confusion/resource commitment (NLT 031900Z DEC 25).

• TIMELINE: The critical decision window remains the next 3 hours (until 031900Z).

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 Paralysis via Eastern Encirclement and Kinetic Decapitation. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

The Myrnohrad claim is verified, resulting in a large UAF unit being cut off. RF exploits the associated command panic by simultaneously launching Iskander/Kinzhal strikes aimed at forward C2 nodes supporting the Myrnohrad/Pokrovsk area and the 5th Assault Brigade C2 near Zaporizhzhia. The resulting lack of coordinated response leads to localized operational collapse on both fronts, forcing a strategic retreat from the Eastern Donetsk region.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS (ACTION-INTEL)

1. Reserve Allocation and Verification (IMMEDIATE - J3/J5):

   • Phase 1: Myrnohrad Verification (031600Z - 031700Z): Divert maximum available ISR assets (CR Priority 1) to confirm the Myrnohrad status. This task overrides the Pokrovsk city-center verification.
   • Phase 2: Pre-Positioning: If the Myrnohrad threat is verified, J5 must immediately issue the order for the Protocol CHARLIE-FLANK reserve package (a motorized or tank battalion, if available) to move to a staging area west of Pokrovsk to protect the T-0515 GLOC intersection, preventing a deep flank collapse.
   • Maintain Southern Defense: DO NOT shift reserves from Protocol BRAVO-BLOCK (Huliaipole) unless Myrnohrad is confirmed as a lesser threat than Stepnohorsk MLD.

2. Electronic Warfare/Air Defense (IMMEDIATE - J6/J3):

   • Counter-Adaptation: Given the proven resilience of "Geran" munitions during the geomagnetic storm, discontinue reliance on broad-spectrum noise jamming as the sole countermeasure. Shift EW focus to narrow-band directional jamming and deception jamming against specific loitering munition telemetry links.
   • MOG Protection: Integrate active counter-UGV/counter-drone protection (short-range EW, auto-cannon systems) within Mobile Fire Group formations immediately to prevent further attrition.

3. Strategic Communications (IMMEDIATE - NCA/G7):

   • Stabilize Eastern Front Narrative: Rapidly utilize the 7th DShV confirmation to counter the RF Pokrovsk claim. Communicate that RF advances have stalled (NLT 031630Z).
   • Manage Morale Risk: Issue a statement clarifying the military salary budget issue, detailing future plans for remuneration increases or non-monetary compensation to mitigate RF exploitation of domestic dissent.

4. Force Protection (URGENT - J3/J6):

   • Counter-UGV Tactics: Immediately distribute technical intelligence on the RF counter-UGV engagement to all brigade commanders utilizing ground robotics, emphasizing the requirement for redundancy, camouflage, and operational security during movement.
   • Black Sea Diplomacy: J3/J7 must initiate immediate high-level liaison with Romanian MoD to de-escalate the Sea Baby incident and establish clearer coordination protocols for UAF maritime operations in proximity to NATO territorial waters.