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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-03 13:04:34Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-03 12:34:33Z)

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - MLD EXPLOITATION PHASE - FOLLOW UP

TIME: 031300Z DEC 2025 OPERATION: MLD EXPLOITATION PHASE / STEPNOHORSK / LOGISTICS INTERDICTION / NORTHERN FIXING OPERATIONS FOCUS: Confirmation of RF intentions in Sumy Axis (Kuryer UGV deployment) and operational impact of internal UAF C2 restructuring.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational tempo remains critically high across three distinct axes, emphasizing RF multi-domain synchronization.

  • Zaporizhzhia Axis (Stepnohorsk): Confirmed continued exploitation by RF Vostok Group elements (including VDV near Prymors'ke, 031236Z). The Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) remains the primary threat.
  • Northern Axes (Kharkiv/Sumy): RF fixing efforts are escalating from deep strikes to active maneuver preparation.
    • Kharkiv: Confirmed high-impact strike (likely ballistic/guided missile) on Shevchenkivskyi district resulting in 2+ casualties (031234Z). Active engagement continues in Vovchansk, with UAF claiming a successful strike on an RF UAV C2 post (031242Z).
    • Sumy: CRITICAL FACT: RF has confirmed the deployment of "Kuryer" Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs) with mine trawls clearing roads in Sumy Oblast (031237Z). This marks a significant shift, indicating preparation for complex breach/ground maneuver operations outside the immediate MLD sector. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Donetsk Axis (Myrnohrad): High KAB usage reported (031302Z), continuing to suppress UAF logistics/fire support in the rear areas. The logistics crisis identified in the previous report remains the primary operational constraint.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant change. Poor visibility in Donetsk sector favors RF maneuvering.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF resources are increasingly strained by the need to allocate counter-mobility and ISR assets to the Sumy axis, which threatens to degrade the kinetic defense posture in Zaporizhzhia (MLD).


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is to achieve kinetic success at Stepnohorsk while simultaneously forcing UAF to dilute reserves and attention across the northern border.

  • Tactical Adaptation (Sumy): The deployment of the specialized Kuryer UGV (previously identified for Stepnohorsk) to the Sumy region demonstrates RF intent to conduct operational shaping or preparatory breach maneuvers in the north. This is designed to hold UAF Northern OEC units in place. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
  • Logistics & Drone Integration: RF continues to demonstrate robust, decentralized tactical logistics through localized drone maintenance hubs (e.g., 15th GMRB "pharmacy station," 031237Z), enhancing mission sustainment at the tactical edge.
  • Strategic Intent: RF IO is tightly synchronized with kinetic actions. Maximalist claims (Vovchansk "liberation," 031301Z) and diplomatic counter-narratives regarding Western support (reparations loan/asset seizure, 031253Z) are designed to undermine UAF confidence and international political will.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF is standardizing the use of specialist breach technology (Kuryer UGV) across multiple Operational-Strategic Directions (OSDs), confirming multi-axis offensive preparation.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains robust, evidenced by confirmed SAR data in the previous report (260th Rocket Base score) and current decentralized drone support.

2.4. Intelligence Gaps and Collection Requirements

PRIORITY 1 (KINETIC): Immediate technical intelligence (TECHINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) to confirm the exact location and scope of Kuryer UGV activity in Sumy Oblast. Determine if this is a large-scale penetration attempt preparation or localized counter-mobility effort. (ISR/TECHINT) PRIORITY 2 (KINETIC): Confirm the current status of Vovchansk. Verification of the RF claim of "liberation" versus UAF strike reports. (IMINT/HUMINT)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF units continue to execute local defensive actions effectively (82nd Airmobile successful engagement, DPSU strike). However, operational C2 risk has risen due to internal administrative measures.

  • NEW CRITICAL RISK (C2 Instability): President Zelenskyy has ordered the immediate and significant administrative 'reset' (personnel replacement/supervisory board cessation) across the energy and defense sectors (031256Z, 031257Z). While strategically necessary for governance and accountability, this introduces short-term friction and potential decision-making paralysis in key logistical and procurement departments (DP-4). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Success: Confirmed tactical neutralization of RF assets (82nd Airmobile, DPSU Northern Sector strike).
  • Setback: Continued deep strike penetration of critical civilian infrastructure (Kharkiv).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate need to counter the Kuryer UGV threat in Sumy adds pressure on specialized counter-mobility teams and technical ISR assets already tasked with supporting the Stepnohorsk defense.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is leveraging the dynamic kinetic situation and diplomatic developments:

  1. Vovchansk Maximalism: Claiming the capture of Vovchansk to project overwhelming force in the North, aiming to validate the fixing operation.
  2. Strategic Coercion: Framing the EU's potential use of frozen RF assets as illegal and desperate, designed to deter further Western political commitment and delegitimize financial aid mechanisms.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The simultaneous pressure from deep strikes (Kharkiv) and the significant internal government administrative changes (Defense/Energy C2 reset) require careful management to prevent public perception of instability or crisis.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The EU's announced proposal for an asset-backed "reparations loan" provides a powerful counter-narrative opportunity for UAF/NCA, shifting the focus from military setbacks to securing long-term financial backing. The claimed US support for this initiative (031257Z) requires immediate diplomatic reinforcement.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

  1. MLD Consolidation (NLT 040600Z): The 37th GMRB penetration will stabilize west of Stepnohorsk. RF forces will leverage the established flank positions (e.g., Zelyony Gai/Prymors'ke area) and the continued UAF logistics deficit near Myrnohrad to achieve local operational success, likely involving envelopment or forcing a controlled withdrawal.
  2. Northern Probing and Fixation: RF forces in the Sumy region will utilize the Kuryer UGV assets to probe UAF defenses, attempting to identify weak points suitable for a limited border penetration (5-10 km) designed purely to fix remaining UAF strategic reserves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF forces in the Zaporizhzhia Axis achieve a rapid, deep operational breakthrough (20+ km). This success is magnified by the current friction in UAF defense sector C2 (DP-4), leading to delayed or uncoordinated reserve commitment. Simultaneously, the logistics crisis in Myrnohrad forces a chaotic retreat of Donetsk front units, leading to a synergistic strategic collapse across the Eastern Front.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Decision Point (DP)Condition / EventDeadlineAction Triggered
DP-1 (CRITICAL - Logistics): Myrnohrad IsolationUAF command confirms drone/UGV logistics saturation insufficient to meet Myrnohrad forces' minimal daily requirements. (Repeat from previous report)NLT 031400ZExecute PROTOCOL RETROGRADE DELTA. Initiate phased, controlled withdrawal or emergency air-drop resupply plan.
DP-2 (KINETIC - Sumy UGV):Confirmation that Kuryer UGV activity in Sumy Oblast is supported by mechanized infantry/armor follow-on forces (i.e., not purely mine-clearing).NLT 040900ZCommitment of Territorial Defense Reserves and dedicated anti-UGV/counter-mobility teams to the Sumy border perimeter.
DP-3 (IO/DIPLOMATIC): Strategic Sanctions InitiativeDiplomatic channels confirm willingness of key partners to immediately investigate and sanction the GUR-identified component suppliers.NLT 040900Z DECHigh-level GUR briefing to NCA/Diplomatic staff.
DP-4 (INTERNAL C2):Immediate adverse operational impact observed resulting from the defense/energy supervisory board reset (e.g., cancellation of critical supply contracts, failure of energy grid management).NLT 041800ZActivation of J-3/J-4 emergency procurement override protocols and military governance integration (MP) in critical energy infrastructure C2.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate priority shifts to addressing the emerging, confirmed ground threat in the North (Sumy) while maintaining the kinetic defense of the MLD axis.

PriorityActionTarget Unit/DomainTimeframe
CRITICAL 1 (NORTHERN COUNTER-MOBILITY)ACTIVATE COUNTER-KURYER PROTOCOL (CKP). Redirect available anti-UGV teams and specialized FPV assets (J-3) to the confirmed Kuryer UGV locations in Sumy Oblast. Prioritize kinetic denial of breach technology over general infantry targets.J-3, Northern OEC, DPSUIMMEDIATE
CRITICAL 2 (KINETIC RESPONSE - SOUTH)SUSTAIN FIRE PLAN DELTA. Focus MLRS/Tube Artillery fires on identified second-echelon armor assembly areas and VDV consolidation points (e.g., Prymors'ke vicinity) to prevent exploitation of the Stepnohorsk breach.Fire Support Command, Vostok OECCONTINUOUS
URGENT 3 (LOGISTICS EMERGENCY)MAXIMIZE LOG-DRONE TASK FORCE (LDTF) OUTPUT. Logistical stability in Myrnohrad remains paramount. Logistical command must confirm the LDTF is meeting required throughput (DP-1 monitoring).J-4, J-3 (Myrnohrad Sector)CONTINUOUS, NLT 031400Z CONFIRMATION
HIGH 4 (INTERNAL C2 MITIGATION)SECURE C2 INTERFACE. J-3/J-4 must establish redundancy and continuity of command procedures with key defense and energy infrastructure companies (e.g., missile parts procurement, energy dispatch centers) to mitigate immediate friction caused by the administrative 'reset' (DP-4).NCA, J-3/J-4, Ministry of DefenseIMMEDIATE
HIGH 5 (IO/DIPLOMATIC)AMPLIFY EU ASSET EXPROPRIATION NARRATIVE. Use the EU's "reparations loan" proposal to immediately counter RF IO regarding aid suspension. Frame this as a strategic, long-term funding victory for Ukraine and a critical blow to Russian state assets.J-7 Strategic Comms, NCA, MFANLT 031500Z
Previous (2025-12-03 12:34:33Z)

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