Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) - MLD EXPLOITATION PHASE // 031245Z DEC 2025

TIME: 031245Z DEC 2025 OPERATION: MLD EXPLOITATION PHASE / STEPNOHORSK / CRITICAL LOGISTICS FAILURE NEAR POKROVSK FOCUS: IMMEDIATE KINETIC INTERDICTION OF RF PENETRATION AND EMERGENCY LOGISTICAL RESPONSE IN DONETSK OEC.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is marked by kinetic escalation across multiple axes synchronized with RF maximalist strategic information objectives.

• Zaporizhzhia Axis (Stepnohorsk): The RF Vostok Group MLD remains the Main Effort. RF channels are disseminating claims of kinetic success (12:32), strongly suggesting the initial breach (DP-1, from previous report) may have been achieved or is imminent. (JUDGMENT: Breakthrough highly likely given synchronized RF IO.)
• Donetsk Axis (Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad): The situation in the rear areas is critical. Localized logistics in Myrnohrad (key forward logistics hub for units west of Pokrovsk) have fully degraded. Ground units are now entirely reliant on air and ground drones for supply and casualty evacuation, with wheeled transport non-viable due to constant fire contact (12:16). This confirms that major ground lines of communication (GLOCs) are cut or interdicted. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Northern Axes (Kharkiv/Sumy): RF is executing fixing maneuvers.
  • Confirmed deep strike on Kharkiv (Shevchenkivskyi district, 12:25).
  • Confirmed RF UAV activity targeting Shostka (Sumy region, 12:20) and Poltava (12:32).
  • RF claims capture of Vovchansk creates conditions for further advance toward Stary Saltov (12:10).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No change. Low visibility (fog) persists in the Donetsk sector, exacerbating UAF ISR deficiencies and the Myrnohrad logistical crisis.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are highly stressed. Reserves are likely being fixed by RF activity in the north. The primary tactical constraint is the loss of wheeled GLOCs near Pokrovsk, severely restricting UAF operational flexibility in the entire western Donetsk sector.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF intent is confirmed: Execute a rapid penetration at Stepnohorsk while preventing the commitment of UAF reserves by simultaneously pressuring the northern border and strategic rear areas (Poltava).

• New Strategic Intent: RF IO now explicitly signals maximalist aims, stating that "The next territorial demands of Russia will be greater" (12:05). This is designed to undermine current diplomatic mediation efforts (Dublin Track) and strategically coerce Western partners. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Deep Strike Targeting: The confirmed destruction of the STB television production facility in Kyiv (12:15) demonstrates intent to target core Ukrainian civilian and media infrastructure to degrade national morale concurrent with kinetic assaults.
• C2/Logistics: RF military channels report success on the developing Sumy front (22nd Regiment operations, 12:20), indicating coordinated resource allocation and C2 effectiveness across multiple operational areas.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF adaptation focuses on fixing UAF forces in the north using limited ground maneuvers and deep/strategic strikes (Kharkiv, Kyiv, Poltava ISR), ensuring UAF cannot reposition significant reserves to counter the Stepnohorsk MLD.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics are robust enough to sustain high-intensity, multi-axis operations.

2.4. Intelligence Gaps and Collection Requirements

PRIORITY 1 (KINETIC): Immediate confirmation of the depth and speed of the 37th GMRB penetration west of Dobropillya. Specifically, confirmation of control over the Stepnohorsk immediate defensive perimeter (DP-2 trigger). (ISR/SIGINT)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are holding defensive lines under massive pressure but are facing immediate operational challenges.

• Critical Constraint (Logistics): The failure of wheeled logistics in the Myrnohrad area (12:16) represents a systemic operational constraint in the Donetsk sector. UAF must rapidly transition to high-throughput air/ground drone supply chains or risk the collapse of the forward units. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
• Morale/IO Target: RF is explicitly targeting Ukrainian units (e.g., 225th Separate Assault Battalion near Huliaipole) with demoralizing narratives, falsely claiming they are acting as "blocking forces" (Zagrađotriad, 12:15). This requires proactive counter-IO messaging.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Logistics): Confirmed incapacitation of ground logistics for the Pokrovsk-area defense (Myrnohrad).
• Setback (C3I Infrastructure): Confirmed successful RF strike on Ukrainian media infrastructure in Kyiv (12:15).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Establishment of a dedicated high-throughput, emergency logistics coordination cell (LOG-DRONE Task Force) to support Myrnohrad. STRATEGIC REQUIREMENT: Urgent diplomatic capital expenditure (DP-3) to leverage the GUR sanctions data, reinforced by the confirmation of high EU fossil fuel payments to Russia (12:08).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is leveraging simultaneous high-impact narratives:

1. Kinetic Success: Maximizing claims of success at Stepnohorsk and in the North (Vovchansk).
2. Strategic Coercion: Explicitly threatening greater territorial demands (12:05).
3. Domestic Stability: Projecting strong governance through high-profile anti-corruption arrests and veteran benefits legislation (12:03, 12:19).
4. Targeted Demoralization: Using deep strikes on media infrastructure (12:15) and localized rumors (225th Battalion, 12:15) to degrade internal cohesion.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is being tested by simultaneous military and deep strike events. The Ukrainian official media response to the EU funding crisis (12:08) must be rapid and aggressive to prevent aid fatigue.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confirmed intelligence that the EU continues to pay Russia up to €1.5 billion monthly for fossil fuels (12:08) provides crucial leverage for the URGENT 3 IO counter-narrative (GUR sanctions loopholes), shifting blame from Ukraine's military effectiveness to Western policy inconsistency.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1. MLD Exploitation (NLT 031600Z): The 37th GMRB will achieve a confirmed operational breach (5-10 km depth) at Stepnohorsk. RF forces will leverage poor visibility and the air defense gap to push mechanized forces rapidly, attempting to establish a firing line that isolates Stepnohorsk defenders.
2. Myrnohrad Interdiction: RF forces near the former Pokrovsk sector will transition from harassing fires to a full blockade of drone/UGV logistics into Myrnohrad (NLT 040600Z), forcing a critical decision regarding UAF troop withdrawal or encirclement.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF forces in the Zaporizhzhia Axis, using their confirmed anti-MOG technology and weather advantage, bypass heavy UAF resistance and achieve a rapid 20+ km operational breakthrough towards the Dnipro logistics chain. Simultaneously, the logistical collapse at Myrnohrad forces a panicked, uncoordinated UAF retreat from the entire western Donetsk front, leading to strategic reserve commitment under adverse conditions and a significant loss of territory.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The priority remains kinetic interdiction at Stepnohorsk (CRITICAL 1) and immediate stabilization of the Donetsk logistics crisis (NEW CRITICAL 2).