Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT: ZAPORIZHZHIA AXIS – ASSAULT INITIATION PHASE (UPDATE 1)

TIME: 030800Z DEC 2025 OPERATION: FORWARD DEFENSE // SECTOR 1 (ZAPORIZHZHIA)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) remains focused on breaching UAF defenses at Stepnohorsk (Zaporizhzhia Axis). RF activity in the secondary axis at Huliaipole is escalating, with RF sources claiming a local "breakthrough," intended to fix UAF reserves (e.g., 82nd DSHB) previously committed to the now-lost Donetsk sector (Pokrovsk). Confirmed fighting continues in the Northern Kharkiv sector (Vovchansk, 08:02Z), serving as a strategic fixing operation.

• Stepnohorsk: Imminent mechanized assault threat remains HIGH.
• Zelyony Gai: Confirmed staging area for RF 37th Guards MRB. Critical target for pre-emptive interdiction (Mission VOID).
• Huliaipole: RF IO reports suggest success; UAF must urgently verify kinetic reality of the claimed "breakthrough" to prevent operational paralysis.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant change. Ground remains trafficable for mechanized movement, supporting the immediate launch of the RF MLD.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF forces executed a massive saturation strike overnight. UAF Air Force confirmed 83 enemy UAVs suppressed or shot down (07:50Z). While UAF AD performance remains strong (over 75% neutralization rate of the launch volume), the sheer number of targets necessitated high expenditure of interceptors, creating local and systemic AD resource strain.

• RF: Sustained deep strike efforts persist, with UAV activity confirmed heading toward deep logistics targets (e.g., Pavlohrad, 08:01Z). RF forces are synchronized, leveraging kinetic action with decisive strategic information operations.
• UAF: Defensive posture maintained, but readiness is degraded by the AD saturation strike and the critical loss of tactical AD coverage due to the 'Gerbera' anti-MOG threat.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION: Achieve rapid mechanized breakthrough at Stepnohorsk NLT 1200Z 03 DEC, synchronized with diplomatic coercion that leverages the perception of US political fragmentation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

KEY TACTICAL ADAPTATIONS:

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains peaked (260th Central Rocket Artillery Base SAR score 29.50) and capable of supporting the high-intensity MLD phase. No current logistical bottlenecks are identified for Vostok Group's immediate assault capacity.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective and demonstrating strong operational/information synchronization. The cancellation of the Zelensky-Witkoff/Kushner meeting (07:46Z) following the Moscow talks confirms the strategic effectiveness of RF influence operations targeting political decision-making in Kyiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces, particularly the 5th Assault Brigade defending Stepnohorsk, are under maximum kinetic and cognitive pressure. While high readiness is reported, the effectiveness of the forward defense is severely hampered by the tactical AD gap caused by the 'Gerbera' munition and the inability of MOGs to operate freely.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Strategic Setback: Cancellation of the meeting between President Zelensky and US proxies (Witkoff/Kushner) in Brussels. This represents a strategic IO defeat that aligns perfectly with RF messaging. (CRITICAL)
• Strategic Success: NATO Secretary General confirmed intent to spend €1 Billion monthly on US weapons procurement for Ukraine (07:37Z). Norway committed an additional $500 Million (07:58Z). This provides a crucial, long-term counter-narrative to political uncertainties.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint is the lack of protected C2 and AD coverage in the forward area. Resources must be diverted immediately to interdiction (kinetic) and survivability (EW/hardening) measures.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is exploiting the confluence of military and diplomatic events:

1. Military Inevitability: Amplification of the Pokrovsk capture (Krasnoarmeysk) and claims of breakthrough near Huliaipole to project rapid RF momentum.
2. Political Paralysis: Focus on the cancellation of the diplomatic meeting, portraying Kyiv as isolated and lacking reliable US support.
3. Domestic Projection: TASS emphasizes RF economic and employment strength, insulating the domestic population from high casualty rates and long-term economic instability.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian public channels are actively engaging in fundraising (Sternenko, 07:47Z), demonstrating continued high morale and civilian resolve. STRATCOM must immediately leverage the major NATO/Norway financial commitments to stabilize military and political morale in light of the cancelled US meeting.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Fact (Positive): Major long-term financial commitments from NATO and Norway confirm sustained allied material support, effectively contradicting RF narratives of total abandonment.
• Fact (Negative): The cancelled high-level US/UA meeting represents a tactical failure in diplomatic coordination, amplifying RF coercion efforts.
• Fact (Economic Pressure): Besiktas (Turkey) ceases operations with RF following a maritime incident, placing new, targeted pressure on RF shipping and trade routes.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF Vostok Group will execute the Stepnohorsk mechanized assault between 0900Z and 1200Z 03 DEC.

1. Preparation/Breach: Heavy preparatory fires and KAB strikes focusing on 5th Assault Brigade defenses. Deployment of 'Kuryer' UGVs to create armor corridors.
2. Exploitation: Lead armor columns (RF 37th Guards MRB) move rapidly through the breach, aiming for the operational depth, simultaneous with the delivery of a political ultimatum to Kyiv.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

The RF claim of a "breakthrough" at Huliaipole is used to draw UAF reserves, followed by a concentrated RF thrust from this secondary axis, timed with a successful precision strike on the 5th Assault Brigade C2 node (enabled by confirmed RF spy intelligence). This would achieve a deep, unexpected breakthrough, threatening UAF logistics lines to the Donbas.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The critical window for UAF to achieve kinetic interdiction of the RF MLD staging area (Mission VOID) is NLT 0830Z 03 DEC. Failure to strike RF armor concentrations in Zelyony Gai before 0900Z will likely result in a combat initiation that maximizes UAF risk.

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate priority is neutralizing the staging area at Zelyony Gai and ensuring C2 survivability under the new intelligence environment.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)