Situation Report

SITUATION REPORT: ZAPORIZHZHIA AXIS – IMMEDIATE THREAT EXECUTION PHASE

TIME: 030745Z DEC 2025 OPERATION: FORWARD DEFENSE // SECTOR 1 (ZAPORIZHZHIA)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational focus remains the Zaporizhzhia Axis, with imminent kinetic execution anticipated by RF Vostok Group. The strategic loss of Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) is confirmed (RF claim, UAF strategic intelligence assessment), validating the shift of the RF Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) towards Stepnohorsk.

• Stepnohorsk: Critical vulnerability persists due to confirmed flanking pressure from likely captured Zelyony Gai position (RF 37th Guards MRB assembly area).
• Donetsk (Pokrovsk): Now confirmed RF control. This frees RF forces previously committed to the seizure phase for potential redeployment or sustained fixing operations, threatening UAF reserves.
• Huliaipole: Continued tactical engagements reported (07:13Z), confirming the secondary axis is maintained to prevent UAF redeployment and protect the MLD’s eastern flank.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

No significant change. Terrain remains trafficable for mechanized forces.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF forces executed a major shaping operation in the deep battlespace, launching 111 UAVs (Shahed/Geran-2 equivalent) overnight (07:06Z), saturating UAF Air Defense (AD) assets. Current UAV activity is confirmed over the Southern Zaporizhzhia sector (07:28Z), highly indicative of last-minute tactical reconnaissance preceding the ground assault.

• RF: High tempo of ISR and deep strike maintained. Persistent use of 'Gerbera'/'Geran' family munitions continues to constrain UAF Mobile Fire Groups (MOGs).
• UAF: Active defense posture. While UAF reports successful shootdowns, the sheer volume of the overnight strike (111 units) represents a significant consumption rate of interceptors and necessitates immediate enforcement of enhanced EMCON procedures.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION: Immediate mechanized breakthrough at Stepnohorsk NLT 1200Z 03 DEC, synchronized with strategic coercion. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

KEY CAPABILITIES CONFIRMED:

2.2. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The sustained fire capacity indicated by the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base SAR score (29.50) is directly supporting the current saturation strikes and the anticipated heavy preparatory artillery barrage for Stepnohorsk.

• Judgment: RF sustainment has peaked for this specific MLD phase and is not currently a limiting factor.

2.3. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly centralized, demonstrating tight synchronization between the Vostok Group ground offensive timing and the Federal IO apparatus.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Units defending the Zaporizhzhia line (e.g., 5th Assault Brigade) are in high readiness for defense. However, operational readiness is hampered by the loss of tactical AD coverage and the severe strain placed on air defense resources by the overnight saturation strike.

• Constraint: The continued engagement of high-value units (e.g., 82nd Air Assault Brigade) in the now-secondary Donetsk axis following the fall of Pokrovsk severely limits the maneuver options for the UAF High Command to reinforce Stepnohorsk.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Critical): Confirmed high volume of enemy UAV saturation (111 units) overnight.
• Setback (Strategic): Confirmation of the RF capture of Pokrovsk solidifies the strategic loss of the Donetsk sector.
• Success (Tactical): Successful FPV drone strikes against RF personnel confirmed (Madyar’s Birds, 07:33Z), demonstrating continued asymmetric advantage in localized engagements.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate requirement is for effective and immediate EW countermeasures and disciplined EMCON to negate the 'Gerbera' threat and preserve remaining AD assets. The high expenditure of interceptors during the 111-UAV attack requires an immediate resupply assessment and prioritization for remaining interceptors.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Operations (IO) are actively exploiting the political friction surrounding US aid:

1. Aid Corruption: RF channels (Colonelcassad, 07:05Z) are amplifying claims of high-level corruption and theft of US aid (alleging cash transfers), aimed at reducing domestic support for Ukrainian leadership and undermining international confidence.
2. Military Triumph: The confirmed capture of Pokrovsk is immediately used to project military inevitability and success ("Day of Flags in Krasnoarmeysk," 07:17Z).
3. Morale Erosion: The D-S model indicates a moderate belief score (4.6%) concerning Morale Decline for Ukraine, suggesting the IO campaign is having some effect.

4.2. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

• Fact: EU member states agreed on a date for full refusal of Russian gas imports (07:11Z). This provides a long-term positive economic signal to Ukraine and maintains pressure on the RF economy, counterbalancing the immediate US aid narratives.
• Judgment: STRATCOM must leverage positive EU developments to mitigate the tactical narrative damage caused by RF misinformation regarding US support.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF Vostok Group will execute the Main Effort mechanized assault on Stepnohorsk between 0900Z and 1200Z 03 DEC, capitalizing on the tactical AD suppression achieved by the confirmed saturation UAV strike.

1. Preparation: Sustained heavy artillery and KAB strikes focusing on the 5th Assault Brigade defensive lines.
2. Breach: Focused deployment of 'Kuryer' UGVs and specialist engineering units through the Zelyony Gai staging area to breach the main mine belt.
3. Exploitation: RF 37th Guards MRB armor columns will follow the breach lanes, aiming for operational depth toward the main highway junction, simultaneous with the delivery of a political ultimatum to Kyiv.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

The RF MLD at Stepnohorsk is a feint. The actual deep exploitation occurs from the Huliaipole sector (57th/114th MRR), utilizing the current fixing operations, timed with the loss of the 5th Assault Brigade's C2 node (vulnerable due to MOG constraints). This thrust would bypass Stepnohorsk, moving deeper eastward to sever key lines of communication (GLOCs) towards the Donbas.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The critical window for UAF to disrupt the RF assault preparations (Mission VOID) is NLT 0900Z 03 DEC. Failure to achieve critical kinetic mass in the Zelyony Gai staging area by this time will allow the armor columns to initiate movement, rapidly reducing the effectiveness of all but short-range fire assets.

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ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate priority is to neutralize the tactical air superiority established by the 'Gerbera' threat and achieve interdiction of the RF assembly area at Zelyony Gai.

INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CR)