Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP 06:00Z)

TIME: 030600Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: ZAPORIZHZHIA AXIS: IMMEDIATE TACTICAL AND STRATEGIC CRISIS. RF MECHANIZED ASSAULT CONTINUES. CRITICAL DIPLOMATIC TRACK COLLAPSES.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The RF Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) on the Stepnohorsk/Orikhiv axis is confirmed and ongoing, leveraging the previously secured staging area near Zelyony Gai (Confirmed HIGH Confidence in previous Daily Report). The focus of kinetic activity is the forward line of own troops (FLOT) in the 5km defensive depth approaching Stepnohorsk. Secondary kinetic activity is confirmed in the Kupyansk direction (06:02Z), indicating a coordinated RF effort to fix Northern UAF reserves, reinforcing the assessment that Zaporizhzhia is the decisive theater.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Dawn transition complete. Visibility is HIGH. This favors RF aerial observation and the effective employment of long-range Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs) and Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) against UAF Mobile Fire Groups (MOGs) now executing Protocol HARP-1 (Dispersion).

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF defensive elements are attempting to implement decentralized defense (HARP-1). The RF attack appears robust and synchronized.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Intent (Updated): Exploit the initial breach and the confirmed UAF diplomatic vulnerability to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough toward Orikhiv, creating a fait accompli before potential Western political response can materialize. Capabilities: RF retains HIGH capability for synchronized kinetic action (Stepnohorsk) and fixing operations (Kupyansk). Furthermore, RF demonstrates HIGH capability in manipulating the global information environment to support military objectives (synchronizing Kremlin talks photo ops with assault launch). Recent Tactical Changes: RF deployment of assets to the Kupyansk direction (06:02Z) is a dedicated operational maneuver, confirming the Stepnohorsk offensive is supported by fixing efforts, not simply a local engagement.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

D-S metrics indicate high confidence in Logistical Shift: Disruption in Critical Supplies to Russian Forces (0.458). This suggests RF C2 is attempting to maximize offensive momentum now, expecting reduced supply throughput in the immediate future. This supports the assessment that the assault is intended to be sharp and decisive, relying on reserves already forward-deployed (260th Central Rocket Artillery Base surge confirmed in previous Daily Report).

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust and highly synchronized across domains. The immediate shift of Witkoff's flight path to Canada (TASS 05:37Z), combined with the photo-op summaries (Colonelcassad 05:37Z), demonstrates RF C2 successfully operationalized the diplomatic meetings as strategic cover for the kinetic action. However, internal friction among milbloggers (Desantnik 05:37Z, 05:51Z) criticizing politicians’ pronouncements indicates that the high human cost of the current offensive is being noted domestically, potentially affecting morale/troop willingness in protracted engagements.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: Immediate, decentralized defense (HARP-1). Forces must prioritize survivability over engagement until the exact RF force composition (CR-32) is confirmed. READINESS: All assets on the Zaporizhzhia front are at maximum readiness. Critical readiness requirement is the immediate effective deployment of counter-mobility teams to target the "Kuryer" UGVs and suppress the "Gerbera" threat through strict EMCON/EW measures.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

CRITICAL SETBACK: The confirmed cancellation of the European follow-up meeting between Ukrainian leadership and US proxies (05:57Z) is a major strategic failure that reinforces RF confidence in continued escalation. Setback: Continued RF Information Operations (IO) are effectively leveraging the perception of Russian diplomatic momentum. Success: UAF IO elements (05:45Z) immediately attempted to frame the Kremlin talks as non-productive, serving as a rapid, though ultimately insufficient, counter-narrative.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Critical Requirements:

1. Immediate acquisition of BDA (CR-32) on the Stepnohorsk axis.
2. Effective EW countermeasures against the "Gerbera" munition (CR-30 Update).
3. Urgent high-level strategic communication to mitigate the morale impact of the canceled diplomatic meeting.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)

The collapse of the diplomatic track shifts the IO focus from managing perception to managing crisis.

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF utilizes state media and key milbloggers to project an image of strategic control (Colonelcassad, TASS confirmation of Witkoff's immediate departure). This narrative is designed to paralyze Western decision-making and break Ukrainian resolve simultaneously with the kinetic assault. RF internal messaging is mixed, combining celebratory propaganda with somber acknowledgments of military losses (Dva Mayora, 05:51Z, 05:51Z), likely aiming to manage internal military dissent while maintaining external aggression.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic Ukrainian morale is highly vulnerable to the news of the cancelled meeting, which validates the previous reports of potential US aid cuts (CR-30 Update). Failure to provide a rapid, credible explanation and counter-narrative will lead to immediate morale degradation among frontline personnel and strategic planners.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The immediate flight of Whitkoff to Canada confirms the failure of the negotiations initiated in Moscow to open a viable diplomatic channel for de-escalation or coercion. This diplomatic void is being exploited by the RF kinetically. UAF must now lean heavily on European allies (e.g., confirmed Irish aid) to fill the perceived US vacuum.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The MDCOA identified previously is now highly probable given the successful diplomatic isolation achieved by the RF. RF forces will likely intensify the assault based on this strategic advantage.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The strategic gap related to US aid suspension is now exacerbated by the diplomatic setback and requires immediate prioritization.

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The critical operational requirement is to weather the tactical assault while simultaneously managing the strategic crisis caused by the diplomatic failure.

1. TACTICAL PRIORITY: DESTROY BREACHING CAPABILITY (J3 – Maneuver)

   • Action: Immediately task all forward-deployed Mobile Fire Groups (MOGs) and specialist teams (regardless of AD threat) to prioritize the destruction of "Kuryer" UGVs and Engineering Vehicles over tanks and IFVs in the lead RF element.
   • Effect: Crippling breaching capabilities maximizes friction and slows the rate of advance in the mined areas, buying time for stabilization and reducing the probability of the MDCOA achieving deep operational exploitation.

2. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS CRISIS MANAGEMENT (NCA/J9)

   • Action: Immediately issue a high-level presidential statement or media briefing acknowledging the cancellation of the meeting, but reframing it as RF fear of dialogue and a direct consequence of the ongoing, desperate kinetic assault (Stepnohorsk). Emphasize that Western support is measured in materials, not meetings.
   • Effect: Mitigates the inevitable morale decline and prevents the RF narrative of strategic victory from fracturing international support at this critical juncture.

3. REINFORCE NORTHERN FLANKS (J3 – Force Protection)

   • Action: Given the confirmed fixing operation in Kupyansk (06:02Z), ensure adequate reserve forces are maintained on the Northern fronts. Do not be tempted to over-commit Northern reserves to the Zaporizhzhia axis, as this plays directly into the RF strategic objective.
   • Effect: Prevents the RF from successfully creating a second operational breakthrough simultaneous with the Stepnohorsk main effort, maintaining the strategic initiative for UAF to counter-attack elsewhere once the current assault is suppressed.

4. EW/EMCON TIGHTENING (J6 – C4ISR)

   • Action: Immediately increase EW output targeting known RF ISR frequencies along the Stepnohorsk axis. Enforce maximum EMCON (Emission Control) for all forward C2 nodes, utilizing fiber or designated low-power relay systems to avoid targeting by precision assets leveraging the MOG neutralization gap.
   • Effect: Reduces the effectiveness of both tactical ISR and the "Gerbera" guided munition, enhancing survivability of forward fighting groups.

//END OF SITREP//