Sitrep 2025-12-03 05:34:31

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP 05:34Z)

TIME: 030534Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: ZAPORIZHZHIA AXIS: KINETIC ASSAULT INITIATED. RF VOSTOK GROUP COMMITTING TO MECHANIZED PUSH. IMMEDIATE BDA REQUIRED.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The predicted Stepnohorsk-Orikhiv mechanized thrust (MLCOA) is assessed as being initiated concurrent with this reporting window (Predicted NLT 05:30Z). The immediate operational area is the eastern flank defense line centered on the Huliaipole/Stepnohorsk approaches. RF forces are actively utilizing adjacent oblasts for supporting fires, confirmed by Vostok Group claims of drone strikes against personnel and vehicles in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (05:11Z). This suggests the RF intent is to isolate the main engagement zone by interdicting UAF reinforcement or movement to the north.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Current conditions are transitioning from pre-dawn to early morning (05:34Z), favoring low-altitude ISR and FPV/loitering munition use. Visibility is increasing, which will soon favor the RF’s employment of guided aerial bombs (KABs) and longer-range anti-tank systems if UAF mobility groups are exposed.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are confirmed maintaining security in adjacent areas (Kryvyi Rih reported "controlled situation," 05:33Z). However, the critical operational gap remains the force status of the 47th Mechanized Brigade (CR-27). RF C2 is confirming offensive operations across the theater, leveraging propaganda while engaging in kinetic action on the ground.

Factor	Assessment	Confidence	Justification
Mechanized Assault Status	INITIATED. The timeline has elapsed for the predicted MLCOA launch. Active kinetic strikes reported against the wider Zaporizhzhia region and Dnipropetrovsk Oblast confirm the simultaneous initiation of shaping operations.	HIGH	Previous SITREP prediction (NLT 05:30Z) matched by increased regional kinetic activity (05:10Z, 05:11Z).
RF Interdiction Strategy	Active Isolation. RF Vostok Group elements are actively targeting movement routes in Dnipropetrovsk, indicating an intent to prevent UAF maneuver/reinforcement to the Stepnohorsk front.	HIGH	Vostok Group (29th Army) drone claims explicitly target personnel/vehicles in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (05:11Z).
Friendly Flank Security	Stable but Under Pressure. Local control is asserted on the western flank, but RF continues to fix Northern reserves.	MEDIUM	Kryvyi Rih leadership reports "Situation Controlled" (05:33Z).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Intent (Operational): To rapidly transition the tactical advantage gained from the suppressed 47th BDE/MOG positions into a localized operational breach toward Orikhiv, while simultaneously using deep fires (drones in Dnipropetrovsk) to isolate the battle space. Capabilities: RF retains HIGH capability for synchronized fires, employing tactical ISR/strike platforms (drones) and leveraging diplomatic messaging (Ushakov/Witkoff readout) to manage the global perception of victory. Tactical Change: RF is explicitly leveraging its conventional deep-strike ISR assets (Vostok Group, 29th Army) for interdiction fires immediately adjacent to the main axis, shifting resources to ensure the forward breach forces are not counter-attacked or reinforced.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Despite the successful UAF deep strikes against fuel infrastructure (Tambov/Voronezh, previous report), RF appears committed to expending reserves to achieve the Stepnohorsk breach immediately. The high tempo suggested by the simultaneous kinetic action and propaganda push suggests RF command prioritizes kinetic momentum over resource conservation in the short term.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating high synchronization across all domains (Kinetic, IO, Diplomatic). The immediate public confirmation of the Putin/Witkoff/Kushner meeting (Ushakov, 05:05Z) serves as crucial strategic cover and context for the simultaneous ground assault. This coordinated approach validates the previous assessment of robust RF C2 structure despite tactical setbacks in precision targeting.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: UAF must now execute the decentralized defense protocols (Protocol HARP-1) under live fire. The posture is one of immediate, decentralized combat engagement focused on delaying the mechanized push. READINESS: High alert for all available decentralized Mobile Fire Groups (MOGs) and ATGM units in the Stepnohorsk sector. Critical action is required to engage the lead RF tracked vehicles before they gain momentum.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: Continued high effectiveness in the IO domain (EU gas termination 2027, previous asset confiscation news). Setback: The lack of confirmed BDA on the 47th BDE (CR-27) is now transitioning from a constraint into an acute operational vulnerability as the enemy attack is underway. Civilian casualty reported in Zaporizhzhia (05:10Z) confirms RF disregard for LOAC.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: CR-27 BDA must be obtained while delaying the enemy push. The critical operational requirement is the ability to sustain SHORAD/counter-drone defense against RF interdiction attempts (Dnipropetrovsk axis) targeting UAF reinforcement paths.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

The Information Environment is being leveraged by the RF to convince international observers and domestic Ukrainian audiences that the war's outcome is decided, coinciding exactly with the kinetic assault.

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF state media and milbloggers (Operatsiya Z, 05:31Z) are actively amplifying international reports (The Telegraph) that suggest Russia is winning and will dictate peace terms. This propaganda is directly linked to the diplomatic meetings confirmed by Ushakov (05:05Z) and is designed to fracture international resolve at the moment of peak kinetic pressure on the front line.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian sources are emphasizing positive geopolitical developments (EU gas cutoff 2027, 05:23Z), which helps maintain domestic morale by proving sustained Western pressure on Russia. However, the localized pressure and civilian casualties in Zaporizhzhia (05:10Z) risk degrading frontline morale if not successfully countered by immediate defensive action.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Ushakov readout confirms that RF is using diplomatic contact with US proxies (Witkoff/Kushner) as an aggressive information lever, not a channel for substantive de-escalation. The EU diplomatic moves (gas cutoff, previous asset confiscation) remain the key UAF advantage in the diplomatic sphere.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The MLCOA is confirmed as initiated. The key decision point is whether UAF ATGM/MOG units can impose friction sufficient to halt or severely delay the RF advance before RF ISR confirms the neutralization of the 47th BDE's residual fighting capacity.

COA	Description	Trigger/Timeline	Confidence
MLCOA (Mechanized Penetration/Immediate Exploitation)	RF Vostok Group armored columns penetrate the 5km defensive depth. The focus will be on forcing engagement with surviving UAF armor or MOGs to confirm targets for air/artillery suppression, paving the way for deep breach toward Orikhiv.	Currently Underway. Confirmed armored contact NLT 06:30Z.	HIGH
MDCOA (Deep Operational Exploitation & Strategic Isolation)	RF successfully suppresses key decentralized MOG/ATGM positions, enabling dedicated close air support (Su-25/KAB) (D-S belief 0.084) to eliminate residual resistance. Simultaneously, RF deep interdiction (Dnipropetrovsk strikes) proves successful, isolating the Stepnohorsk front from Northern reinforcement.	Successful penetration beyond 10km depth and confirmed destruction of 5+ UAF tracked vehicles. Timeline NLT 09:00Z.	HIGH
Alternate COA (Immediate RF Friction/Stall)	UAF decentralized resistance, utilizing the recommended Push-Pull protocols, cripples 50% of the lead RF mechanized reconnaissance force within 60 minutes, forcing the RF C2 to delay the commitment of the main combat reserves to re-task engineering assets.	Confirmed destruction of 3+ RF tracked vehicles by decentralized ATGM teams before 06:30Z.	MEDIUM

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The focus shifts from pre-strike detection to immediate BDA and assessment of enemy unit commitment/composition.

Priority	Gap Description	Collection Requirement (CR)	Confidence Assessment
PRIORITY 1 (CRITICAL - ALL ASSETS)	Immediate BDA of MLCOA. Confirmation of the precise location of armored contact and the immediate composition (tanks/IFVs/UGV count) of the lead RF element.	CR-32 (NEW - IMMEDIATE): All forward reconnaissance, FPV, and surviving ISR drones must prioritize line-of-sight visual confirmation and real-time grid coordinates of lead RF vehicles near Huliaipole/Stepnohorsk approaches.	HIGH
PRIORITY 2 (TECHINT/SIGINT)	RF Armor C2 Network. Confirmation that the MLCOA is being directed by the 37th GMRB Main C2, or if it is a decentralized, probing attack.	CR-30 (UPDATED): Continue intense SIGINT/ELINT monitoring for 37th GMRB C2 activation and shift focus to locating dedicated RF Fire Support Officer (FSO) radio traffic coordinating artillery/KAB support for the penetration.	HIGH
PRIORITY 3 (IMINT/SIGINT)	Effectiveness of RF Interdiction (Dnipropetrovsk). Assessment of damage/disruption caused by Vostok Group drone strikes on UAF mobility/logistics routes north of the main battle space.	CR-33 (NEW): Reroute deep ISR assets to monitor key interdiction points (bridges, road intersections) in the western Dnipropetrovsk Oblast for signs of kinetic activity or stalled UAF convoys.	MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The transition to active combat requires shifting resources from strategic preparation to tactical engagement and force protection.

EXECUTE COUNTER-MOBILITY PROTOCOLS (J3 – Maneuver)
- Action: Immediately transition the Push-Pull Engagement Protocols (recommended in the previous SITREP) from alert status to execution. Prioritize the destruction or crippling of Command Vehicles (CVs) and Engineering/Breaching Vehicles (UGVs/Mine Trawls) in the lead element to maximize tactical friction.
- Effect: A targeted attack on lead elements forces the RF MLCOA to stall, negating the advantage gained by the suppression of the 47th BDE and buying critical hours for CR-32 BDA acquisition.
PROTECT REINFORCEMENT ROUTES (J3/J6 – Force Protection)
- Action: Immediate activation of anti-drone/EW measures along all designated reinforcement and logistics routes connecting Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia. This is a direct response to the confirmed RF Vostok Group interdiction strikes (CR-33).
- Effect: Maintains the integrity of UAF mobility options and prevents the RF from achieving operational isolation (MDCOA condition).
MAXIMIZE IO COUNTER-PUNCH (NCA/J9)
- Action: Rapidly deploy media assets (video clips, presidential statements) linking the ongoing Stepnohorsk assault directly to the RF maximalist claims (Pevtsov) and the aggressive diplomatic posturing (Ushakov/Telegraph narrative). Emphasize that the EU asset and gas decisions prove the RF offensive is a desperate, short-term measure.
- Effect: Prevents the RF narrative of impending victory from taking hold internationally or domestically during the critical opening hours of the assault.
RECONNAISSANCE FOCUS SHIFT (J2 – Intelligence)
- Action: All reconnaissance assets (CR-32) must be instructed that a visual confirmation of just one UAF surviving 47th BDE fire group engaging the enemy is more valuable than a full BDA count of destroyed equipment.
- Effect: Confirmed residual fighting capacity significantly changes the RF operational calculus and may deter immediate MDCOA escalation.

//END OF SITREP//

Situation Report