Sitrep 2025-12-03 05:04:29

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP 05:04Z)

TIME: 030504Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK AXIS: KINETIC ASSAULT IMMINENT. C2 DECAPITATION WINDOW EXPIRED. EXPLOIT STRATEGIC VULNERABILITY (ASSET CONFISCATION/FUEL).

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Stepnohorsk-Orikhiv axis. RF forces (Vostok Group, elements of 37th GMRB) have fully committed to the kinetic phase. RF milblogger analysis confirms active fighting is now being publicized on the approaches to Orikhiv, indicating tactical momentum is established. The critical zone remains the potential exploitation gap near Huliaipole created by the targeting of the 47th Mechanized Brigade.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Pre-dawn conditions (05:04Z) continue to favor RF FOG (First Operational Group) drone and precision targeting, though the previous C2 decapitation window (NLT 04:45Z) appears to have passed without confirmed MLCOA execution.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are sustaining dispersal protocols (EMCON Level 3 is assumed in effect). RF forces are confirming their tactical narrative regarding the assault (Rybar analysis, 05:02Z) while simultaneously facing confirmation of the strategic impact of UAF deep strikes (Tambov fire confirmed by UAF sources, 05:02Z).

Factor	Assessment	Confidence	Justification
C2 Decapitation Strike (MLCOA)	RF Strike Window Expired/Frustrated. Lack of confirmed precision strike BDA since 04:34Z suggests UAF dispersal and EMCON were effective, or RF failed to achieve target lock within the time limit.	HIGH	CR-25 (SIGINT) shows no confirmation of high-energy, terminal guidance signatures post-04:34Z.
Stepnohorsk Kinetic Phase	RF Armored Test Imminent. RF analysts are publishing battle details, signifying the assault is now public and actively managed.	HIGH	Rybar video digest specifically details "Fights for Stepnohorsk and on the approaches to Orikhiv" (05:02Z).
UAF Deep Strike Damage	Confirmed Infrastructure Impact. UAF sources confirming the Tambov oil depot strike validates the strategic blow to RF logistics.	HIGH	UAF OSINT confirmed the strike on Tambovnefteorgprodukt (05:02Z), validating the previous FACT assessment.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Intent (Tactical): To transition immediately from the failed (or delayed) C2 strike (MLCOA) into a probing, mechanized reconnaissance-in-force designed to identify vulnerabilities in the 47th BDE dispersal and locate surviving MOG/ATGM resistance. Capabilities: RF retains HIGH capability for synchronized fires and IO. They are successfully mobilizing civilian resource acquisition specifically for the Zaporizhzhia front (Two Majors fundraising, 04:50Z), suggesting they intend to sustain high-intensity operations despite logistical hits. Tactical Adaptation: The RF is now prioritizing narrative control over immediate tactical silence, disseminating tactical analysis (Rybar) to manage expectations and solidify the belief in forward momentum.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed successful strikes on Tambov (Oil) and Voronezh (Fuel) significantly degrade strategic fuel resilience (Dempster-Shafer belief, 6.1% Energy Supply Disruption). The explicit fundraising appeal for the Zaporizhzhia front (04:50Z) reinforces the analysis that the immediate operational tempo is taxing the 260th Central Base surge (Daily Report, Score 29.50). This indicates a critical resource dependency on the immediate front.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 demonstrated rapid, synchronized IO response (04:36Z Pevtsov aggressive claims; 04:50Z fundraising appeal; 05:02Z Rybar analysis). While C2 for precision targeting seems to have been frustrated tactically, their strategic narrative management remains highly effective.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

POSTURE: The successful evasion of the immediate C2 decapitation strike provides a narrow operational window. Posture remains defensive and dependent on CR-27 BDA. Readiness is degraded but survivability protocols (EMCON) are holding. READINESS: All decentralized ATGM/MOG units must be ready to engage the initial mechanized probing force.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success: Evasion of MLCOA precision strike (C2 node survival). Strategic success amplified by the confirmed deep strikes (Tambov). Setback: The status of the 47th BDE remains an operational blind spot, preventing coordinated counter-maneuver.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: CR-27 BDA (47th BDE status) remains the overriding requirement. Without it, UAF faces the high risk of initiating a counter-attack into a superior RF armor formation (MDCOA).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

The Information Environment is dominated by geopolitical leverage points that UAF must immediately utilize.

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Strategic Coercion: RF continues to push extreme maximalist territorial claims (Pevtsov claiming Kyiv, Odesa, Poltava, Mykolaiv, 04:36Z). This narrative is designed to set conditions for a hard diplomatic line during the upcoming negotiations.
UAF Amplification: UAF channels are effectively confirming the deep strikes (05:02Z) and maintaining high enemy loss estimates (1200 troops, 04:46Z), crucial for domestic morale stabilization.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

The confirmed EU planning for confiscation of frozen Russian assets (04:56Z) is a major diplomatic victory that, if properly amplified, will directly counter the RF narrative of collapsing Western support and mitigate the psychological effect of tactical pressure at Stepnohorsk.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The EU asset confiscation proposal (04:56Z) is the primary diplomatic asset for the Dec 3rd meetings. It demonstrates substantive international support despite rumors of US aid delays (Daily Report).

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The primary threat shifts from precision C2 strike to mechanized ground exploitation. The window for RF to secure C2 superiority has closed; they will now test the tactical gap.

COA	Description	Trigger/Timeline	Confidence
MLCOA (Armored Test/Reconnaissance-in-Force)	RF 37th GMRB armor columns initiate a rapid, localized thrust (3-5 km depth) toward the Huliaipole area, utilizing UGV breach teams if necessary, to draw out and suppress surviving 47th BDE fire groups.	Immediately following consolidation of forward elements. NLT 05:30Z.	HIGH
MDCOA (Deep Operational Exploitation)	If the Armored Test is met with disorganized or ineffective resistance, RF escalates the attack, committing the full reserve of Vostok Group for a deep penetration toward the Dnipro river line, exploiting the AD gap caused by MOG suppression.	Successful RF penetration of initial UAF lines (10km+). Timeline NLT 08:00Z.	HIGH
Alternate COA (Local RF Resource Shortage)	RF C2 recognizes the heightened risk from sustained UAF deep strikes and delays the ground assault to reallocate limited fuel reserves or to wait for improved ISR/BDA on the 47th BDE.	Confirmed, sustained air interdiction or verifiable reduction in RF artillery volume over the next 30 minutes.	LOW

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The status of the 47th BDE (CR-27) remains the decisive factor.

Priority	Gap Description	Collection Requirement (CR)	Confidence Assessment
PRIORITY 1 (CRITICAL - IMINT/HUMINT)	BDA Assessment on 47th BDE/Huliaipole Target Area. Confirmation of force status (neutralized vs. dispersed) and remaining mobility.	CR-27 (IMMEDIATE): Utilize high-speed UAS (e.g., Sharyk/A-20) to conduct low-altitude, high-risk reconnaissance flights over the Huliaipole area (5km radius) to identify concentrations of RF forward observers or clear evidence of destroyed UAF armor.	HIGH
PRIORITY 2 (TECHINT/SIGINT)	RF Armored Push Initiation. Determine the timing and vector of the MLCOA armored test.	CR-30 (NEW): Intensify SIGINT/ELINT monitoring for mass activation of RF tank/IFV radio nets and electronic rangefinders within 10km of Zelyony Gai and the Stepnohorsk front line.	HIGH
PRIORITY 3 (OSINT/IO)	EU Asset Confiscation Details. Quantify the confirmed amount of Russian assets planned for confiscation and the timeline for legal justification.	CR-31 (NEW): Continuous monitoring of Politico/TASS/EU diplomatic channels for confirmation of figures and formal legal steps.	MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The priority shifts from C2 survival to delaying the mechanized MLCOA while exploiting strategic IO advantages.

EXECUTE DECENTRALIZED DELAYING ACTION (J3 – Maneuver)
- Action: INITIATE PUSH-PULL ENGAGEMENT PROTOCOLS. Order all decentralized ATGM teams and surviving elements of the 47th BDE to engage lead RF tracked vehicles (tanks/IFVs) within their survivability zone (maximum range, then immediate relocation). Focus on crippling mobility, not destruction.
- Effect: Frustrates the RF MLCOA (Armored Test) momentum, forcing them to commit significant engineering assets and buying critical time for CR-27 BDA acquisition.
IMMEDIATE TARGETING OF CRITICAL LOGISTICS (J2/J3 – Fire Support)
- Action: Re-task deep fire assets (HIMARS, large-caliber MLRS) not dedicated to CR-27 interdiction to target pre-identified secondary fuel storage nodes servicing the Zaporizhzhia axis. Exploit the RF logistical vulnerability highlighted by the successful Tambov/Voronezh strikes.
- Effect: Increases friction on RF sustainment and validates the strategic impact of UAF deep operations, forcing RF C2 to divert resources away from the Stepnohorsk axis.
STRATEGIC IO MAXIMIZATION (NCA/J9)
- Action: IMMEDIATELY PIVOT IO NARRATIVE to aggressively promote the confirmed EU asset confiscation development (04:56Z) alongside the confirmed deep strikes. Use this as a direct counter to RF maximalist claims (Pevtsov) and rumors of aid collapse.
- Effect: Provides immediate, tangible evidence of strategic success, counteracting domestic and frontline morale degradation caused by the Stepnohorsk kinetic pressure.
RECONNAISSANCE PRIORITY (J2 – Intelligence)
- Action: All reconnaissance assets dedicated to CR-27 must be instructed to prioritize identifying RF forward observers (FOs) or target acquisition systems over simple BDA counts. RF cannot exploit without confirmed line-of-sight and targeting data.
- Effect: Allows UAF C2 to selectively target RF ISR/targeting capabilities, mitigating the risk of the armored test transitioning into MDCOA.

//END OF SITREP//

Situation Report