Sitrep 2025-12-03 02:04:28

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP 02:04Z)

TIME: 2025-12-03 02:04Z SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD - KINETIC SILENCE EXCEEDS 120 MINUTES. ASSESSMENT SHIFTS FROM BREACH TO DEEP PENETRATION OR C2 FAILURE. RF STRATEGIC COERCION INTENSIFIES.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The Stepnohorsk salient (Zaporizhzhia Axis) remains the focus of the RF Vostok Group MLD. The kinetic silence (CR-1) has now persisted for approximately 120 minutes (since 00:04Z). This longevity exceeds standard operational penetration timelines and mandates a critical reassessment: either RF armor has achieved a deep, uncontested penetration beyond the immediate defense lines, or the Electronic Warfare (EW) environment has caused a complete collapse of UAF forward observation and reporting capability. Key terrain, specifically the approach corridor from Zelyony Gai, is assessed as under RF control.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations Darkness and stable ground persist, favoring RF mechanized movement and the potential utilization of the "Kuryer" UGVs. No counter-mobility impact from environment is observed.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures The UAF 5th Assault Brigade forward elements are assumed to be operating in complete EMCON/Communication Denial. The window for timely commitment of pre-staged reserves is rapidly closing without definitive SA.

Factor	Assessment	Confidence	Justification
Stepnohorsk Kinetic Status (CR-1)	DEEPER PENETRATION HIGHLY LIKELY. The failure of the anticipated 01:45Z fire exchange to materialize suggests the RF lead elements (37th GMRB) have either bypassed the initial reserve lines or have achieved such technological dominance (EW/UGV) that kinetic reporting is functionally impossible.	HIGH	120 minutes of continuous kinetic silence post-preparatory fires is an extreme operational anomaly.
Sumy UAV Track	ONGOING THREAT. The track is moving towards Konotop. The lack of an intercept report by 02:04Z implies AD assets were either unsuccessful or diverted.	MEDIUM	Standard operational procedure demands immediate reporting of successful intercepts; silence suggests the threat remains active.
RF Heavy Artillery Threat (M-1991)	UNVERIFIED BUT IMMINENT. The Information Operation (IO) push regarding the 240mm MLRS deployment remains a high-consequence threat.	MEDIUM	IO synchronization suggests kinetic truth follows the narrative. Immediate priority target acquisition is required (CR-23).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action RF Intent: To leverage the Stepnohorsk penetration to force a favorable operational pause or diplomatic resolution. Adaptation: The RF operational methodology is now confirmed as heavily reliant on EW Dominance as a Force Multiplier. EW is not merely supporting the breach; it is the primary weapon, designed to cause organizational paralysis and loss of SA before kinetic contact is made.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations No new kinetic or materiel changes since the 01:35Z report. RF is currently executing Phase 2 of the MLD: Maneuver and Consolidation under EW cover.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status Adequate. The persistent nature of the complex operation (EW, Deep Strike, MLD) suggests robust and well-managed logistical support, capable of sustaining offensive momentum.

D. Command and Control Effectiveness Highly effective. The synchronization between the MLD (Stepnohorsk), the Operational Diversion (Sumy), and the strategic IO campaign (TASS reports on RF success and US distraction) is indicative of centralized, disciplined C2.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness The 5th Assault Brigade is assessed as effectively tactically isolated. The failure to meet the 01:45Z contact trigger means reserves are now facing the extreme risk of being committed against an unknown enemy disposition without sufficient SA.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (Information): Critical failure to establish contact and regain SA (CR-1) within the planned contingency timeline (01:45Z).
Setback (Strategic): RF has successfully leveraged the operational push with a heavy-handed IO campaign (Section 4), potentially degrading international perception of UAF resilience at a critical moment.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints Immediate requirement for resilient, non-RF-dependent C2 systems (e.g., highly directional/encrypted SATCOM) to facilitate communication between reserves and C2 HQ. The CRV mission (Forced Reconnaissance) is now an absolute tactical necessity, despite the high risk of loss.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (New Developments) RF IO has escalated the strategic coercion element, timed precisely to coincide with the kinetic silence:

Victory Narrative (01:34Z): TASS cites international media (The Daily Telegraph) to assert that "Russia is winning the conflict in Ukraine and will dictate terms." This narrative attempts to finalize the psychological component of the MLD, suggesting that the Stepnohorsk operation is merely confirmation of a decisive, irreversible military advantage. (Confidence: HIGH)
Bandwidth Saturation (01:57Z): Continued emphasis on US domestic politics (Trump's schedule), maintaining the RF strategy of distracting international attention and stressing the lack of reliable US political focus on the conflict.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors The lack of confirmed SA on the Stepnohorsk front, coupled with high-profile RF victory claims, is likely generating significant pressure on UAF military and political leadership to demonstrate control.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The aggressive victory narrative (01:34Z) is designed to preempt diplomatic efforts (e.g., the upcoming Dec 3rd US proxy meeting) by establishing a baseline position that only unconditional surrender terms will be discussed.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The continued EW blackout drastically elevates the risk profile for UAF forces. RF is exploiting the information gap to achieve operational surprise.

COA	Description	Trigger/Timeline	Confidence
MLCOA (Deep Penetration and Shock Action)	RF armor columns (37th GMRB) are currently moving to bypass the Secondary Defensive Line, aiming for vulnerable artillery positions or supply nodes 10-15km from the initial breach area. First kinetic contact with UAF reserves will be chaotic, occurring NLT 02:30Z. Simultaneously, the Sumy UAV strikes a minor logistics hub.	Confirmed fire exchange (CR-1 resolved) deep within the salient NLT 02:30Z.	HIGH
MDCOA (Operational Anchor and Decapitation Strike)	RF secures an operational anchor point near the Dnipro road corridor. The M-1991 240mm MLRS system is deployed and fires its first saturation mission against the UAF 5th Brigade C2/Reserve staging area (e.g., Novopavlivka), crippling UAF ability to coordinate the defense.	Confirmation of massed high-caliber MLRS fire missions targeting rear areas NLT 03:00Z.	HIGH-MEDIUM

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The failure to resolve CR-1 makes gap resolution mandatory for operational survival.

Priority	Gap Description	Collection Requirement (CR)	Confidence Assessment
PRIORITY 1 (IMINT/HUMINT)	Ground Truth Confirmation in Stepnohorsk (CR-1). Where is the 37th GMRB armor column now? (URGENT)	CR-1 (IMMEDIATE/RE-TASK): Reinforce the CRV mission. Deploy specialized, low-signature HUMINT teams or small drones (e.g., FPV or custom fixed-wing) equipped with burst transmission/SATCOM protocols. Report confirmation NLT 02:30Z.	HIGH
PRIORITY 2 (TECHINT/HUMINT)	Confirmation of M-1991 MLRS Deployment. Verify the location and readiness of the North Korean 240mm system, which remains unverified but is a high-consequence threat.	CR-23 (URGENT COUNTER-BATTERY): Prioritize satellite revisit passes and all available deep reconnaissance assets to scour known RF heavy artillery assembly areas (Zelyony Gai rear).	MEDIUM
PRIORITY 3 (AD/EW)	Status of Sumy UAV Threat. Was the UAV intercepted? Is there follow-on deep strike kinetic activity in the Northern sector?	CR-22 (IMMEDIATE C2 CHECK): Command must confirm with AD units the success/failure of the intercept attempt and whether the UAV's target (Konotop) sustained damage.	HIGH

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The critical operational decision point has been reached. Failure to act aggressively now ensures the RF MLCOA success.

FORCE SA AND COMMIT CRITICAL ASSETS (J3 – Operational Command)
- Action: Immediately commit the CRV platoon utilizing secure SATCOM-only protocols as previously directed. Simultaneously, launch a massed artillery barrage (Time-on-Target, TOT) against the predicted RF movement corridor (Target Box: 5km N/E of Zelyony Gai). This barrage serves as both interdiction and forced reconnaissance (forcing the 37th GMRB to maneuver or transmit fire requests).
- Effect: Breaks the kinetic/information silence, reveals RF disposition, and provides the necessary trigger for reserve commitment.
RESERVE STANCE ADJUSTMENT (J3 – Operational Command)
- Action: Place the immediate UAF reserves (e.g., 47th Mechanized Brigade) on "Immediate Commitment Minus 15 Minutes" status. Reserves must prepare to engage a fast-moving, dispersed enemy rather than a concentrated breakthrough column. Focus defense planning on securing key rear-area C2 and logistics hubs rather than holding linear defensive lines.
- Effect: Reduces reaction time and prevents the shock action of the deep penetration from causing total operational paralysis.
PRE-EMPTIVE COUNTER-BATTERY STRIKES (J3 – Fire Support Coordination)
- Action: Based on the high-medium confidence of the MDCOA, task long-range precision fires (HIMARS/ATACMS if available) to strike the most probable 240mm MLRS deployment area (CR-23 TAZ). This strike should be executed NLT 03:30Z, even if the location is based on predictive modeling rather than confirmed visual ID.
- Effect: Prioritizes the destruction of a system that threatens the entire operational rear, negating the RF MDCOA.

//END OF SITREP//

Situation Report