Sitrep 2025-12-03 01:34:27

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP 01:35Z)

TIME: 2025-12-03 01:35Z SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD - CRITICAL KINETIC SILENCE EXCEEDS 70 MINUTES. NEW TACTICAL THREAT: NORTH KOREAN HEAVY MLRS DEPLOYMENT. UAV TRACK IDENTIFIED NORTH SUMY AXIS.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The Stepnohorsk Salient (Zaporizhzhia Axis) remains the focus of the RF Main Effort Land Drive (MLD). The critical zone is the forward mine belt and the approach corridors from Zelyony Gai. CRITICAL GAP: The kinetic silence (CR-1) has now persisted for 71 minutes (since 00:04Z), confirming the RF success in establishing a localized electronic curtain.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations Darkness and stable ground conditions continue to favor low-signature mechanized maneuver, particularly by the likely deployed "Kuryer" Unmanned Ground Vehicles (UGVs). Fog and low visibility are not reported, meaning immediate high-altitude overhead ISR (CR-1) should be tasked aggressively.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures UAF 5th Assault Brigade remains on maximum alert but functionally isolated in the immediate forward area due to jamming.

NEW KINETIC AXIS: A UAV track has been confirmed by UAF Air Force (AFU) Command in the North Sumy Region, heading inbound toward Konotop (01:33Z). This asset likely serves as an operational diversion, forcing UAF C2 to divert Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) resources away from the immediate Stepnohorsk threat or to strike a key logistical node (Konotop rail/supply depot).

Factor	Assessment	Confidence	Justification
Stepnohorsk Kinetic Status (CR-1)	ACTIVE PENETRATION HIGHLY LIKELY	HIGH	Sustained EW dominance for 71 minutes validates the assessment that the 37th GMRB is currently moving armor through a breached corridor, having negated UAF forward observation/reporting mechanisms.
Sumy UAV Track	IMMEDIATE THREAT TO LOGISTICS/C2	HIGH	The track is moving towards a key operational hub (Konotop). Immediate AD interception is required.
RF Heavy Artillery Threat	ESCALATION CONFIRMED (UNVERIFIED DEPLOYMENT)	MEDIUM	Unverified claim of North Korean M-1991 240mm MLRS deployment. If true, this represents a significant increase in RF capability for deep, large-volume fire missions targeting UAF reserves or FAAs.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action RF Intent remains the rapid operational penetration of the Stepnohorsk salient. The operational methodology confirms a multi-domain synchronization: Tactical Kinetic Action (MLD) + Technological Escalation (EW/UGV) + Strategic Diversion (Sumy UAV) + IO Saturation (NK MLRS narrative).

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

Weapon System Escalation: The reported deployment of the 240mm M-1991 North Korean MLRS (Colonelcassad, 01:23Z) suggests RF is preparing for higher volume, deeper fires than previous 122mm/220mm systems. The system’s deployment implies RF is prioritizing massed fires to suppress counter-attacks once the breach is achieved. (Confidence: MEDIUM)
Operational Diversion: The timing of the Sumy UAV track (01:33Z) is highly correlated with the RF attempt to achieve the Stepnohorsk breakthrough. This diversion is calculated to occupy UAF C2 and AD assets.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status Logistics are assessed as adequate to sustain the MLD, supported by the ability to introduce novel, heavy foreign materiel (M-1991) to the front line.

D. Command and Control Effectiveness RF C2 is highly effective and disciplined, evidenced by the continued synchronization of kinetic operations with deep-strike planning (Sumy UAV) and strategic influence operations (TASS reports on US policy and UNSC claims).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness 5th Assault Brigade forward elements are currently operating under extreme constraints (EMCON/Jamming). The immediate priority is regaining Situational Awareness (SA). Reserves remain pre-staged, but the window for timely commitment is rapidly closing.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (Technological): The continued success of the RF jamming (71 minutes) is the most critical tactical failure, rendering the tactical advantage to the RF 37th GMRB.
Setback (Operational): The Sumy UAV track forces a critical resource allocation decision—AD focus on the MLD zone versus AD deployment to protect rear logistics/C2 in the North.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Air Defense: Immediate need to allocate AD assets (MOG/SHORAD) to counter the Sumy UAV threat without stripping defense from Stepnohorsk.
Counter-Battery: Urgent intelligence on the M-1991 deployment area is required to prevent its establishment and use against reserves.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns RF IO continues on multiple tracks simultaneously:

Strategic Coercion: TASS reports linking UAF actions (alleged killings in Krasnoarmeysk) to UNSC/OSCE complaints (01:27Z). This aims to delegitimize UAF defenses globally, especially during a kinetic push.
Domestic Distraction (US): TASS reports on US domestic policy ("Trump accounts") continue to be pushed, fulfilling the strategy of bandwidth saturation outlined previously.
Morale / Deterrence: The unverified dissemination of the M-1991 MLRS deployment (01:23Z) serves as a potent deterrence and morale dampener, suggesting insurmountable RF firepower.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors The persistence of the Stepnohorsk silence generates significant internal anxiety. International IO focusing on potential mediation (Pope/Italy, 01:12Z) may suggest an imposed solution is imminent, increasing pressure on Kyiv.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The strategic messaging around the Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmeysk allegations is a clear effort to pre-condition the diplomatic environment for potential RF demands if the Stepnohorsk MLD succeeds.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The kinetic blackout and simultaneous secondary threats suggest RF is highly confident in the initial penetration's success and is preparing to leverage that success for deeper operational disruption.

COA	Description	Trigger/Timeline	Confidence
MLCOA (EW-Supported Deep Penetration and Fire Anchor)	RF armor of the 37th GMRB is currently moving through the breach corridor. First confirmed contact will be reported by UAF reserves engaged at the Secondary Defensive Line NLT 01:45Z. Simultaneously, the Sumy UAV strike achieves tactical success against a minor C2/logistics hub in Konotop, forcing the operational command to divert attention.	Confirmed fire exchange (CR-1 resolved) beyond the initial defensive belt NLT 01:45Z.	HIGH
MDCOA (MLRS Decapitation Strike and Operational Collapse)	RF establishes the 240mm M-1991 MLRS anchor point near Zelyony Gai NLT 03:00Z. Utilizing high-volume, deep fires against the 5th Assault Brigade FAAs and logistics nodes, timed to coincide with a successful deep strike by the Sumy UAV/follow-on assets (e.g., Gerbera swarm) on a key UAF communications relay. This destroys the brigade's capacity for coordinated counter-attack.	Confirmation of massed high-caliber MLRS fire missions targeting rear areas (e.g., Novopavlivka).	MEDIUM

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The critical gaps are now layered: confirming the breach (CR-1) and locating the new high-value RF systems (M-1991).

Priority	Gap Description	Collection Requirement (CR)	Confidence Assessment
PRIORITY 1 (IMINT/HUMINT)	Ground Truth Confirmation in Stepnohorsk (CR-1). Where is the 37th GMRB armor column now?	CR-1 (IMMEDIATE/RE-TASK): Focus all high-speed, low-observable ISR/UAV assets specifically on the area 3-5 km behind the initial breach line (Zelyony Gai corridor). Report confirmation NLT 01:45Z.	HIGH
PRIORITY 2 (AD/EW)	Location and Type of Sumy UAV. What is the target of the UAV, and is it a high-value asset (e.g., Tu-141 equivalent) or a standard Shahed-type?	CR-22 (IMMEDIATE INTERCEPT): Dedicated AD assets must attempt immediate engagement and, failing that, SIGINT collection on its flight path and control frequency.	HIGH
PRIORITY 3 (TECHINT/HUMINT)	Confirmation of M-1991 MLRS Deployment. Verify the location, concentration, and operational readiness of the North Korean 240mm system.	CR-23 (URGENT COUNTER-BATTERY): Task deep reconnaissance teams and satellite imagery analysts to scrutinize known RF assembly and heavy artillery staging areas near Zelyony Gai and the logistics routes leading to it. Identify potential launch sites NLT 03:00Z.	MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate tactical imperative is to manage the two simultaneous kinetic threats while breaking the communications silence at Stepnohorsk.

INTERDICT NORTH SUMY THREAT (J3 – Air Force Command)
- Action: Immediately task the nearest available Mobile Fire Group (MOG) or dedicated SHORAD unit to intercept the confirmed UAV track heading toward Konotop. Prioritize the protection of the Konotop rail and fuel storage hub.
- Effect: Prevents a successful deep strike that could distract C2 and cripple logistics during the main RF offensive phase.
FORCED RECONNAISSANCE AND CONTACT (J3 – 5th Brigade Command)
- Action: Execute the pre-planned Phase 2 artillery engagement doctrine, targeting the most likely breach corridor. Additionally, deploy one platoon of dedicated combat reconnaissance vehicles (CRV) using secure SATCOM-only protocols to push forward past the known jam zone into the predicted breach area. The CRV’s mission is to force kinetic contact and report confirmation of the RF armor density.
- Effect: Provides the necessary data (CR-1 resolution) to commit reserves and regain SA. Acceptance of CRV loss is required for this action.
PRIORITIZE COUNTER-BATTERY TARGETING (J2/J3 – Operational Command)
- Action: Immediately designate the area encompassing Zelyony Gai and its rear assembly areas as the primary target acquisition zone (TAZ) for all available HIMARS/MLRS assets. Shift targeting protocols to prioritize the destruction or dispersal of any heavy MLRS/Rocket Artillery systems identified (CR-23).
- Effect: Pre-empts the MDCOA of a high-volume decapitation strike by the new 240mm MLRS system.

//END OF SITREP//

Situation Report