Sitrep 2025-12-03 01:04:26

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP 01:04Z)

TIME: 2025-12-03 01:04Z SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD - KINETIC SILENCE PERSISTS. HIGH PROBABILITY OF EW-SUPPORTED DEEP PENETRATION. MDCOA C2 STRIKE WINDOW EXPIRED.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The Stepnohorsk Salient (Zaporizhzhia Axis) remains the focus of the RF Main Effort Land Drive (MLD). The critical zone is the forward mine belt and the approach corridors from Zelyony Gai. CRITICAL GAP: 29 minutes have elapsed since the previous SITREP (00:35Z) without confirmed kinetic reporting (CR-1).

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations Darkness and stable ground conditions continue to favor RF mechanized maneuver and infiltration, especially for low-signature assets ("Kuryer" UGVs).

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures UAF 5th Assault Brigade remains on maximum alert. RF Vostok Group's 37th GMRB is assessed to be actively executing the breach operation despite the continued lack of reporting.

Factor	Assessment	Confidence	Justification
Stepnohorsk Kinetic Status	UNCONFIRMED CONTACT (CRITICAL GAP REMAINS)	HIGH	64 minutes (since 00:00Z) without contact reporting strongly validates the P2 assessment: RF is employing heavy, localized Electronic Warfare (EW) jamming to facilitate a "Cold Launch" penetration and achieve local communications blackout.
MDCOA C2 Strike	DELAYED / ABORTED	HIGH	The predicted MDCOA (C2 strike window: 00:35Z - 01:00Z) passed without confirmed high-speed missile track detection (CR-16). The immediate risk to C2 HQ is temporarily reduced, but the threat remains prioritized.
RF Logistics Support	CONFIRMED	MEDIUM	Social media reports confirm continued civilian logistic support ("VECHE" funding tactical medical kits and vests). This sustains morale and indicates RF intent to maintain a high-attrition, high-tempo fight.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action RF Intent remains rapid penetration of Stepnohorsk defenses. The sustained communications blackout suggests RF capabilities have successfully negated UAF forward reporting mechanisms, allowing the 37th GMRB to achieve a greater degree of surprise than anticipated.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations The observed adaptation is the prioritization of EW dominance over immediate C2 decapitation. By achieving communications silence, the RF minimizes UAF reactive artillery fire and obscures the success/failure of the initial breach phase conducted by "Kuryer" UGVs.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status Adequate. The civilian support infrastructure (VECHE) demonstrates resilience in sustaining combat units with basic but critical equipment (tactical medicine).

D. Command and Control Effectiveness RF C2 remains highly disciplined, demonstrated by the continued synchronization of: 1) Tactical EW application; 2) Strategic IO (Kushner narrative); and 3) Concurrent domestic noise generation (Pleiades, Razin legal case) to occupy UAF/Western analysts during the MLD execution.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness 5th Assault Brigade is presumed executing defensive protocols. The lack of kinetic confirmation raises critical concern over UAF ability to detect and report an RF penetration after the initial defensive line. The ability to transition from "Alert" to "Commit Reserves" is currently compromised by the CR-1 gap.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success (Tactical): The expiration of the high-risk MDCOA C2 strike window (00:35Z-01:00Z) suggests RF may not have successfully identified or targeted C2 nodes, or UAF hardening/dispersion protocols (Protocol HARP-1) were effective. (ASSESSMENT)
Setback (Operational): The sustained loss of communications (64 minutes) in the Stepnohorsk AO is an operational failure, regardless of cause, indicating UAF forward sensor/communication redundancy was insufficient against the specific EW threat employed.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Counter-EW: Urgent need to deploy hardened SIGINT teams to pinpoint the jamming source and frequency bands.
IMINT: Immediate requirement for persistent overhead Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets (TB2, satellite tasking, or deep penetration drones) to visually confirm ground truth in the Stepnohorsk AO.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns RF IO strategy continues the calculated saturation of the information space:

Strategic Distraction: TASS reports on the astronomical event (Pleiades) and domestic legal issues (Razin) are low-value but high-volume, designed to dilute analytical focus and bandwidth during the kinetic phase.
Internal Morale: The VECHE humanitarian aid message supports the domestic narrative of sustained effort and civilian support for the war effort, buffering the impact of expected high casualty rates from the MLD.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors Domestic Ukrainian morale is highly dependent on resolving the Stepnohorsk situation. Continued silence coupled with RF IO narratives could generate anxiety regarding the operational situation.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The Dempster-Shafer analysis suggesting "Troop Movement: Reinforcement by Russian in Belgorod direction" (0.18) requires STRATCOM monitoring. This is a potential future strategic move that could pressure the Kharkiv axis, drawing resources away from Zaporizhzhia if the Stepnohorsk MLD succeeds.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The failure of the immediate MDCOA C2 strike reinforces the assessment that RF is prioritizing localized tactical success under EW cover.

COA	Description	Trigger/Timeline	Confidence
MLCOA (EW-Supported Tactical Penetration)	RF Vostok Group achieved a breach using "Kuryer" UGVs and infantry infiltration NLT 00:30Z. The 37th GMRB armor column is currently moving through the breach corridor. First contact will be close-range, high-intensity, and highly localized, involving advanced fire-and-forget AT assets.	Confirmed visual IMINT of RF armor movement past the initial mine belt (NLT 01:30Z).	HIGH
MDCOA (Delayed C2 Strike with Secondary MLD)	RF utilizes the operational quiet to prepare a follow-on strike against C2 nodes (using a loitering asset like Lancet or Gerbera, or a secondary high-speed missile system), timed to coincide with a secondary armor thrust (e.g., from Zelyony Gai) designed to exploit the disarray caused by the MLCOA.	Confirmed location/destruction of a UAF forward observation post (indicating RF ground force presence) followed by a high-speed track detection (CR-16).	MEDIUM
ALCOA (Strategic Redirection)	RF operational planners halt the Stepnohorsk MLD due to persistent technical problems (e.g., "Kuryer" failure, EW platform disruption) and redirect attention (and the 37th GMRB) toward the Belgorod/Kharkiv axis (supported by the Dempster-Shafer hypothesis).	Confirmation of RF vehicle withdrawal from Zelyony Gai AND rapid kinetic escalation near Kharkiv (NLT 06:00Z).	LOW

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The CR-1 gap (kinetic status) remains paramount. The immediate focus must shift from anticipating the strike to confirming the ground penetration.

Priority	Gap Description	Collection Requirement (CR)	Confidence Assessment
PRIORITY 1 (IMINT/HUMINT)	Ground Truth Confirmation in Stepnohorsk. Has the MLD begun, and if so, what is the depth of the penetration?	CR-1 (URGENT/PERSISTENT): Task all available ISR/UAV assets (including civilian or specialized deep-penetration drones) to conduct low-altitude, high-speed passes over the Stepnohorsk forward area, focusing on the Zelyony Gai corridor, using optical and thermal sensors. Report confirmation NLT 01:15Z.	HIGH
PRIORITY 2 (SIGINT/TECHINT)	Location and Spectrum of RF EW Platform. Pinpoint the source of the communication blackout to mitigate its effects.	CR-20 (IMMEDIATE): Dedicated EW teams must prioritize monitoring for wideband jamming signatures and attempt rapid triangulation. Focus on identifying potential ground-based "Tirada-2" or similar systems.	HIGH
PRIORITY 3 (HUMINT/COUNTER-UGV)	Status of the Mine Belt and "Kuryer" Effectiveness. Are the forward defenses still intact?	CR-21 (ACTIONABLE): Forward patrols utilizing secured SATCOM must visually confirm if RF UGVs have successfully cleared breach lanes or if specialized anti-UGV teams have engaged.	MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The tactical imperative is to achieve kinetic confirmation immediately and deploy reserves to counter the likely ongoing penetration.

FORCE KINETIC CONTACT (J3 – 5th Brigade Command)
- Action: Cease passive listening. Immediately initiate pre-planned, phased artillery barrages (Counter-Battery and Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses - SEAD) targeting known RF assembly/staging areas (Zelyony Gai) and predicted breach points. The goal is not damage, but to force a reportable enemy reaction (acoustic detection, visual flare, or radio traffic).
- Effect: Breaks the tactical silence, forces RF to move or communicate, and provides data for CR-1 resolution.
ACTIVATE RESERVE RESPONSE (J3 – Operational Command)
- Action: Pre-stage the designated tactical reserves (e.g., 2nd Battalion, 5th Assault) to their Forward Assembly Areas (FAAs), ready for commitment upon CR-1 confirmation. Given the high probability of a penetration, reserves must be mobile and prepared to conduct counter-attack or delaying actions deep inside the defensive zone, rather than waiting at rear staging points.
- Effect: Reduces reaction time for critical counter-maneuver once the enemy's location is known.
Harden Satellite Connectivity (J6 – Communications)
- Action: Implement SATCOM-only reporting protocol for all forward observation posts and C2 elements immediately, accepting the risk of detection over the risk of communications failure. All ground-based radio networks susceptible to RF jamming must enter Emission Control (EMCON).
- Effect: Bypasses the localized ground jamming threat, providing a reliable reporting vector for CR-1.

//END OF SITREP//

Situation Report