Archived operational intelligence briefing
TIME: 2025-12-03 00:00Z SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD EXECUTION – PHASE TRANSITION CONFIRMED. T-MINUS 0.
A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The Stepnohorsk Salient (Zaporizhzhia Axis) remains the focus. The RF Vostok Group main effort launch window has been reached (NLT 00:00Z). Critical terrain is the forward mine belt shielding the 5th Assault Brigade defenses.
B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations Night conditions and stable ground remain favorable for RF heavy armor maneuver.
C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures RF operations have concluded the preparatory phase. Although the predicted 23:45Z massed artillery barrage initiation (CR-1) has not been explicitly confirmed via open sources, all strategic and informational indicators confirm the RF commitment to kinetic execution at 00:00Z. RF continues fixation across other axes:
| Factor | Assessment | Confidence | Justification |
|---|---|---|---|
| RF Main Effort (Stepnohorsk) | Ground Assault Initiated | HIGH | Complete synchronization of diplomatic failure (Whitkoff departure), IO justification, and tactical fixation efforts adhere perfectly to the MLCOA timeline. |
| RF Fixation Efforts | Sustained and Dispersed | HIGH | Confirmed KAB activity in Donetsk and UAV activity in Chernihiv demonstrates sustained multi-axis pressure designed to fix UAF reserves. |
| UAF 5th Brigade Posture | Immediate Defense Transition | HIGH | Forces are at maximum readiness and must now transition from passive preparation to active defense execution. |
A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action RF Intent is confirmed: Achieve rapid penetration of the Stepnohorsk defenses immediately following the conclusion of the diplomatic window.
B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations No deviation from the overall strategy of utilizing IO and fixation to mask the Stepnohorsk main effort. The lack of confirmation on CR-1 (massed artillery) is the most critical unknown influencing immediate friendly response.
C. Logistics and Sustainment Status Status remains CRITICAL. RF has the confirmed sustainment capacity for high-intensity operations exceeding 72 hours.
D. Command and Control Effectiveness C2 effectiveness is assessed as HIGH. The complex, time-sensitive coordination across diplomatic, IO, and kinetic domains suggests disciplined and centralized control (Vostok Group / RF General Staff).
A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness The 5th Assault Brigade must now assume contact has been made or is seconds away. All pre-assault disruption recommendations are now moot if not already executed. The focus shifts entirely to tactical defense and survivability.
B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
C. Resource Requirements and Constraints
A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns The RF narrative has achieved its immediate objective: framing the Stepnohorsk offensive as a necessary kinetic response after diplomacy failed.
B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors UAF command must be prepared to aggressively counter the negative strategic IO impact of the canceled Kyiv meeting, linking the RF diplomatic failure directly to the immediate, desperate kinetic escalation at Stepnohorsk.
C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The diplomatic track (Dublin/Kyiv) is momentarily broken. The outcome of the next 72 hours at Stepnohorsk will entirely determine the future posture of international support and the possibility of reviving negotiations.
The kinetic phase has begun (or is initiating now). Attention must immediately shift to the tactical execution timeline and the MDCOA.
| COA | Description | Trigger/Timeline | Confidence |
|---|---|---|---|
| MLCOA (Stepnohorsk MLD Execution) | RF Vostok Group initiates the 37th GMRB armored assault on schedule (00:00Z). Initial preparatory fires are highly compressed or conducted via KAB saturation, followed immediately by UGV/armor breach attempt. | First detection of kinetic contact in the forward defense area (confirmed UGV engagement or heavy armor penetration). | HIGH |
| MDCOA (Decapitation Strike) | RF executes high-speed precision missile strike (Iskander/Kalibr) targeting UAF 5th Assault Brigade HQs/C2 nodes between 00:00Z and 00:15Z, coinciding with the ground assault chaos. | Confirmed track detection of inbound high-speed missiles targeting known C2 coordinates (e.g., Novomykolaivka area). | HIGH |
| ALCOA (Significant Delay/Halt) | RF delays the assault by 2+ hours due to catastrophic internal failure (logistics breakdown, communications failure) or devastating, confirmed BDA from unconfirmed UAF pre-emptive fires. | No kinetic activity reported at Stepnohorsk NLT 00:30Z. | LOW |
The requirement has shifted from pre-emptive confirmation to immediate tactical assessment (BDA and C2 protection).
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence Assessment |
|---|---|---|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (IMINT/HUMINT) | Confirmation of MLD Initiation and Immediate Assessment of Penetration. Where exactly did the 37th GMRB attack? Is the UGV threat realized? | CR-1 (URGENT/PERSISTENT): Immediate, granular reporting from 5th Assault Brigade forward observation posts and FPV teams on RF axis of advance and type of assets engaged (UGVs, tanks, APCs). Report first armor engagement NLT 00:05Z. | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 2 (FRIENDLY BDA) | Effectiveness of Pre-emptive Fires. Were the urgent long-range fires against Zelyony Gai (CR-18) executed, and did they cause attrition? | CR-18 (IMMEDIATE INTERNAL): Final status report from UAF Fire Support Command (J3) confirming expenditure and initial BDA. This BDA estimate is critical for reserve commitment decisions. | HIGH |
| PRIORITY 3 (TECHINT/AD) | C2 Strike Warning. Detection and tracking of high-speed ballistic/cruise missiles targeting operational depth C2 nodes. | CR-16 (Immediate Intercept): Strategic AD assets must report confirmed tracking/engagement of any hostile high-speed air contacts targeting C2 nodes immediately upon detection (T-5 minutes warning). | HIGH |
The defense must execute immediate, decisive tactical actions to survive the initial breach attempt and prevent command paralysis.
INITIATE COUNTER-MOBILITY PROTOCOLS (J3 – Engineering/Forward Units)
ACTIVATE C2 HARDENING (J6/J3 – Force Protection)
IGNORE FIXATION EFFORTS (J3 – Force Management)
//END OF SITREP//
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