Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 2025-12-02 22:45Z SUBJECT: RF KINETIC INITIATION CONFIRMED: STRATEGIC DECEPTION VIA MULTI-DOMAIN STRIKES. STEPNOHORSK MLD EXECUTION IMMINENT (NLT 0000Z).

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The Main Effort remains the Stepnohorsk Salient (Zaporizhzhia Axis), where the RF 37th GMRB is staged for the Main Land Drive (MLD) breakthrough. Control of the Pokrovsk-Zelyony Gai axis confirms the RF freedom of maneuver for the assault.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations Night conditions favor RF reconnaissance and mechanized movement utilizing advanced optics. Low cloud cover over the Black Sea region provides cover for UAV ingress routes. Ground conditions remain suitable for heavy mechanized armor.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures The diplomatic off-ramp has officially failed ("no compromises found," 22:06Z, 22:25Z). RF has responded immediately with coordinated, multi-axis kinetic activity designed to fragment UAF Air Defense (AD) resources and mask the final MLD launch preparation.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action RF Intent is kinetic coercion. The current strategy is to launch a synchronized multi-domain strike package across key strategic nodes before the MLD:

1. Distraction/Fixing: UAV swarm on Southern critical infrastructure (Pivdenne/Odesa region, Mykolaiv) forces UAF AD to commit resources away from the Stepnohorsk main effort.
2. Pressure/Threat: Ballistic missile alert from Kursk (22:13Z) fixes high-value AD systems (Patriot/NASAMS) in central/northern regions, preventing their shift south to cover the MLD.
3. Ground Penetration: Leverage the resulting AD vacuum over Stepnohorsk for the 37th GMRB MLD, utilizing "Kuryer" UGVs to ensure rapid breaching under KAB cover.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations The key adaptation is the synchronization timing. RF is no longer delaying kinetic action until the MLD launch but using deep strikes as the immediate, strategic signal of diplomatic failure, maximizing the coercive effect and operational surprise for the ground assault. RF Group 'North' is also observed employing counter-drone trap systems (22:10Z), indicating an active counter-ISR/EW effort near the border regions.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status SAR score remains CRITICAL (29.50). RF has the confirmed logistic capacity to sustain high-intensity operations on both the Stepnohorsk axis (Artillery/Armor) and the deep strike axis (Missiles/UAVs). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

D. Command and Control Effectiveness Strategic and Operational C2 effectiveness is assessed as HIGH. The immediate, synchronized execution of deep fires following Ushakov's press conference (22:17Z, confirming diplomatic failure) demonstrates seamless integration between the Kremlin’s political signaling and Vostok Group/Aerospace Forces operational orders.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness UAF is currently reacting to the MDCOA/distraction phase (UAV/Ballistic strikes). The 5th Assault Brigade remains poised for defense, but resources must be carefully managed to prevent tactical overextension responding to the Southern threat. Activation of local AD/SHORAD for coastal protection is necessary but must not compromise the integrity of C2 node defense in Zaporizhzhia.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (AD Fragmentation): The necessity of allocating AD assets to counter the 12+ UAVs targeting port infrastructure (Pivdenne) directly reduces the AD depth available to mitigate KAB strikes or the MDCOA (C2 Decapitation) against the 5th Brigade.
• Success (Information): Swift local media reporting (e.g., Sternenko, 22:06Z) immediately clarifying the failure of compromise helps preempt RF disinformation regarding territorial negotiations.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. AD Interceptors: Immediate, high-volume expenditure of low-cost AD munitions (e.g., MANPADS, ZSU, dedicated MOGs replacement systems) is required to address the UAV swarm without depleting high-value interceptors needed for ballistic threats (Kursk) or KAB defense (Stepnohorsk).
2. Time: The window for MLD initiation is narrowing (current estimate NLT 0000Z). Final hardening protocols (EMCON, decoy deployment) for the 5th Brigade C2 must be completed immediately.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns RF IO is executing a classic "Good Cop/Bad Cop" narrative:

1. Good Cop (TASS/Ushakov): Stating that dialogue is open, friendly greetings were exchanged, and "peace prospects certainly did not move away" (22:03Z).
2. Bad Cop (Kotsnews/Colonelcassad): Simultaneously confirming "Kompromisy ne naydeny" (Compromises not found, 22:10Z).

• Judgment: This signaling is designed to convey to US/international partners that negotiations are possible, but only after RF secures tactical gains via the kinetic operation (MLD). The failure to compromise provides the political justification for the ongoing escalation.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors High state of alert nationally due to the ballistic and drone threats. Maintaining high morale requires immediate and visible successful interdiction of the Southern UAV threats, coupled with the clear communication that the primary ground threat (Stepnohorsk) is contained/anticipated.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The core diplomatic fact is the hardening of RF territorial demands, validated by the immediate kinetic response. The failure of the Putin-Witkoff talks to produce an immediate ceasefire confirms that the Dec 3rd follow-up meeting is contingent on the outcome of the Stepnohorsk battle.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The previous MLCOA (Immediate MLD) remains highly probable but is now assessed to be masked by the current deep strike synchronization.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The focus remains on confirming the final ground assault launch sequence while managing the immediate deep strike threat.

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The tactical requirement is to maintain resilience against the MDCOA (C2 strike) while executing decisive pre-emptive fires against the MLCOA staging areas, ignoring the distraction where possible.

1. MAINTAIN AD SANCTUARY OVER C2 (J3/J6 – Force Protection)

   • Action: Do not redeploy the new IRIS-T system or other high-value AD assets from the 5th Assault Brigade C2 protective sector to address the Southern UAV swarm. Use dedicated point-defense (MANPADS, machine guns, local MOG replacements) for the UAVs.
   • Effect: Mitigate the MDCOA risk during the critical MLD window and deny RF the strategic objective of C2 decapitation.

2. EXECUTE PRE-PLANNED FIRES ON STAGING AREAS (J3 – Fire Support)

   • Action: Immediately transition remaining long-range precision fires (HIMARS/MLRS) to Execution Status. Prioritize saturation fires on the confirmed staging/assembly areas (Zelyony Gai, Dobropilsky) to disrupt the 37th GMRB formation before the launch order. Utilize counter-battery assets to suppress known RF artillery positions supporting the expected breach.
   • Effect: Maximize organizational chaos and attrition among RF armor prior to launch, increasing the probability of MLD failure.

3. PRIORITIZE ANTI-UGV INTERDICTION (J3 – Engineering)

   • Action: Direct all forward UAF specialized teams to aggressively hunt and destroy "Kuryer" UGVs immediately upon detection in the forward defensive zone. This is the single highest tactical priority to maintain the integrity of the minefield belt.
   • Effect: Prevent the mechanized breakthrough by denying the RF the ability to quickly clear approach routes.

4. REINFORCE MARITIME INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (J3/J6 – Local Defense)

   • Action: Local UAF units and territorial defense in the Mykolaiv/Odesa region must shift immediately to layered, low-cost UAV defense, leveraging visual spotters, searchlights, and heavy machine guns to counter the Shahed/Geran-2 threat focused on Pivdenne/Chornomorske.
   • Effect: Protect critical maritime supply lines and energy infrastructure targeted by the ALCOA.

//END OF SITREP//