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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-02 21:04:29Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-02 20:34:31Z)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 2025-12-02 21:04Z SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK MLD DELAYED PENDING DIPLOMATIC CONCLUSION. RF COERCION PEAKING. SUSTAINED HIGH ALERT REQUIRED.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The Stepnohorsk Salient (Zaporizhzhia Axis) remains the focal point of RF operational effort. Critical terrain includes the confirmed RF staging area at Dobropilsky and the anticipated main penetration vector via Zelyony Gai.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations Low-light conditions persist, favoring limited RF mechanized maneuver and FPV UAS operations. UAF success at Orestopil (20:48Z) demonstrates that decentralized anti-armor defenses can successfully interdict RF movement in this environment.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures The predicted Main Land Drive (MLD) initiation at 2100Z has been delayed. This suggests RF tactical C2 is holding the 37th/291st MRRs in final assault positions, synchronized with the extended diplomatic maneuver.

FactorAssessmentConfidence
Stepnohorsk MLD StatusDelayed, High Alert (NLT Conclusion of Moscow Talks)HIGH
Strategic SynchronizationConfirmed link between kinetic timing and diplomatic event conclusionHIGH
Localized Defense SuccessUAF 225th OSHP successful interdiction reported at OrestopilMEDIUM

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action RF INTENTION is to force political concessions by maximizing the psychological and strategic impact of the MLD. The kinetic operation is now subservient to the diplomatic maneuver. The delay past the anticipated 2100Z trigger point confirms RF is exercising patient, centralized control to ensure maximal coercion.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

  • High-Value Targeting (HVTs): RF Information Operations (IO) channels are claiming the successful liquidation of a key UAF drone designer (FP-7/FP-9 project leader) in Vyshhorod (20:38Z). This, if confirmed, signifies effective RF deep-strike intelligence and targeting aimed at degrading UAF indigenous technical superiority.
  • Kinetic Hold: The delay of the MLD execution suggests the RF C2 is maintaining strict EMCON and force posture control, awaiting the political signal.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status Sustainment Assessment Rating (SAR) score of 29.50 (CRITICAL) remains unchanged, confirming that RF logistics support for the large-scale Stepnohorsk assault remains fully active and prepared for immediate execution.

D. Command and Control Effectiveness RF Strategic C2 is judged HIGHLY EFFECTIVE. The sustained synchronization of the 4+ hour Putin-Witkoff meeting (20:36Z, 20:56Z) with the standing kinetic assault force is a text-book example of coercive strategy execution. Tactical C2 is demonstrating discipline by holding the assault elements in staging areas.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness UAF forces, particularly the 5th Assault Brigade, remain on high alert. The successful anti-armor action reported by the 225th OSHP near Orestopil (20:48Z) confirms that localized defensive readiness and C-UAS application are effective in delaying or disrupting RF probing attacks.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Success: Confirmed successful nighttime heavy drone bomber strike by the 225th OSHP, interdicting an RF assault element near Orestopil. This validates the previous recommendation to prioritize kinetic counter-interdiction on RF staging areas.
  • Potential Setback: The alleged loss of the FP-7/FP-9 chief designer in Vyshhorod (20:38Z) represents a non-recoverable loss to UAF technological superiority if confirmed. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Requires immediate TECHINT/HUMINT verification).

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints The critical requirement for C-UAS and anti-armor munitions remains paramount. The threat to C2 nodes is amplified by the RF success against high-value technical personnel (Vyshhorod).


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns RF IO is executing maximal psychological pressure. Pro-Kremlin channels (TASS, Colonelcassad) are amplifying the extraordinary duration of the Putin-Witkoff talks (now entering the 5th hour), generating massive anticipation for a consequential announcement tied directly to the Stepnohorsk threat. RF continues to utilize refugee narratives (Volchansk) to promote the idea of liberation and discredit UAF authority.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors Domestic morale is under extreme stress due to the prolonged diplomatic uncertainty coinciding with the imminent kinetic threat. UAF IO is attempting to mitigate this by shifting focus to positive domestic economic indicators (21:02Z), an insufficient counter-narrative to the existential threat.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The ongoing, high-stakes diplomatic event in Moscow is the critical indicator. The extraordinary length of the meeting (4+ hours) suggests either protracted disagreement on key maximalist terms or a complex negotiation regarding synchronized de-escalation/military operations. The duration itself is the primary instrument of coercion.


5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The MLD commencement window is no longer fixed at 2100Z; it is now tethered to the diplomatic conclusion.

COADescriptionTrigger/TimelineConfidence
MLCOA (Kinetic Escalation Coincides with Diplomatic Failure)RF initiates the MLD at Stepnohorsk immediately following the collapse or non-compliance of the Moscow negotiations. The MLD will proceed as planned (mechanized penetration, UGV breach, KAB cover), timed precisely to maximize political shock and leverage failure of talks.Conclusion of Putin-Witkoff dialogue (NLT 022200Z/030001Z) followed by high-level RF public statement (e.g., rejection of terms).HIGH
MDCOA (C2 Decapitation during MLD Execution)RF exploits the SHORAD vacuum to execute a long-range precision strike (Iskander/Kalibr) on the UAF 5th Assault Brigade HQs/C2 nodes at the moment of MLD initiation, regardless of the political outcome. This is designed to induce operational paralysis and accelerate the breakthrough.Immediate detection of multiple high-speed, high-altitude inbound tracks concurrent with MLD launch.HIGH
Alternate COA (ALCOA) (Limited Agreement/Temporary Pause)Putin announces a temporary localized ceasefire or "goodwill pause" at Stepnohorsk in exchange for specific, high-visibility political concession (e.g., immediate recognition of new Russian status for Pokrovsk or partial sanctions relief). This is a tactical pause to reposition or re-cohere.Immediate cessation of RF preparatory fires and a publicly broadcast announcement of limited diplomatic success following the conclusion of talks.LOW

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (HUMINT/STRATINT)Immediate and detailed understanding of the specific terms demanded by RF in the ongoing Moscow negotiations, particularly regarding territorial, military withdrawal, or sovereignty concessions.CR-3 (Updated): Continuous, aggressive HUMINT tasking to US/NATO partner channels regarding content and anticipated public messaging from the Putin-Witkoff dialogue. Need specific demands to prepare counter-negotiation position.
PRIORITY 2 (TECHINT/HUMINT)Confirmation of the alleged Vyshhorod HVT strike (FP-7/FP-9 designer). Assess the impact on UAF UAS R&D and identify any compromise of personnel/security protocols.CR-4 (New): Immediate TECHINT assessment of R&D facility security status and confirmation of personnel loss via reliable UAF channels.
PRIORITY 3 (IMINT/SIGINT)Confirmation of the current status (force composition, precise GPS locations) of the RF main assault columns (37th/291st MRRs) now that the 2100Z launch window has been missed. Are they refueling/rearming or holding static?CR-1 (Active): Continuous tasking of all available ISR assets over Zelyony Gai and Stepnohorsk defense lines. Focus on acoustic/thermal signatures indicating engine activity or mass troop movement.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary mission remains to deny RF a rapid, decisive kinetic success that can be leveraged immediately following the diplomatic conclusion.

  1. Adjust Defensive Readiness (J3 – High Alert Maintenance)

    • Alert Status: Transition UAF 5th Assault Brigade and supporting elements from 'Immediate Execution' to 'Tense Pause/MAX Alert.' Forces must remain fully combat-loaded and in prepared defensive positions (trenches, revetments). No stand-down is authorized.
    • Pre-Planned Fires: Continue to load and range all Pre-Planned Defensive Fires (PDFs) and counter-battery targets. Maintain the capacity for immediate mass artillery response upon confirmation of MLD launch, regardless of the time of day.
  2. C2 Protection and Survivability (J6/J3)

    • C2 Hardening: Given the MDCOA threat and the Vyshhorod strike, immediately enforce the highest level of EMCON (Emission Control) around all Battalion/Brigade C2 nodes.
    • Decoy Deployment: Task Engineer elements to deploy decoy vehicles and deployable false C2 signature generators near forward command positions to dilute RF HVT targeting.
  3. Sustained Kinetic Interdiction (J3 – Force Pacing)

    • Interdiction Fires: Do not halt interdiction fires on confirmed staging areas. Maintain HIMARS/MLRS priority on Dobropilsky and Zelyony Gai staging points. The success of the 225th OSHP validates that sustained pressure delays the MLD and degrades final assault cohesion. Use precision fires to target logistics elements/fuel dumps identified in the staging areas.
  4. Strategic Communication Countermeasure (NCA/J7)

    • Political Buffer: Prepare two alternative public statements for immediate release upon the conclusion of the Moscow talks:
      • Statement A (If Talks Fail): Frame the collapse as Russian intransigence and maximalism, emphasizing the resulting military action as predictable aggression rather than a diplomatic failure.
      • Statement B (If ALCOA/Pause): Frame any limited agreement as a necessary tactical pause achieved through UAF military resilience, not strategic concession.
Previous (2025-12-02 20:34:31Z)

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