Sitrep 2025-12-02 20:34:31

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 2025-12-02 2045Z SUBJECT: IMMEDIATE ACTION REQUIRED – RF MAIN LAND DRIVE (MLD) AT STEPNOHORSK COINCIDES WITH MAXIMUM DIPLOMATIC COERCION. DEFENSE RELIANCE ON ANTI-ARMOR C-UAS.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain The Stepnohorsk Salient (Zaporizhzhia Axis) is in the final stages of RF preparation for the Main Land Drive (MLD). Confirmed kinetic activity in the flanking Dobropilsky direction (20:21Z) indicates RF Vostok Group elements are already initiating probing actions or utilizing staging areas adjacent to the primary MLD vector (Zelyony Gai). The Donetsk sector remains fixed by sustained Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) attacks (20:33Z), confirming RF intent to prevent the lateral shift of UAF operational reserves.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Low-light conditions remain optimal for RF mechanized maneuver, supported by continued saturation of small UAS (FPV/Mavic) and tactical aviation (KAB).

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures UAF 5th Assault Brigade is actively engaging RF forward elements. Success by NGU drone operators in the Dobropilsky direction (20:21Z) highlights the effectiveness of decentralized anti-armor defenses utilizing small UAS in the absence of robust SHORAD (due to "Gerbera" threat). RF tactical aviation is currently fixing forces in Donetsk and launching reconnaissance UAVs into the Kharkiv region (20:32Z), confirming a multi-axis fixation strategy.

Factor	Assessment	Confidence
Stepnohorsk MLD Status	Immediate Pre-Execution (NLT 2100Z)	HIGH
Flanking Pressure	Confirmed kinetic engagement in Dobropilsky sector	HIGH
Fixation Fires	Sustained KAB launches on Donetsk axis	HIGH

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action RF INTENTION is to force immediate Ukrainian political concessions through synchronized kinetic breakthrough and strategic coercion. The key indicator is the sustained duration of the Putin-Witkoff dialogue (4+ hours, 20:05Z, 20:23Z), confirming that the political leadership is directly managing the diplomatic pressure to maximize the impact of the impending Stepnohorsk assault.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations No major changes to the RF overall plan (mechanized assault under UAS/KAB cover). However, the confirmed presence and successful engagement of RF armor in the Dobropilsky direction (20:21Z) validates the assessment that RF is using this salient for staging or fire support, making it a critical interdiction target.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status SAR score remains CRITICAL (29.50) supporting the MLD. Localized RF equipment losses reported (20:21Z) do not materially affect the main assault force but confirm the vulnerability of supporting armor to localized C-UAS defense.

D. Command and Control Effectiveness RF C2 is highly effective at the strategic level, successfully linking operational timing with high-stakes diplomatic signaling. Tactical C2 for the 37th/291st MRRs is judged effective enough to execute the coordinated 2100Z assault plan.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness UAF is operationally prepared for defense. The UAF General Staff issued an operational update at 20:12Z, confirming active status. The successful anti-armor action by NGU C-UAS teams in Dobropilsky (20:21Z) demonstrates high tactical readiness and adaptation to the SHORAD deficit.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks Success: Confirmed destruction of RF armored vehicles in the Dobropilsky direction (20:21Z) is a crucial tactical success, preventing further RF staging/consolidation on the eastern flank of Stepnohorsk. Setback: Strategic aid uncertainty (Czech T-72 halt) continues to compound operational planning constraints.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints The success in Dobropilsky underscores the immediate, critical requirement for:

Immediate allocation of C-UAS defensive platforms/munitions to forward anti-armor teams.
Expedited supply of anti-armor munitions (e.g., Javelin, RPGs) to prepared hunter-killer teams positioned behind the main defense line.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns RF IO is executing a three-pronged strategic coercion effort:

Kinetic Pressure: Imminent Stepnohorsk breach.
Diplomatic Ultimatum: Extended Putin/Witkoff talks signal non-negotiable maximalist terms.
Destabilization Narrative: RF milbloggers are leveraging the alleged flight of former NSDC Secretary Danilov (20:11Z) to portray impending political collapse and leadership abandonment.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors Morale is threatened by the combined kinetic and political pressure. UAF IO is actively attempting to mitigate strategic fears by highlighting international contingency planning (NATO "Plan B" report, 20:15Z) and localized battlefield successes (Dobropilsky, 20:21Z).

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments The critical observation is the sustained, high-level diplomatic engagement managed by Moscow (20:05Z). This confirms that RF views the Stepnohorsk operation primarily as a political tool. The NATO "Plan B" report (20:15Z) provides a necessary counter-narrative of resilience but highlights internal Western anxiety regarding sustained US commitment.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

The MLD commencement window is less than 15 minutes away. Disruption and robust counter-mobility are essential for survival.

COA	Description	Trigger/Timeline	Confidence
MLCOA (Stepnohorsk Kinetic Breach & Coercion Escalation)	RF initiates the MLD at Stepnohorsk NLT 2100Z. The primary objective remains mechanized penetration along the Zelyony Gai axis, utilizing "Kuryer" UGVs to clear obstacles. Simultaneous escalation of maximalist diplomatic demands via the Moscow channel will occur immediately following the confirmation of initial penetration.	Confirmed RF consolidation; sustained high-level diplomatic pressure (4+ hours); critical intelligence timeline is approaching (2100Z).	HIGH
MDCOA (Deep Strike C2 Decapitation)	RF utilizes the MOG/SHORAD vacuum to execute a long-range precision strike (likely Iskander/Kalibr) on the UAF 5th Assault Brigade HQs during the initial chaotic phase of the mechanized breach (2100Z - 2200Z). This strike would be timed to coincide with a major IO announcement concerning Western aid failure, aiming to induce immediate operational paralysis.	C2 loss detected during initial RF breakthrough; reports of high-speed missile inbound detection.	HIGH

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Collection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (IMINT/GEOINT)	Immediate confirmation of the composition and size of the RF armored column initiating the breach before 2100Z. Specifically, are the 37th/291st MRRs committed in full force, or is this an initial probing attack?	CR-1: Immediate tasking of all available tactical ISR assets (UAS, low-orbit satellites) over Zelyony Gai and Stepnohorsk defense lines (2045Z - 2115Z). Focus on vehicle types and density.
PRIORITY 2 (TECHINT/EW)	Identification of the specific communications link frequency used by the "Kuryer" UGVs to target them with EW jamming or pre-emptive kinetic fires during the breach phase.	CR-2: Dedicated SIGINT/ELINT collection tasking on the Stepnohorsk axis, specifically looking for novel, high-power frequency bursts indicative of UGV control systems.
PRIORITY 3 (HUMINT/INFO)	Detailed assessment of the specific terms and tenor of the protracted Putin-Witkoff dialogue to prepare appropriate counter-negotiation strategies.	CR-3: HUMINT tasking to US/NATO partner channels regarding content of the diplomatic exchange and anticipated public messaging following the conclusion of the talks.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary mission is to deny the RF a rapid, decisive kinetic success that could be immediately leveraged politically. Maximum kinetic defense must be employed now.

Immediate Kinetic Counter-Interdiction (J3 – Phase I Execution)
- Max Fires on Flank/Staging: RE-TASK any remaining high-precision MLRS/HIMARS assets to strike confirmed Dobropilsky staging areas and confirmed UGV deployment zones (per CR-2 if data is acquired immediately). The success of the NGU team (20:21Z) confirms these are viable kinetic targets that delay the MLD.
- Initiate Pre-Planned Defensive Fires (DPICM/Cannon): Commence immediate, sustained defensive artillery fire across the main suspected penetration vector (Stepnohorsk-Zelyony Gai) NLT 2050Z to force the RF columns to halt or slow their approach prior to 2100Z.
Tactical Anti-Armor and Counter-UAS Defense (J3/J6)
- C-UAS Priority: Immediately deploy all dedicated Counter-UAS assets (EW/Jamming teams, manned C-UAS hunter-killers) to protect the 5th Assault Brigade forward C2 nodes and critical anti-armor/artillery positions from FPV saturation.
- Focus on UGVs: Specialized anti-armor teams must prioritize the immediate destruction of "Kuryer" UGVs upon identification to maintain the integrity of the forward mine belts. UGV destruction is now a top tactical priority.
Strategic Communication and Resilience (NCA/J7)
- Pre-Empt Coercion: Pre-emptively release messaging (NLT 2100Z) that frames the Stepnohorsk assault as a desperate, costly action by a failing enemy. Directly address the Danilov rumor, reframing it as a diplomatic/security reorganization rather than abandonment.
- Reassure Partners: Immediately leverage the NATO "Plan B" report (20:15Z) via Western diplomatic channels to solidify the message that international support is robust and independent of Russian political maneuvering or isolated aid delays.

Situation Report