Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – PHASE VII: STEPNOHORSK MLD CRITICAL ACTION WINDOW

TIME: 021804Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: DECISIVE DEFENSE / STRATEGIC COERCION EXTREME FOCUS AOR: Zaporizhzhia Operational Sector (Stepnohorsk MLD) & Dnipropetrovsk/Northern Logistics Hubs

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The kinetic ME remains the Stepnohorsk MLD. RF efforts are synchronized to suppress UAF AD/C2 (Gerbera/UAV) while preparing the main mechanized assault. Tactical friction exists in the recently seized Donetsk sector.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Low temperatures and dry ground continue to favor RF mechanized thrust into the Stepnohorsk MLD NLT 030600Z DEC.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: Resources remain highly stressed, particularly AD assets now split between defending the Zaporizhzhia frontline AD vacuum and the critical Northern logistics hubs (Lozova/Pavlohrad). Localized counter-mobility and reconnaissance actions (425th Skala Regiment) are tactically positive but do not alter the strategic vulnerability.

RF: Force synchronization is assessed as optimal across kinetic (Stepnohorsk), deep strike (UAVs on Pavlohrad), and cognitive (Moscow talks, Trump IO).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (STRATEGIC COERCION/BREAKTHROUGH): RF objective is to achieve a decisive breakthrough at Stepnohorsk coinciding with the Dec 3rd diplomatic window. This is designed to force Kyiv and its allies into immediate negotiations from a position of strategic weakness. The primary tool is operational paralysis through AD suppression ("Gerbera") and logistics disruption (UAVs on Pavlohrad/Lozova).

CAPABILITY (IO Leverage): RF is successfully leveraging US non-governmental presence in Moscow (Witkoff) and external political commentary (Trump) to amplify the strategic IO theme of US abandonment and diplomatic isolation. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

COA (IMMEDIATE KINETIC): Final mechanized assault on Stepnohorsk NLT 030600Z DEC, preceded by peak UAV saturation (Lozova/Pavlohrad) NLT 022300Z DEC.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The expansion of critical UAV targeting to Pavlohrad (Dnipropetrovsk) indicates a calculated escalation to paralyze multiple logistics routes simultaneously. Pavlohrad is a major rail junction that feeds both the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia fronts; successfully disrupting this node would have wider operational consequences than just Lozova.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Logistics remain robust, sustained by both state systems (confirmed high throughput at 260th Rocket Base) and dispersed private funding. The confirmed quick success of the VDV drone fundraising (537,000 RUB in a day) assures high FPV drone replenishment rates for frontline units, crucial for countering UAF armor and C2 nodes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective and synchronized across multiple domains. IO messaging (Kotsnews poll confirming rejection of ‘unfulfillable demands’) preemptively justifies further military action, indicating political-military alignment.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is high, focusing on immediate defense of the Stepnohorsk salient. The tactical success of the 425th Skala Regiment near Pokrovsk shows local initiative, but the overall force posture is reactive to the RF synchronized offensive (Gerbera/UAV/IO).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success (Tactical Resilience): Successful clearance and prisoner capture by the 425th Skala Regiment near Pokrovsk delays immediate RF consolidation and frictionally binds RF forces earmarked for Stepnohorsk reinforcement. Success (Strategic Communications): President Zelenskyy’s address to the Irish Parliament maintains the visibility of Ukraine’s diplomatic engagement and counters the RF narrative of isolation.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. IMMEDIATE (AD PRIORITY SHIFT): Assets must be re-prioritized immediately to defend Pavlohrad in addition to Lozova, given the confirmed UAV tracks.
2. CRITICAL (EW COUNTERMEASURE): The failure to neutralize "Gerbera" C2 (EW Priority 1 Gap) remains the single greatest tactical vulnerability ahead of the main assault.
3. FIRE SUPPORT (DE-ESCALATION WINDOW): Sustained interdiction fires against RF assembly areas (Zelyony Gai/Dobropillia) must continue to force the RF launch window past the Dec 3rd summit, disrupting the strategic coercion timeline.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO focuses heavily on:

1. Diplomatic Chaos: Amplification of the ongoing Moscow meeting (Witkoff/Putin) and Trump’s statements regarding US financial disengagement to project abandonment.
2. NATO Aggression: Hungarian statements (Siijjarto via TASS) that Western Europe seeks to prolong the conflict to prepare for a 2030 war with Russia—used to justify current RF kinetic aggression as necessary self-defense.
3. UAF Attrition: Dissemination of purported Reuters reporting (via RVvoenkor) detailing high UAF volunteer casualty/desertion rates to undermine domestic morale and recruitment efforts.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale remains resilient, supported by strong messaging from UAF leadership and continued international visibility (Zelenskyy's address). The primary threat to morale comes from the perceived US strategic disengagement being amplified by RF IO.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Dec 3rd follow-up meeting in Europe is critical to stabilizing the narrative following the Moscow talks. The continued physical presence of US proxies in Moscow, even for private/humanitarian talks, creates an ongoing strategic vulnerability that RF IO is exploiting effectively.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: COORDINATED KINETIC-COERCIVE BREAKTHROUGH. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group will launch the mechanized assault into the Stepnohorsk salient NLT 030600Z DEC, exploiting the MOG-AD vacuum created by "Gerbera." UAV saturation attacks targeting Lozova and Pavlohrad logistics hubs will peak NLT 022300Z DEC, causing significant logistical friction and delaying UAF Northern reserves. RF will issue an immediate ultimatum following penetration to maximize coercion during the Dec 3rd diplomatic window.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 DECAPITATION AND DEEP STRIKE ON LOGISTICS SPINE. (Risk Level: CRITICAL) RF uses the combined MOG suppression and Northern AD diversion (due to UAVs) to execute a synchronized high-speed missile strike (Iskander/Kinzhals) targeting the main UAF Operational Command (OC) C2 node in Zaporizhzhia OR the critical rail maintenance facilities at Pavlohrad, aiming for systemic command/logistics paralysis. This would be timed with the peak of the Stepnohorsk assault to cause a rout. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. CRITICAL EW ACTION (J-6/J-3): EXECUTE HIGH-POWER BLANKET JAMMING NOW (Stepnohorsk). Immediately task all available high-power EW platforms to continuously blanket-jam known and suspected Gerbera C-UAS frequency bands over the Stepnohorsk salient. This is mandatory to restore the tactical AD envelope before the mechanized assault. NLT 021830Z DEC.
2. Northern AD Reallocation (J-3): RE-PRIORITIZE LOZOVA AND PAVLOHRAD AD. Immediately allocate dedicated MRAD/SHORAD assets to protect critical logistics nodes around Lozova and the Pavlohrad rail junction. The strategic importance of Pavlohrad requires immediate response.
3. Tactical Friction Exploitation (J-3): MAINTAIN PRESSURE AT POKROVSK. Task nearby UAF units (including elements of the 425th) to maintain harassment and interdiction fires (artillery/drone) on Pokrovsk egress routes to prevent the immediate, clean transfer of RF reinforcements to the Stepnohorsk MLD.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

1. Immediate Counter-Coercion (NCA): PUBLICLY STRESS CONTINUED US OFFICIAL SUPPORT. Issue a high-level statement NLT 021930Z DEC emphasizing that the US delegation currently in Moscow is private and non-governmental, and that strategic security and financial decisions are handled only by official U.S. State Department and White House representatives who remain committed to the strategic partnership.
2. Frame the Kinetic Escalation (J-7): Publicly link the increased, simultaneous deep strikes on logistics hubs (Pavlohrad/Lozova) and the Stepnohorsk assault to the explicit RF political objective of coercing an outcome ahead of the Dec 3rd summit, framing RF actions as a calculated act of diplomatic sabotage.
3. Demand EW Capability (J-7/NCA): Immediately leverage diplomatic channels to demand emergency delivery of high-power, broadband EW systems specifically capable of operating against advanced C2 networks, citing the Gerbera system as an immediate, existential threat to NATO-supplied defensive systems.

//END OF REPORT//