Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – PHASE VII: STEPNOHORSK MLD CRITICAL ACTION WINDOW

TIME: 021745Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: DECISIVE DEFENSE / STRATEGIC COERCION EXTREME FOCUS AOR: Zaporizhzhia Operational Sector (Stepnohorsk) & Strategic Information Environment (Dec 3rd Summit Prep)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational gravity remains fixed on the Stepnohorsk Main Land Drive (MLD) in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. RF Vostok Group is positioned for imminent exploitation. The fall of Pokrovsk (confirmed by RF MoD, 1727Z) formally releases RF assets for reinforcement/repositioning towards the Stepnohorsk axis, validating the shift in the Main Effort (ME).

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change from previous reports. Low temperatures and dry ground favor mechanized maneuver and precision strike (KAB/Gerbera operations).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: 5th Assault Brigade is sustaining attrition. UAF C2 is actively managing the informational counter-response (domestic morale/recruitment) while preparing for the anticipated peak kinetic effort NLT 030600Z DEC.

RF: Force posture is optimized for immediate breakthrough, supported by a fully synchronized Information and Diplomatic Coercion campaign targeting the upcoming Dec 3rd allied meeting.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (STRATEGIC COERCION CONFIRMED): RF strategy is to execute kinetic breakthroughs (Stepnohorsk) and strategic intimidation (Maritime blockade threat) simultaneously to present the international community with a fait accompli (or existential threat) that compels Kyiv to negotiate on Moscow's terms ("come to an agreement on the basis of Russia’s interests" - Poddubny, 1709Z).

CAPABILITY (IO Leverage): RF is successfully leveraging statements from Donald Trump (US not financially involved, 1716Z) and the presence of US delegates in Moscow to project diplomatic isolation of Kyiv. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

COA (IMMEDIATE KINETIC): Final mechanized assault on Stepnohorsk, utilizing "Kuryer" UGVs for breach and Gerbera/KAB for AD suppression, synchronized with sustained UAV strikes aimed at disrupting Northern logistics nodes (Lozova).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The coordination between kinetic targeting (Lozova/Kharkiv UAVs) and the Stepnohorsk ME is tighter than previously assessed. This indicates a high level of operational synchronization across multiple RF operational commands (Vostok/Yug).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The logistics chain for frontline RF units remains robust and resilient. New evidence confirms substantial, successful civilian fundraising appeals (VDV drone collection raising 537k RUB in one day) (1723Z). This dispersed private funding network provides an assured, rapid supply stream for critical technological assets (e.g., FPV/Recon drones) not entirely reliant on official state acquisition.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness is assessed as HIGH. Decisions are synchronized across geographic domains (Stepnohorsk ME, Northern Fixation), technological domains (Gerbera/KAB superiority), and the cognitive/diplomatic domain (Moscow talks, Maritime threat escalation).

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture remains defensive and stressed. While frontline personnel are engaged, key strategic AD/EW assets are being diverted or constrained by the Gerbera threat. Readiness is high, but the strategic decision to commit Northern reserves (currently fixed by UAV activity) must be managed carefully.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (Strategic): Confirmation of RF consolidation in Pokrovsk is a significant strategic loss, freeing up substantial RF resources for the Stepnohorsk ME. Success (Cognitive): UAF governance continues effective resilience messaging, specifically targeting frontline communities with tangible social benefits (subsidized rail, 1706Z) and actively recruiting specialized personnel for defense technology (1730Z), countering RF defeatism.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

1. IMMEDIATE (EW): Gerbera Countermeasure. Failure to neutralize the Gerbera C2 linkage before the main assault will result in the collapse of tactical AD in the Stepnohorsk salient.
2. URGENT (AD Redirection): AD assets must be immediately redeployed/prioritized to protect the Lozova logistics hub from the confirmed incoming UAV wave, even while maintaining coverage over Zaporizhzhia C2.
3. STRATEGIC (Fire Support): Long-range interdiction must be focused immediately on RF armored concentration areas (Zelyony Gai/Dobropillia) to delay the 030600Z DEC assault.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is fully focused on projecting Ukrainian collapse and diplomatic isolation:

1. US Abandonment: Aggressively utilizing Trump's statements ("US no longer financially involved") and the Moscow meeting to suggest Kyiv is being bypassed.
2. Explicit Ultimatum: Putin's direct threat to "cut off Ukraine from the sea" is being amplified by major RF military channels (1720Z), establishing a clear red line aimed at maximizing fear and coercing neutral diplomacy from NATO.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is being maintained by proactive government programs addressing the needs of frontline residents. The widespread use of military satire (1704Z) suggests high public resilience but also acknowledgement of the severity of the situation.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The involvement of US delegates in Moscow and Trump's comments creates confusion and political distraction ahead of the Dec 3rd summit. Mark Rutte's statement (1719Z) that NATO will join discussions on peace agreement clauses is a subtle shift, suggesting NATO seeks to shape the outcome, potentially setting limits on Kyiv's freedom of maneuver but also asserting NATO relevance.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: COORDINATED KINETIC-COERCIVE BREAKTHROUGH. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group will launch the main mechanized thrust into the Stepnohorsk salient NLT 030600Z DEC, attempting to exploit the MOG-AD vacuum. Concurrently, the UAV saturation attack targeting Northern logistics (Lozova) will peak NLT 022300Z DEC. Success in Stepnohorsk will be immediately framed by RF IO as the collapse of the Ukrainian defense, demanding immediate allied intervention to secure a ceasefire on RF terms.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: STRATEGIC MARITIME INTERDICTION AND C2 DECAPITATION. (Risk Level: CRITICAL) RF executes a strategic high-speed missile strike against critical port/naval infrastructure (Odesa/Mykolaiv) NLT 030200Z DEC, fulfilling the highly amplified threat of maritime interdiction. Simultaneously, RF uses the MOG vacuum to execute a deep strike (missile or KAB saturation) on the C2 or logistics hubs of the 5th Assault Brigade, aiming for command paralysis to precipitate a rout toward the Dnipro river line.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. CRITICAL EW ACTION (J-6/J-3): EXECUTE HIGH-POWER BLANKET JAMMING NOW. Immediately task all available high-power EW platforms to continuously blanket-jam known and suspected Gerbera C-UAS frequency bands over the Stepnohorsk salient. The tactical AD failure risk outweighs collateral EMCON concerns. NLT 021830Z DEC.
2. Northern AD Priority (J-3): RE-PRIORITIZE LOZOVA AD. Immediately allocate dedicated SHORAD/MRAD assets to protect critical logistics nodes around Lozova and the main rail junction from the incoming UAV wave. The Northern fixation must not succeed in paralyzing the rear area supply chain.
3. MLD Interdiction (J-3): GMLRS FIRE MISSION PRIORITY ONE: ZELYONY GAI. Exhaust remaining long-range precision assets (HIMARS/MLRS) in a focused, time-sensitive strike on confirmed/suspected RF armored assembly areas in the Zelyony Gai staging ground to disrupt the 37th MRB’s assault formation before 030000Z DEC.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

1. Counter-Coercion Protocol (NCA): ISSUE CLARION CALL ON MARITIME THREAT. The NCA must issue a statement NLT 021900Z DEC linking the explicit Russian threat of maritime decapitation to acts of international terrorism and calling for immediate, visible naval/AD asset guarantees from NATO (e.g., deployment of patrol aircraft or vessels to the Romanian EEZ).
2. Frame Moscow Talks (J-7): Proactively counter the RF narrative that the US is abandoning Ukraine. Publicly frame the Moscow meeting as a private humanitarian/business discussion, stressing that only official state representatives (Secretary of State, NCA) are authorized to negotiate strategic security matters.
3. Diplomatic Tasking (J-7): Immediately brief NATO/G7 partners that the strategic threat is not solely the lack of ammunition, but the Gerbera technological superiority. Demand immediate EW/Tech support, framing it as a NATO R&D failure if the new RF system is not countered.

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