Sitrep 2025-12-02 17:04:36

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – PHASE VII: STEPNOHORSK MLD CRITICAL PHASE ESCALATION

TIME: 021700Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: DECISIVE DEFENSE / STRATEGIC COERCION HIGH FOCUS AOR: Zaporizhzhia Operational Sector (Stepnohorsk) & Strategic Information Environment

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational geometry remains defined by the Stepnohorsk MLD (Main Effort Land Drive) where the 5th Assault Brigade is critically engaged.

Location	Status	Update/Analytical Judgment	Confidence
Stepnohorsk MLD Axis	Assault Status Confirmed (FACT)	RF Vostok Group continues high-intensity preparatory fires and maneuver. The C2 decision window to reinforce or extract the 5th Assault Brigade is closing rapidly (Previous Report: NLT 030600Z DEC).	HIGH
Northern/Eastern Flanks	RF UAV Fixation (FACT)	Confirmed Shahed/UAV activity targeting Izium, Kharkiv region, and Okhtyrka/South Sumy (1650Z-1657Z). This pattern indicates RF intent to fix UAF northern and eastern reserves and stress strategic AD resources away from the Stepnohorsk MLD.	HIGH
Maritime Domain (Black Sea)	Strategic Threat Activated (JUDGMENT)	RF IO and attributed statements from Putin explicitly threaten to cut off Ukraine's access to the sea in response to tanker attacks. This raises the probability of the MDCOA (Maritime Decapitation) significantly.	HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Cold, dry conditions favorable for RF precision strike and aviation remain. Mandatory domestic power consumption limits starting 03 DEC continue to threaten C2 resilience.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: 5th Assault Brigade is sustaining heavy contact. C2 must manage the tactical AD gap (Gerbera threat) while absorbing continuous high-intensity assault pressure. No indication of mass withdrawal or strategic reserves committed to the MLD within the last hour.

RF: Vostok Group maintains the initiative. RF C2 is currently focused on leveraging the presence of US delegates (Witkoff/Kushner) in Moscow to generate maximum political distraction and pressure synchronized with kinetic operations.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (STRATEGIC COERCION): To force international diplomatic concessions (via the Dec 3rd allied meeting) by executing simultaneous kinetic escalation (Stepnohorsk breakthrough) and strategic threats (Maritime Decapitation).

CAPABILITY (KINETIC CONFIRMATION): RF MoD released propaganda confirming the active involvement of the 72nd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (Yug Group) artillery, likely supporting the operational flank of the Stepnohorsk drive or holding positions post-Pokrovsk. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

COA (REFINED STRATEGIC IMMEDIATE):

Kinetic Exploitation: Finalize tactical breakthrough at Stepnohorsk NLT 030600Z DEC using Gerbera-enabled CAS/KAB support and mechanized armor.
Maritime Ultimatum: Prepare high-speed missile strike options (e.g., Kalibr, Iskander) against critical port or vessel infrastructure in Odesa/Mykolaiv, to be executed contingent upon the political outcome of the Dec 3rd allied meeting or in response to perceived UAF escalation (D-S Belief Score for RF Advance in Zaporizhzhia: 0.1097).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has successfully shifted the strategic focus of its IO and kinetic operations towards a coordinated land/sea coercion strategy, emphasizing the link between UAF deep strikes on Russian tankers and the threatened loss of Ukraine’s maritime access.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The logistics stream remains robust. Intelligence now confirms civilian-led support efforts (vehicle collection/staging) augmenting official military logistics (Colonelcassad, 1700Z), providing redundancy and resilience for the assault forces (D-S Belief Score for RF civilian resource acquisition: 0.006).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is demonstrating exceptional strategic synchronization (Land/IO/Diplomacy). The high-visibility Moscow meeting (1641Z onwards) is a deliberate C2 action to amplify RF political leverage precisely during the critical kinetic phase.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is managing severe stress. While core fighting elements (5th Assault Brigade) are holding, the AD vacuum created by the "Gerbera" threat forces an unacceptable tactical risk tradeoff. Readiness remains high, but requires urgent strategic AD/EW redirection.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (Technological): The successful neutralization of UAF MOGs by "Gerbera" means the core defense of the Stepnohorsk salient is structurally weakened, relying solely on heavy fortifications and fire support rather than mobile tactical AD.

Success (Cognitive Domain): UAF governance is effectively counter-messaging the RF defeatist narrative by announcing critical social programs for frontline communities (1640Z) and maintaining an optimistic diplomatic outlook ("closer to peace," 1640Z).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

IMMEDIATE: EW countermeasure against "Gerbera" (CRITICAL).
URGENT: Strategic redirection of long-range fire assets to disrupt RF armored assembly in the Stepnohorsk MLD (Zelyony Gai/Dobropillia).
STRATEGIC: Confirmation/remediation plan for the rumored US aid suspension (particularly AD interceptors).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO focuses on two mutually supporting vectors:

Diplomatic Victory: Maximizing exposure of the Putin-Witkoff-Kushner meeting to project international legitimacy and suggest Kyiv is being bypassed (TASS, 1641Z-1650Z).
Strategic Intimidation: Amplifying the direct threat of maritime action to compel NATO neutrality and deter further aid commitments prior to the Dec 3rd summit (Sterenko/Dva Mayora, 1645Z-1647Z).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian morale is being reinforced by official communication focusing on institutional resilience (education appointments) and tangible government support for affected regions. This must be sustained as the kinetic crisis deepens.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The high-visibility Moscow meeting is designed to destabilize Western unity ahead of the Dec 3rd meeting. The US delegation's presence, regardless of official capacity, grants RF a significant information advantage in the hours preceding the crucial allied discussion.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK BREAKTHROUGH TIMED WITH DIPLOMATIC BLACKMAIL. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF forces will launch the final mechanized thrust into the center of Stepnohorsk NLT 030600Z DEC. Success will be immediately leveraged by Moscow to present the diplomatic community with a fait accompli (the collapse of the Zaporizhzhia front) at the start of the Dec 3rd allied meeting, demanding UAF concessions.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: STRATEGIC MARITIME INTERDICTION AND MASSIVE AIR STRIKE. (Risk Level: CRITICAL - Elevated from previous report) RF executes a strategic strike, likely using high-speed missile assets, against a major port facility (Odesa/Mykolaiv) or a commercial vessel NLT 030200Z DEC. Simultaneously, RF conducts a mass UAV/missile strike (targeting critical infrastructure or C2 nodes) across multiple regions (Harkiv, Sumy, Zaporizhzhia) to capitalize on the stressed UAF AD network and the "Gerbera"-created vacuum. This action fulfills Putin's threat and tests NATO's Article 5 resolve.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Event	Estimated Timeline (ETA)	Confidence	Decision Point/Trigger
RF Maritime Strike (MDCOA Trigger)	NLT 030200Z DEC	MEDIUM	Confirmation of high-readiness status for RF long-range strike assets in Crimea or the Black Sea Fleet.
Stepnohorsk Defensive Line Failure	NLT 030600Z DEC	HIGH	Confirmed isolation or forced collapse of the 5th Assault Brigade’s main resistance pockets.
Dec 3rd Allied Meeting Start	031200Z DEC	HIGH	Official public declarations regarding future aid commitments and response to RF coercion.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gaps/Unresolved Questions	Collection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (EW IMMEDIATE)	"Gerbera" C2 Profile. Failure to identify specific guidance frequency bands (VHF/UHF/Satellite) is resulting in operational setbacks.	TECHINT/SIGINT (Zaporizhzhia FLOT): Specialized ELINT packages deployed forward (Risk Category HIGH) to intercept and triangulate Gerbera operational frequencies NLT 022000Z DEC.
PRIORITY 2 (MARITIME KINETIC)	RF Strategic Maritime Strike Readiness. What is the readiness status and likely targeting package for a strategic port strike (Odesa/Mykolaiv)?	IMINT/HUMINT (Crimea/Black Sea Fleet): Increased ISR coverage on missile readiness and deployment status of surface vessels and specialized aviation units (e.g., Kinzhal carriers).
PRIORITY 3 (KINETIC EXPLOITATION)	RF MLD Reserve Commitment/Intent. Is the 37th MRB being reinforced by units released from the Pokrovsk sector?	IMINT/GROUND RECON (Stepnohorsk-Dobropillia Axis): High-cadence imagery sweeps to detect armored columns moving West from the Pokrovsk logistics hubs toward the Zaporizhzhia axis.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

EW/AD Immediate Action (J-6/J-3): EXECUTE FREQUENCY SWEEP PROTOCOLS (Tier 1). Immediately task all available high-power EW platforms (regardless of optimization) to continuously cycle through suspected high-frequency C-UAS/EW bands, aiming to blanket-jam potential "Gerbera" control signals over the Stepnohorsk salient until a targeted countermeasure is developed.
Maritime Force Protection (J-3): ELEVATE PORT AD READINESS (Odesa/Mykolaiv). Given the explicit threat, shift AD priority to critical maritime infrastructure NLT 021900Z DEC. Initiate EMCON (Emission Control) procedures for key naval assets and commercial port C2 nodes.
Counter-Mobility Fire Plan (J-3): MAXIMIZE COUNTER-ASSEMBLY STRIKES. Prioritize remaining long-range GMLRS/HIMARS strikes against confirmed RF assembly areas in the Zelyony Gai staging area and along anticipated MLD supply routes NLT 021930Z DEC. Delaying the assault is the sole objective until EW measures stabilize the AD situation.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

Counter-Coercion Protocol (NCA): DENOUNCE MARITIME THREATS PUBLICLY. The NCA must issue a statement NLT 021830Z DEC explicitly condemning Putin’s maritime ultimatum as an act of international piracy and nuclear blackmail. Request immediate, strong G7/NATO response linking any maritime action to immediate, decisive sanctions.
Mitigate Moscow Optics (J-7): Utilize media channels to proactively frame the Moscow meeting with US figures as a private "lobbying" or "economic" discussion, devoid of official diplomatic weight, to prevent RF from using the meeting's optics to legitimize their current military aggression.
International Coordination (J-7): Direct diplomatic teams to emphasize to NATO/EU partners that the Gerbera/MOG vulnerability is an immediate tactical threat demanding urgent, targeted electronic warfare support, not just long-term heavy weapon supply.

//END OF REPORT//

Situation Report