Sitrep 2025-12-02 16:34:33

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – PHASE VII: STEPNOHORSK MLD CRITICAL PHASE

TIME: 021730Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: DECISIVE DEFENSE / CRISIS RESPONSE (Stepnohorsk MLD) FOCUS AOR: Zaporizhzhia Operational Sector (Stepnohorsk/Huliaipole Axis)

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Location	Status	Update/Analytical Judgment	Confidence
Stepnohorsk MLD Axis	Active Penetration (FACT/JUDGMENT)	RF media (Rybar) claims "successes" (021631Z). This, combined with the confirmed loss of Zelyony Gai (previous report), indicates RF maneuver elements are actively seeking operational depth.	HIGH
Huliaipole Vicinity	RF Presence Confirmed (FACT)	RF sources (Colonelcassad) publish photo evidence of RF flags raised near Huliaipole (021603Z). This confirms RF forces are conducting deep reconnaissance or localized raids southeast of Stepnohorsk, aiming to stretch UAF defenses.	MEDIUM
Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk)	RF Control Confirmed (FACT)	High-ranking NATO official confirmed to DW that RF controls 95% of the city (021623Z). This is a strategic loss confirmation, releasing RF reserves for redeployment or fixation efforts on the northern flanks (e.g., Druzhkivka/Toretsk).	HIGH
Kupiansk Sector	UAF Tactical Improvement (FACT)	CinC Syrskyi reports UAF improved tactical positions and ongoing clearance operations (021626Z). This suggests local stabilization despite the Southern crisis.	HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Weather remains consistent: cold, dry, permissive for RF aviation (KAB delivery) and all-weather precision strike assets. The strategic constraint of mandatory power consumption limits (starting 03 DEC) remains the critical environmental factor impacting C2 and logistics resiliency.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: 5th Assault Brigade is engaged in critical close-quarters combat inside Stepnohorsk. C2 priority must shift to preventing the Stepnohorsk defense from turning into an operational collapse due to the eastern flank penetration from Zelyony Gai. C2 must manage the AD vacuum created by the confirmed "Gerbera" threat (see 2.1).

RF: Vostok Group is operating under a strategy of kinetic maximum pressure (Zaporizhzhia) synchronized with peak strategic coercion (Diplomacy/IO).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): Exploit the AD gap created by "Gerbera" to use KABs for close air support on Stepnohorsk, enabling rapid mechanized penetration toward the T-0408 highway NLT 030200Z DEC.

CAPABILITY (TECHNOLOGICAL): "Gerbera" Loitering Munition. Confirmed utilization and documented success against UAF Mobile Fire Groups (MOGs) (021625Z). This system, specifically designed to counter localized SHORAD, provides the RF Main Effort with critical, temporary air superiority over the immediate tactical zone. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

COA (REFINED IMMEDIATE):

Stepnohorsk MLD Completion: RF forces utilize "Kuryer" UGVs (as previously assessed) and Gerbera-cleared air space to push assault columns into Stepnohorsk's center, aiming to isolate the 5th Assault Brigade.
Escalated Coercion: Putin’s statements (021617Z, alluding to nuclear conflict if Europe intervenes) are a deliberate escalation intended to intimidate allied decision-makers ahead of the Dec 3rd diplomatic meetings. This is a primary driver of RF IO activity.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF doctrine has successfully adapted to the UAF MOG concept. The deployment and confirmed operational effectiveness of the "Gerbera" system against MOGs demonstrates a capacity for targeted, rapid counter-EW/AD development. This tactical adaptation directly supports mechanized penetration.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The logistics stream feeding Vostok Group (evident by the sustained KAB usage and high SAR scores at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base) remains robust and adequate to support the current high-intensity assault phase.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective, exhibiting a clear, synchronized strategy that links kinetic breakthroughs (Pokrovsk, Stepnohorsk) with strategic diplomatic coercion (Moscow talks, aggressive public statements).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensively maximized on the Zaporizhzhia axis. The claimed stabilization/improvement in Kupiansk provides a necessary, though limited, buffer for C2 resource management. The critical vulnerability remains the immediate tactical AD/C-UAS layer.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (Confirmed): The tactical loss of the Pokrovsk defensive line (95% RF control) confirms the previous strategic setback assessment.

Successes (Diplomatic): The official visit to Ireland and the signing of a 5-year partnership roadmap (021611Z) is a necessary diplomatic countermeasure against the RF IO campaign suggesting total international isolation following the US aid rumors.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary and most urgent resource requirement is immediate EW capability against the "Gerbera" system. Failure to neutralize this new threat will render tactical AD platforms (MOGs) unusable near the front, exposing ground forces to catastrophic KAB strikes.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is leveraging tactical success to create a sense of national collapse and diplomatic futility:

Amplifying Defeatist Narratives: Russian sources are amplifying quotes attributed to former UAF officials discussing the need to accept "painful reality" (021623Z).
Strategic Intimidation: Putin's rhetoric (nuclear escalation, war with Europe) is designed to force concessions from Western allies by maximizing perceived risk.
IO Counter-Measure (UAF): President Zelensky's statement that Ukraine is "closer to peace than ever" (021620Z) is a deliberate attempt to project strength and control the narrative amid tactical losses and aid uncertainty.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian morale is under severe kinetic and cognitive stress, stemming from: 1) the confirmed loss of Pokrovsk; 2) the threat of nationwide power restrictions (03 DEC); and 3) the uncertainty regarding essential US military aid. UAF IO must effectively leverage the diplomatic gains (Ireland) and tactical successes (Kupiansk) to manage this stress.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The strategic environment is highly kinetic and coercive. The focus remains on the Dec 3rd allied meeting. The confirmation of the Ireland partnership (including a 5-year roadmap) stabilizes the political support narrative, but it does not address the critical kinetic requirements lost if the US aid suspension rumor (021620Z) is true.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: OPERATIONAL BREAKTHROUGH ON STEPNOHORSK MLD NLT 030600Z DEC. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group will maintain high-tempo assault operations, using the Gerbera-enabled AD suppression to maximize KAB saturation on UAF C2 and fortified positions within Stepnohorsk. The goal is to force the 5th Assault Brigade to withdraw or risk encirclement by forces pushing from Zelyony Gai. This kinetic action will be leveraged politically to influence the Dec 3rd allied decisions.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: NUCLEAR COERCION & STRATEGIC MARITIME DECAPITATION. (Risk Level: CRITICAL) RF executes a limited, but strategically unambiguous, strike on highly sensitive port infrastructure (Odesa/Mykolaiv) NLT 030200Z DEC, confirming the maritime blockade. Simultaneously, RF strategically deploys high-yield nuclear-capable delivery systems (e.g., Iskander-M) near the Belarusian border in a highly publicized manner, fulfilling Putin's strategic threat and maximizing pressure on NATO to prevent further aid commitment.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Event	Estimated Timeline (ETA)	Confidence	Decision Point/Trigger
Stepnohorsk Defensive Collapse	NLT 030600Z DEC	HIGH	Confirmed breach of the secondary defensive line in Stepnohorsk or isolation of the 5th Assault Brigade’s main logistical route.
Gerbera Countermeasure Effectiveness	NLT 030000Z DEC	MEDIUM	Confirmation via TECHINT or field reports that deployed EW countermeasures are degrading "Gerbera" C2 or guidance systems.
Dec 3rd Allied Meeting Outcome	031200Z DEC	HIGH	Official statement regarding the status of critical US weapons systems (e.g., AD interceptors, 155mm shells).

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gaps/Unresolved Questions	Collection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (TECHNOLOGICAL IMMED.)	"Gerbera" C2 Profile. Critical need to identify the specific control mechanism (frequency, satellite linkage, anti-jamming measures) of the Gerbera munition to enable effective EW countermeasures and nullify the current AD vacuum.	TECHINT/SIGINT (Zaporizhzhia FLOT): Continuous monitoring and spectral analysis for novel high-frequency or burst transmissions associated with the Gerbera targeting system.
PRIORITY 2 (KINETIC EXPLOITATION)	RF MLD Reserve Commitment/Intent. Has the 37th MRB (previously assessed) been fully committed, or is it held for operational exploitation towards the Dnipro? Are there signs of follow-on forces pushing through the now-secured Pokrovsk?	IMINT/GROUND RECON (Stepnohorsk & Dobropillia): High-fidelity ISR to track movement of RF reserve echelons (37th MRB and forces previously engaged at Pokrovsk).
PRIORITY 3 (STRATEGIC SUPPORT)	US Aid Suspension Scope. Confirmation of the specific weapons systems suspended by the US, affecting immediate operational readiness (e.g., AD interceptor stock levels vs. long-term artillery shell supply).	HUMINT/OSINT (Washington/Brussels): Acquire high-confidence confirmation of specific systems affected and projected timeline for resumption.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

Immediate Stepnohorsk Counter-Mobility (J-3): EXECUTE PRIORITY ARMORED INTERDICTION. Redouble efforts to target and destroy RF assault columns exiting Zelyony Gai. Prioritize heavy artillery (e.g., 203mm, if available) and long-range fire assets for counter-mobility fire missions against identified RF armor assembly points between Zelyony Gai and Stepnohorsk NLT 021900Z DEC.
Gerbera Countermeasure Deployment (J-6): DEPLOY BROADSHEET JAMMING DEVICES. Given the confirmed threat, immediately deploy any available high-power, broad-spectrum jamming systems (even if not optimized for the threat frequency) to the Stepnohorsk axis. This is a stop-gap measure to disrupt potential line-of-sight control of the Gerbera system.
AD Resource Allocation (J-3): SHIFT AD PRIORITY TO CRITICAL C2/LOGISTICS. Re-task remaining strategic AD assets away from low-value targets toward the protection of critical military C2 nodes and the Zaporizhzhia logistical hub against anticipated KAB strikes, compensating for the lack of tactical MOG coverage.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

Counter-Coercion Narrative (NCA): ADDRESS US AID RUMORS DIRECTLY. Pre-empt the expected RF IO surge related to the US aid suspension NLT 021830Z DEC. The NCA must acknowledge temporary delays or bureaucratic hurdles while emphasizing the continued commitment of other NATO allies (Ireland roadmap, German support) and demanding explicit, unified commitments from the Dec 3rd meeting participants.
Mitigate Escalation Threats (J-7): Utilize diplomatic channels (e.g., through UN representatives) to publicly denounce Putin's nuclear escalation rhetoric as baseless intimidation, seeking to dilute the psychological impact of the MDCOA.
Harness Diplomatic Wins (J-7): Maximize media visibility for the Ireland Partnership Roadmap, framing it as proof of long-term, stable Western commitment that transcends temporary, bilateral political disputes (like the rumored US aid pause).

//END OF REPORT//

Situation Report