Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – PHASE VI: STEPNOHORSK MLD EXECUTION

TIME: 021700Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: DECISIVE DEFENSE / CRISIS RESPONSE (Stepnohorsk) FOCUS AOR: Zaporizhzhia (Stepnohorsk MLD Axis) and Strategic Coercion Domain

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Weather remains permissive for RF precision strike and aviation operations (KAB delivery). Critical update: Ukrenergo confirmed mandatory power consumption limits for all regions on 03 DEC, signifying strategic infrastructure damage is now translating into operational constraints.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: The 5th Assault Brigade is now engaged in close combat within the Stepnohorsk urban environment and simultaneously defending against a flanking maneuver from the newly secured Zelyony Gai. C2 must manage the dual threat of immediate penetration and strategic KAB suppression in the rear.

RF: Vostok Group is executing a synchronized, multi-domain attack: 38th GMRB/37th MRB conducting the kinetic push, supported by deep KAB strikes and sustained strategic coercion (maritime/diplomatic/energy).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): RF intends to secure a tactical foothold in Stepnohorsk NLT 030600Z DEC, forcing a UAF defensive retreat or collapse, while simultaneously maximizing international pressure via the explicit threat of full maritime economic warfare and energy collapse.

CAPABILITY (TECHNOLOGICAL): The confirmed operational success of the "Gerbera" loitering munition (targeting MOGs) and the likely deployment of "Kuryer" UGVs demonstrate RF capability to suppress tactical AD and conduct complex breach operations simultaneously. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

COA (REVISED IMMEDIATE):

1. Stepnohorsk Flank Exploitation: Utilize the 38th GMRB from Zelyony Gai to bypass Stepnohorsk proper or execute a pincer movement, aiming for depth NLT 030600Z DEC.
2. Strategic Coercion Peak: Time the tactical breakthrough with a maximum IO push (leveraging US aid uncertainty and the Moscow diplomatic track) and possibly execute limited, high-profile strikes on port infrastructure to enforce the maritime blockade threat.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The attribution of the Zelyony Gai seizure to the 38th GMRB (rather than 37th MRB) suggests refined operational coordination within Vostok Group, possibly indicating a broader, phased attack using multiple motorized rifle units simultaneously against Stepnohorsk's flanks.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF sustainment faces a new challenge: energy constraints. The confirmed power limits will impact C2 node resiliency, maintenance, and local war economy production beginning 03 DEC. RF deep strikes on power infrastructure are achieving strategic effects.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 maintains highly effective centralization, evidenced by the synchronized claim of Zelyony Gai control, the continuation of KAB strikes on logistic nodes (Kryvyi Rih), and the timing of Putin's aggressive public statements.

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is critical and reactive. Defensive operations are underway inside Stepnohorsk. Reserves must be rapidly tasked and inserted to prevent the confirmed RF flank movement from Zelyony Gai from transforming a penetration into an operational breakthrough.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setback (CRITICAL): Confirmation of the loss of Zelyony Gai represents the successful culmination of RF preparatory fires and maneuver, placing the 5th Assault Brigade defense in extreme jeopardy.

Successes: Claims of successful long-range strikes against four RF military/security objectives in the Chechen Republic (021553Z). If verified, this represents a significant escalation of deep strike capability, forcing RF to divert resources to internal security and air defense far in the rear.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

Primary constraints are immediate SHORAD coverage (due to "Gerbera" suppression) and now, stable energy supply. The power restrictions mandated for 03 DEC require immediate contingency planning to maintain power to critical military communications and industrial production centers.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF is employing a high-risk, high-reward communication strategy:

1. Strategic Intimidation: Putin's explicit threat of war with Europe "right now" (021545Z) aims to pressure allied capitals attending the Dec 3rd meeting.
2. Operational Deception: Asserting the operation is "surgical" and "not war" (021559Z) attempts to reassure global actors that escalation will be controlled, potentially normalizing the annexation of Krasnoarmeysk and the impending breakthrough at Stepnohorsk.
3. IO Vector (Diplomatic Undermining): The highly publicized meeting between US proxies (Witkoff/Kushner) and Putin on Red Square (021538Z) attempts to fracture allied unity by suggesting a non-governmental peace channel is active.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian public sentiment is under pressure from the convergence of tactical losses (Zelyony Gai), strategic threats (maritime blockade), and domestic hardship (03 DEC power restrictions). NCA efforts to frame the Irish diplomatic track as a success are crucial but may be insufficient against the kinetic reality.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The entire strategic environment is defined by RF strategic coercion. The key uncertainty remains the scope and timing of the reported US aid suspension. The Dec 3rd diplomatic track must achieve explicit, unified commitment from allies to counter the maritime blockade threat and provide immediate AD assets, or RF coercive efforts will succeed.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK MLD ACHIEVES OPERATIONAL DEPTH, FIXING NORTHERN RESERVES. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) The 38th GMRB, exploiting the Zelyony Gai axis, will attempt to secure control of the high ground east of Stepnohorsk by 030600Z DEC. This effort will be supported by continued KAB/artillery concentration on UAF logistical nodes feeding the 5th Assault Brigade. RF forces on the Kupyansk/Druzhkivka axis will increase pressure to fix Northern UAF reserves, preventing redeployment south.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: SYNCHRONIZED INFRASTRUCTURE AND C2 DECAPITATION STRIKE. (Risk Level: CRITICAL) RF executes massive, layered kinetic strikes (Kalibr/Bastion-P) NLT 030200Z DEC targeting two or more critical objectives: (1) Odesa port facilities (fulfilling the maritime threat); and (2) Major energy generation/transmission facilities in the Kyiv/Lviv area. This strategic strike, timed with the power restrictions, aims to cause nationwide societal shock and cripple UAF military C2 redundancy.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. Stepnohorsk Immediate Counterattack (J-3): COMMIT LOCAL RESERVES TO FLANK DEFENSE. Immediately deploy the nearest tactical reserve element to stabilize the eastern flank and prevent a catastrophic operational bypass resulting from the loss of Zelyony Gai. Prioritize LRPF assets (HIMARS, MLRS) for counter-mobility fire missions against any armored columns exiting Zelyony Gai NLT 021800Z DEC.
2. Counter-UAS/EW Protocol Enforcement (J-6): IMPLEMENT HARP-1 AND EW COUNTERMEASURES. Mandate strict adherence to the HARP-1 EMCON/dispersion protocols for all MOGs. Simultaneously, initiate rapid deployment of any available broad-spectrum jamming systems identified in CR P2 to the Zaporizhzhia axis to degrade "Gerbera" C2.
3. Energy Infrastructure Defense (J-3/J-5): RE-TASK AD FOR CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION. Given the confirmed power constraints for 03 DEC and the MDCOA threat, re-task at least 20% of strategic AD assets (e.g., NASAMS batteries, if feasible) to protect critical power generation and distribution nodes, particularly those feeding the Southern Operational Command area.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

1. Counter-Coercion Narrative (NCA): FORMALIZE MARITIME SECURITY APPEAL. Prior to the Dec 3rd meeting, the NCA must publicly demand that NATO/EU establish a Maritime Security Observation Corridor in the Black Sea, framing the RF threat as global economic terrorism.
2. Address Energy Resilience (J-7): Issue immediate public guidance (NLT 021800Z DEC) detailing military contingency plans to maintain C2 and essential services despite the confirmed power limits, mitigating public panic and countering the RF IO goal of psychological collapse.
3. Exploit RF Frictions (J-7): Amplify the verified reports of corruption and internal friction within the RF military (e.g., the volunteer/bribe incident) through international media to degrade the perception of Russian military professionalism and high morale among Western allies.

//END OF REPORT//