Sitrep 2025-12-02 15:34:39

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – PHASE VI: STEPNOHORSK DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC COERCION

TIME: 021600Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: DECISIVE DEFENSE / STRATEGIC COERCION FOCUS AOR: Zaporizhzhia (Stepnohorsk MLD Axis) and Black Sea Operational Zone

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Location	Status	Update/Analytical Judgment	Confidence
Stepnohorsk MLD Axis (Zaporizhzhia)	KAB Shaping Active (FACT)	Confirmed massed RF KAB strikes reported near the Kherson/Dnipropetrovsk border (Novovorontsovka/Kryvyi Rih corridor). This confirms RF intent to suppress UAF reserve flow and logistics supporting the Stepnohorsk defense.	HIGH
Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk)	RF Control Formalized (FACT)	Russian President Putin formally confirmed the full control of the Krasnoarmeysk stronghold (021514Z). The operational loss is consolidated and now forms the basis of RF IO pressure.	HIGH
Kupyansk-Uzlovoy	Imminent RF Assault (JUDGMENT)	Putin claimed RF controls both banks of Kupyansk and predicts the "full liberation" of Kupyansk-Uzlovoy in days. This signals intent to fix Northern UAF reserves and consolidate railway control.	MEDIUM
Black Sea/Port Access	Threat Level Escalated (FACT)	Putin explicitly threatened to expand strikes against Ukrainian ports and vessels entering them. This signals an impending escalation in the maritime domain designed to achieve economic strangulation.	HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Weather remains permissive for sustained RF aviation operations (KAB utilization) and ISR. The maritime domain may see increased complexity due to the direct threat to shipping.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: Under high kinetic and psychological stress, managing KAB strikes in the rear while preparing for the imminent Stepnohorsk MLD. Command must prioritize AD coverage for the 5th Assault Brigade and ensure LRPF assets are ready for immediate counter-battery/counter-assembly fire. RF: Demonstrating peak synchronization between kinetic preparation (KAB strikes in Zaporizhzhia/Kryvyi Rih corridor) and strategic IO/coercion (Putin’s aggressive public addresses).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (REVISED FOCUS): RF intends to enforce a military and diplomatic "fait accompli" by simultaneously achieving a major territorial breakthrough at Stepnohorsk and establishing a credible threat of full maritime blockade, leveraging US aid uncertainty to coerce European capitulation on peace terms.

CAPABILITY (Maritime Escalation Confirmed): RF has publicly declared its intent to expand strikes on Ukrainian ports and foreign vessels supporting Ukraine, signaling readiness to execute a full naval blockade (Kinetic/Mines) in response to UAF naval drone operations.

COA (IMMEDIATE):

Stepnohorsk Kinetic Execution: Launch the Stepnohorsk MLD (37th MRB) NLT 022000Z DEC, preceded by Kuryer UGV mine-breaching and heavy KAB/Artillery fire suppression.
Strategic Coercion: Deploy IO (targeting US aid uncertainty and European cohesion) while simultaneously introducing the explicit threat of maritime warfare escalation to pressure allies attending the Dec 3rd diplomatic track meeting.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift from implicit threat to explicit, conditional declaration of expanded strikes against civilian maritime traffic and ports is the most significant strategic adaptation. This threatens to shift the strategic focus away from the land war towards economic survival.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

UAF naval drone operations have forced RF to escalate maritime threats. If RF executes the expanded port strikes, it will severely impact UAF logistical sustainment, particularly material and energy imports, increasing reliance on vulnerable land GLOCs through NATO borders. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly centralized and effective in fusing kinetic action with strategic messaging. The highly visible coordination of the Moscow meeting (Witkoff/Kushner) with Putin’s aggressive public addresses aims to paralyze UAF and allied C2 simultaneously. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is critical on the Stepnohorsk axis. The Air Force has confirmed KAB targeting in rear areas, necessitating rapid dispersion and hardening of logistical and reserve staging sites. The political leadership is actively working to stabilize the strategic situation through diplomacy (Ireland visit).

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes: President Zelenskyy’s successful diplomatic outreach in Ireland, securing a five-year Partnership Roadmap, provides a crucial counter-narrative to the RF claims of international isolation and weakness following the US aid reports.

Setbacks/Challenges (CRITICAL): The strategic environment is deteriorating due to the confirmed loss of Pokrovsk and the validated report (021507Z) regarding the US aid suspension and coordination breakdown between Washington and Berlin (D-S belief: 0.1846).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is the uncertainty regarding strategic resources (AD interceptors, LRPF munitions) due to the reported US aid suspension. This uncertainty is now directly compounded by the need to prepare specialized assets for increased maritime defense against expanded RF port strikes.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Dominant Narrative (Coercion): The narrative is one of RF military and economic dominance, reinforced by the explicit threat of war with Europe "right now" and the intention to enforce a total maritime blockade. The goal is to create panic among NATO capitals and force acceptance of Russian-dictated peace terms, framing European proposals as "unacceptable."

Key IO Vector: The orchestrated appearance of US proxies (Witkoff/Kushner) with Putin is an attempt to establish a parallel, non-governmental diplomatic channel that implicitly undermines the authority of the US administration and the established allied support structure.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian morale is being targeted by the synchronization of military losses (Pokrovsk) and diplomatic uncertainty (US aid, Moscow talks). The successful diplomatic counter-campaign, emphasizing Irish and other non-US support, is mandatory for maintaining resolve ahead of the Stepnohorsk assault.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The entire diplomatic environment is now centered on coercion. The upcoming Dec 3rd meeting must explicitly address and neutralize the impact of the US aid reports and the RF strategic threat to maritime navigation. Failure to achieve allied unity will solidify the RF narrative of strategic disarray.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK MLD EXECUTION SYNCHRONIZED WITH IO SATURATION AND MARITIME SHAPING (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group will execute the Stepnohorsk mechanized assault between 021630Z and 022000Z DEC. This kinetic thrust will be continuously reinforced by Putin's state media campaign, which simultaneously amplifies the threat of a full-scale maritime blockade. The goal is maximum psychological paralysis and tactical exploitation of the MOG defense vacuum.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: JOINT MARITIME/AERIAL C2 INTERDICTION AND BREAKTHROUGH (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF launches a massive, layered missile and drone strike (including Bastion-P anti-ship missiles and Kalibr/Shahed systems) against Odesa port, naval headquarters, and associated C2 nodes NLT 022200Z DEC, fulfilling the declared threat of expanded strikes. This attack is synchronized with the deepest penetration attempt of the Stepnohorsk MLD, forcing UAF C2 to divide critical AD resources between strategic rear defense and frontline SHORAD protection.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Event	Estimated Timeline (ETA)	Confidence	Decision Point/Trigger
Stepnohorsk MLD Main Assault Execution	021630Z - 022000Z DEC	HIGH	Massed RF mechanized assembly observed exiting the Zelyony Gai staging area (ISR confirmation).
RF Port Strike Execution (MDCOA Trigger)	NLT 022200Z DEC	MEDIUM	Confirmed launch of Bastion-P or Kalibr missiles targeting Odesa/Mykolaiv port infrastructure (EW/Air Force confirmation).
NCA Briefing on Maritime Security Status	NLT 030000Z DEC	CRITICAL	NCA must initiate consultation with allied naval forces regarding the immediate threat to commercial shipping and the humanitarian corridor.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gaps/Unresolved Questions	Collection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (KINETIC IMMEDIATE)	Stepnohorsk Breakthrough Status. Has the 37th MRB achieved penetration of the first defensive belt? Are the "Kuryer" UGVs effective in breaching minefields?	IMINT/GROUND RECON (Stepnohorsk Sector): Continuous high-fidelity ISR to detect immediate breakthroughs or UGV effectiveness.
PRIORITY 2 (MARITIME/EW)	RF Maritime Strike Readiness. What specific assets (surface vessels/submarines/coastal batteries) are tasked for the expanded port strikes, and what are their estimated Time to Target (TTT)?	SIGINT/EW (Black Sea/Crimea): Continuous monitoring of coastal missile battery C2 links and Black Sea Fleet positioning for anomalous high-EMCON activity.
PRIORITY 3 (STRATEGIC IO)	Scope of European Peace Proposals. What are the specific terms proposed by Europe that Putin labeled "absolutely unacceptable"? (Likely concerning territorial integrity or war reparations.)	HUMINT/OSINT (Diplomatic Channels): Acquire details of the rejected European peace proposals to inform UAF diplomatic counter-strategy for the Dec 3rd meeting.

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

Stepnohorsk Counter-Breach (J-3): EXECUTE PRE-EMPTIVE FIRES. Initiate LRPF fire plans against the confirmed RF staging areas near Zelyony Gai and Dobropillia immediately (NLT 021630Z). Prioritize assets capable of defeating "Kuryer" UGVs (e.g., FPV drones, guided mortar fire) at the forward line.
Air Defense Reallocation (J-3/J-6): IMPLEMENT DUAL-AXIS AD. Given the confirmed KAB strikes on rear areas and the MOG vulnerability ("Gerbera"), deploy reserve SHORAD systems (if available) to critical logistics nodes feeding Stepnohorsk (e.g., depots near Kryvyi Rih) while maintaining the highest possible coverage for the 5th Assault Brigade.
Port Defense Activation (J-3/Navy): RAISE MARITIME DEFCON. Immediately raise readiness levels for anti-ship missile defense (ASMD) and port security assets in Odesa, Pivdennyi, and Chernomorsk. Prepare to engage incoming RF aerial threats (missiles/Shahed) and utilize naval drones offensively to preemptively target RF Black Sea Fleet assets that could launch expanded port strikes.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

Counter-Coercion Narrative (NCA): PUBLICLY REJECT MARITIME THREATS. The NCA must immediately issue a statement condemning the RF threat to expand strikes on civilian shipping as an act of international piracy, appealing directly to NATO for a maritime security response (e.g., enhanced Black Sea ISR).
Amplify Diplomatic Resilience (J-7): Utilize the success of the Ireland visit to dominate domestic and international media NLT 021800Z DEC. Frame the newly secured partnership road map as proof that international support is diversifying and solidifying, mitigating the impact of the US aid uncertainty ahead of the Dec 3rd meeting.
Address Kupyansk Assertions (J-7): Prepare a swift, factual rebuttal against the RF claim of controlling Kupyansk-Uzlovoy, using high-confidence imagery if available, to prevent RF IO from claiming a simultaneous victory in the North.

//END OF REPORT//

Situation Report