Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – PHASE V: VICTORY EXPLOITATION AND KINETIC FOLLOW-THROUGH

TIME: 021530Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: KINETIC CRISIS / INFORMATION DOMAIN CONSOLIDATION FOCUS AOR: Zaporizhzhia (Stepnohorsk MLD Axis) and Donetsk (Post-Pokrovsk Collapse)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change from previous reporting. Weather remains permissive for sustained RF aviation operations, high-fidelity electro-optical ISR, and KAB glide munitions utilization.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: Under extreme operational stress, managing the tactical/political fallout from the confirmed loss of Pokrovsk while maintaining a hard-line defense on the Stepnohorsk axis. Reserves must be prioritized to the South, despite Northern UAV fixation efforts. RF: Demonstrating peak synchronization between kinetic operations (Pokrovsk victory, Stepnohorsk buildup) and the Information Environment (Putin’s immediate media outreach). RF seeks to rapidly consolidate gains into political leverage.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (REVISED): RF intends to convert the tactical-operational victory at Pokrovsk into a strategic, non-negotiable diplomatic reality. The immediate military objective remains securing terrain advantage via the Stepnohorsk MLD to reinforce the diplomatic ultimatum.

CAPABILITY (IO/Information Warfare Escalation Confirmed):

1. "Open Source" Weaponization: Putin’s invitation for foreign journalists to visit Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) and Kupyansk is a sophisticated IO maneuver designed to bypass existing Western media filters, visually confirm RF territorial control, and project Russian confidence and operational security. This move forces NATO allies to reckon with the reality of RF gains.
2. Internal Security Consolidation: FSB detention messaging regarding domestic financial support for Ukraine reinforces the internal security clampdown and signals high-confidence counter-intelligence effectiveness.

COA (IMMEDIATE): Phase I: Maximum IO amplification of the Krasnoarmeysk victory. Phase II: Execute the coordinated MLD on Stepnohorsk NLT 021700Z DEC (as previously predicted), utilizing Vostok Group units (37th MRB) while UAF is strategically distracted.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift of the main RF effort to weaponize IO around Krasnoarmeysk is the critical change. Tactically, the confirmed continuous UAV activity (Chernihiv) supports the hypothesis that RF is dedicated to draining UAF AD resources in preparation for the Stepnohorsk mechanized breakthrough, which relies heavily on air superiority/close air support.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Overall RF strategic logistics remain robust (supporting multi-front operations). However, UAF forces confirmed localized success in interdicting logistics via drones (Kostiantynivka direction). This suggests RF is vulnerable to distributed, high-tempo UAF drone operations against secondary supply routes near the current front lines. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly integrated, demonstrating operational coherence by immediately converting a kinetic victory (Pokrovsk) into an information tool (journalist invitation) designed to paralyze UAF and allied C2 simultaneously. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensively firm but strategically exposed due to the loss of Pokrovsk and the critical vulnerability of Mobile Fire Groups (MOGs) to the new RF "Gerbera" TTP. Force readiness hinges on the rapid implementation of MOG defense protocols and the timely deployment of reserves to the Stepnohorsk axis before the RF MLD commences.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Localized Logistical Interdiction: Confirmed drone strikes near Kostiantynivka demonstrate UAF ability to disrupt RF tactical supply flow, providing a critical morale boost and an operational counter-narrative to the Pokrovsk loss.
• Resource Resilience: The confirmed use of volunteer-supplied drones in kinetic operations reinforces the resilience of the civil-military acquisition network, partially mitigating strategic resource uncertainty.

Setbacks/Challenges (CRITICAL):

• Loss of Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk): This is the most significant operational setback, demanding immediate defensive adjustments and a robust IO counter-strategy to manage internal and external perceptions.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint remains the political uncertainty regarding US aid suspension (as noted in the previous report). This uncertainty is now exacerbated by the need for immediate, large-scale defensive materiel (AD interceptors, anti-armor, counter-battery systems) to meet the Stepnohorsk threat while simultaneously refitting forces evacuated from the Donetsk sector.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Dominant Narrative: The immediate, coordinated IO campaign around Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) aims to establish the narrative of RF operational inevitability and UAF strategic defeat. The journalist invitation seeks to delegitimize UAF claims regarding the tactical situation and force Western acknowledgement of RF gains.

Disinformation Vector: RF state media is actively targeting allied unity, exemplified by the targeting of Italian PM Meloni's stance on "victory." The intent is to shift the allied objective from "Ukrainian victory" to "negotiated peace on current lines."

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Ukrainian public sentiment is likely to experience a significant dip due to the confirmation of Pokrovsk’s loss. Morale requires immediate bolstering through NCA communication that clearly links current hardships (Pokrovsk) to future resolve (Stepnohorsk defense and successful localized kinetic actions like the Kostiantynivka strikes).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The diplomatic track is now dominated by the RF-engineered perception that they hold the military advantage necessary for negotiation. The upcoming Dec 3rd meeting in Europe (Kyiv/US proxies) must pivot from discussing aid uncertainty to explicitly countering the RF "fait accompli" narrative with proof of UAF defensive capability (Stepnohorsk hold).

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK MLD EXECUTION SYNCHRONIZED WITH IO SATURATION (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF forces will initiate the mechanized assault along the Stepnohorsk axis (37th MRB spearhead) between 021630Z and 022000Z DEC. This assault will be preceded by massed preparatory fire targeting reserve assembly areas, exploiting the confirmed MOG vulnerability and utilizing Kuryer UGVs for mine clearance. The kinetic push will be synchronized with 24-hour IO saturation (Krasnoarmeysk victory framing) to overwhelm UAF C2 decision-making capacity and potentially trigger premature reserve deployment or withdrawal.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: JOINT AIR-GROUND C2 STRIKE ON ZAPORIZHZHIA SECTOR HQ (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF utilizes the confirmed AD suppression success ("Gerbera") to gain temporary local air superiority over the Zaporizhzhia operational rear. This enables a coordinated strike (Ballistic/KAB/Jet-Shahed) against a primary UAF Operational Command Post (OCP) or major reserve staging area near Dnipro, aiming for C2 decapitation. The MDCOA leverages the dual UAF fixation on the Pokrovsk fallout and the Stepnohorsk defense.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. Stepnohorsk Kinetic Priority (J-3): EXECUTE DEEP INTERDICTION FIRE PLAN. Immediately shift all available Long-Range Precision Fires (LRPF) and Counter-Battery resources from secondary sectors (e.g., parts of Kharkiv/Donetsk) to the Stepnohorsk axis. Focus target acquisition on RF C2 nodes and known 37th MRB staging areas along the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia junction before the 1700Z predicted assault window.
2. MOG Force Protection (J-6/J-3): ENFORCE HARP-1 PROTOCOL STRICTLY. Any Mobile Fire Group (MOG) failing to implement the new distributed, high-EMCON protocol within the next 60 minutes must be temporarily withdrawn and placed under hard cover. We cannot afford further AD asset losses to "Gerbera" just before the MLD.
3. Counter-Mobility Adaptation (J-TECH): Rapidly deploy anti-UGV teams (e.g., utilizing FPV drones with net payloads or directed electronic warfare against confirmed Kuryer frequencies) to the forward line of the Stepnohorsk defense to neutralize the robotic breach attempt.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

1. Immediate Counter-Narrative (NCA/J-7): LAUNCH "COST OF VICTORY" CAMPAIGN. Publicly acknowledge the withdrawal from Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) as a necessary tactical decision to preserve forces, but immediately pivot the narrative. Amplify the success of UAF logistics interdiction (Kostiantynivka strikes) and the unwavering resolve of the Stepnohorsk defense. Frame Pokrovsk not as a final defeat, but as a sacrifice absorbed to prevent a greater strategic loss.
2. Allied Cohesion Stabilization (NCA/J-7): Immediately brief strategic partners (via secure channels) on the RF IO campaign targeting Western leaders (e.g., Meloni). Request unified public statements from EU/NATO capitals emphasizing that the military situation does not change the commitment to Ukrainian sovereignty or the required level of aid.
3. Resource Signaling (NCA): Utilize the Dec 3rd European meeting to publicly announce new, non-US sourced defensive capabilities (e.g., Netherlands €250M contribution), demonstrating operational self-sufficiency and mitigating the strategic effects of the US aid ambiguity.

//END OF REPORT//