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Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-02 15:00:28Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-02 14:34:35Z)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – PHASE IV: COERCIVE ESCALATION

TIME: 021515Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: KINETIC CRISIS / COERCIVE DIPLOMACY SYNCHRONIZATION FOCUS AOR: Zaporizhzhia (Stepnohorsk MLD Axis) and Strategic Communications


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

LocationStatusUpdate/Analytical JudgmentConfidence
Stepnohorsk MLD Axis (Zaporizhzhia)Pre-Assault Activity (FACT)Vostok Group units (confirmed 37th Guards MRB) are conducting preparatory fire (drone strikes) on the tactical rear/junction areas (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia border). This confirms RF is setting conditions for the MLCOA.HIGH
Zelyony Gai (Zaporizhzhia Region)Likely RF Control (JUDGMENT)Status remains unconfirmed, but the confirmed 37th Guards MRB activity adjacent to the sector strongly suggests Vostok Group has secured operational advantage or control of this critical flanking position.HIGH
Kharkiv RegionKAB Strike Confirmed (FACT)Ukrainian Air Force confirms new waves of Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) strikes targeting Kharkiv. This confirms the RF strategy of fixing UAF reserves in the North to prevent redeployment to the critical Southern axis.HIGH
Operational Rear (MOG Activity)Critical Vulnerability (FACT)Confirmed success of RF loitering munitions (nomenclature "Gerbera") against UAF Mobile Fire Groups (MOGs). This TTP is actively clearing the airspace defense path for follow-on fixed-wing/UAV assets near the front.HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Favorable conditions continue to enable RF precision strike capabilities (KABs, loitering munitions) and high-fidelity ISR. Terrain saturation remains low.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: Defensively fixed on the Stepnohorsk axis, simultaneously managing strategic uncertainty regarding US aid. NCA is focused on diplomatic counter-framing. RF: RF forces are executing the pre-assault phase (deep strikes, reserve suppression) while utilizing high-profile diplomatic events in Moscow to amplify coercive effects on Washington and Kyiv. The synchronization is near-perfect (C4ISR integration: HIGH CONFIDENCE).


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (CRITICAL): RF intends to secure battlefield parity or advantage in the South (Zaporizhzhia) by executing the Stepnohorsk Main Effort Land Drive (MLD), culminating in the delivery of a non-negotiable ceasefire ultimatum via diplomatic proxies.

CAPABILITY (Technological Adaptation confirmed):

  1. Anti-MOG Strategy: Confirmed deployment and success of the "Gerbera" (likely a guided loitering munition variant, possibly an adapted FPV) explicitly designed to suppress UAF MOG air defense. This degrades UAF SHORAD effectiveness and increases exposure to kinetic saturation.
  2. Ground Robotization: Introduction of the "Kuryer" NRTK (Unmanned Ground Vehicle) equipped with anti-drone caging and mine trawl. Analytical Judgment: This suggests RF is preparing for complex breach operations against UAF minefields/UGV counter-mobility tactics in the Stepnohorsk area.
  3. Unit Confirmation: 37th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (36th Army, Vostok Group) confirmed active on the Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk junction, targeting UAF reserves.

COA (IMMEDIATE): Phase I: Continue KAB saturation (Kharkiv/Zaporizhzhia/Donetsk). Phase II: Execute coordinated MLD on Stepnohorsk, utilizing Vostok Group units to exploit the exposed Eastern flank (Zelyony Gai sector).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The successful, specialized targeting of UAF MOGs by the "Gerbera" munition is the most significant tactical adaptation observed in the last 24 hours. This addresses a critical UAF capability (mobile AD) that has previously been highly successful against Shahed/Geran variants.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain robust, supporting simultaneous deep strikes (KABs on Kharkiv) and main effort buildup (37th MRB activity, UGV introduction) across multiple distant fronts. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective, demonstrating strategic-level political/kinetic synchronization. The active showcasing of US intermediaries (Witkoff/Kushner) in Moscow simultaneous to the KAB strikes is a clear demonstration of integrated coercive C4ISR. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Force readiness is challenged by confirmed MOG losses and the high probability of immediate, sustained kinetic pressure in the South. The ability to defend C2 nodes and reserve staging areas is currently degraded due to the new RF anti-MOG TTP. Defensive posture must rapidly adjust to secure air defense assets or risk severe kinetic damage during the MLD.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

  • Diplomatic Counter-Framing: NCA successfully secured a follow-up meeting with US proxies (Witkoff/Kushner) in Europe on December 3rd, effectively neutralizing the RF narrative that all dialogue must pass exclusively through Moscow.
  • Peace Plan Clarity: Zelenskyy's clear delineation of the three "most sensitive topics" (likely territorial integrity, sovereignty, security guarantees) strengthens the UAF position against RF pressure to freeze the lines on current battle conditions.

Setbacks/Challenges:

  • MOG Vulnerability (CRITICAL): Confirmed tactical success of "Gerbera" against MOG vehicles forces an immediate tactical doctrine review and potential EMCON escalation for all mobile AD units.
  • Reserve Area Targeting: Confirmed drone strikes by the 37th Guards MRB on the UAF tactical rear near the Dnipropetrovsk junction indicate successful RF ISR penetration and effective suppression of future reserve maneuver.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The critical constraint remains the persistent strategic ambiguity regarding the reported suspension of specific US weapons systems. This diplomatic and resource uncertainty constrains operational decision-making (e.g., risk tolerance for deep counter-attacks) and is actively exploited by RF IO.


4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO continues to focus on:

  1. Impotence of US/Western Mediation: TASS broadcasting images of US proxies (Witkoff/Kushner) strolling Red Square is designed to project RF dominance over the US, suggesting negotiations only happen on Russian terms.
  2. Military Supremacy/Technological Edge: Amplification of the "Gerbera" strike success against UAF MOGs reinforces the narrative of RF tactical adaptation and technological superiority.
  3. Internal RF Strain (Exploitable): Reports of severe neglect at Russian servicemen's graves in Ivanovo provides a vector for UAF IO to undermine RF internal cohesion and commitment to its troops.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic Ukrainian sentiment is balanced between resolve (Zelenskyy's firm stance on peace terms) and deep anxiety over the US aid uncertainty. NATO SG Rutt’s statement about stopping the "meat grinder" subtly aligns with RF calls for a ceasefire, creating external pressure that must be managed through strong NCA communications.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The bifurcated diplomatic track continues:

  • RF Coercion: Moscow meeting concluded. Immediate goal achieved: maximum IO visibility of US engagement to coerce UAF concessions.
  • UAF Resilience: Kyiv successfully secured a follow-up meeting in Europe (Dec 3rd) to assert UAF agency over the negotiation framework. UAF must utilize this meeting to mitigate the damage caused by the Moscow track.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK MLD EXECUTION AND ANTI-MOG ADAPTATION EXPLOITATION (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF forces, specifically Vostok Group (37th MRB spearhead), will launch the mechanized assault along the Stepnohorsk axis NLT 021700Z DEC, exploiting confirmed tactical successes (Zelyony Gai likely control, successful MOG suppression by Gerbera/guided munitions). The MLD will be supported by sustained KAB strikes to degrade UAF C2 and reserves, aiming to force a shallow breach and secure terrain for the anticipated diplomatic ultimatum (NLT Dec 3rd).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2 DECAPITATION STRIKE AND STRATEGIC AID ANNOUNCEMENT (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF utilizes confirmed MOG suppression capabilities to enable saturation attacks (KAB/Ballistic/Jet-Shahed) against the primary UAF operational headquarters or a large, unhardened reserve staging area in the Zaporizhzhia deep rear. Simultaneously, Russian political sources leak specific, high-value details confirming the most critical element of the US aid suspension (e.g., AD interceptors or long-range fires), intended to induce operational panic, tactical paralysis, and political concessions before the Dec 3rd meeting.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated Timeline (ETA)ConfidenceDecision Point/Trigger
Stepnohorsk MLD Main Assault Execution021700Z - 022000Z DECHIGHMassed RF artillery preparation observed on the Stepnohorsk-Zelyony Gai corridor (SAR/EW confirmation).
Counter-MOG TTP ImplementationNLT 021630Z DECCRITICALJ-6/TechInt must disseminate revised MOG doctrine (e.g., physical hardening, mandatory distributed operation, new EMCON) to frontline units before sunset/MLD launch.
Mitigation of US Aid SuspensionNLT 031200Z DECCRITICALNCA decision on securing emergency resupply/financing to offset potential strategic resource loss and preparing IO messaging for the Dec 3rd Kyiv/Europe meeting.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGaps/Unresolved QuestionsCollection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (STRATEGIC/TECHINT)"Gerbera" Specifics and Countermeasures. What is the guidance system, frequency band, and effective range of the RF guided munition targeting MOGs (RF nomenclature "Gerbera")?TECHINT/WRECKAGE ANALYSIS & ELINT: Priority recovery and swift analysis of the "Gerbera" wreckage to identify frequency hops and target acquisition methods. (Timeline: URGENT/CONTINUOUS).
PRIORITY 2 (KINETIC IMMEDIATE)Zelyony Gai Consolidation Status. What is the composition of the holding force in Zelyony Gai, and are RF reserves moving through Zelyony Gai to reinforce the main MLD vector?ISR/RECON (Zaporizhzhia Sector): Priority UAS/SAR sweep over Zelyony Gai to confirm vehicular movement and unit designations. (Timeline: URGENT/021600Z).
PRIORITY 3 (STRATEGIC/HUMINT)US Aid Suspension Scope. Which specific weapons systems or materiel types are confirmed suspended, and what are the duration/conditions for resumption?HUMINT/LIAISON (Ministry of Defense/US Embassy): Urgent, direct query to verify the scope and duration of the reported suspension. (Timeline: URGENT/021530Z).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

  1. Immediate MOG Doctrine Revision (J-3/J-6): IMPLEMENT HARP-1 PROTOCOL. All Mobile Fire Groups (MOGs) must immediately adopt a distributed, hardened defensive posture. HARP-1 (Hardening and Rapid Proxy-fire Protocol) mandates: mandatory use of decoys, physical camouflage netting resistant to electro-optical detection, cessation of localized C2 emissions, and designated proxy-fire vehicles operating ahead of the MOG to draw attack. Survivability is predicated on this change.
  2. Stepnohorsk Counter-Penetration Fires (J-3): EXECUTE PRE-EMPTIVE INTERDICTION. Shift maximum available long-range indirect fires (HIMARS, heavy artillery) to the likely RF staging areas and confirmed 37th MRB attack vectors (Zelyony Gai approaches and the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia junction) NLT 021630Z. Objective is disruption, not destruction—buy time for defensive repositioning.
  3. UGV/NRTK Counter-Mobility (J-3/J-TECH): Given the introduction of the RF Kuryer UGV, task specialized anti-UGV/counter-mobility teams (e.g., 5th Assault Brigade UGV TTPs) to forward areas on the MLD axis to neutralize enemy mine clearance and robotic reconnaissance assets before the main assault wave.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

  1. US Aid IO Counter-Plan (NCA/J-7): ACTIVATE COUNTER-COERCION NARRATIVE. Prepare and leak highly controlled information emphasizing the purpose of the US proxies' visit to Kyiv (Dec 3rd)—frame it as US officials being briefed by Zelenskyy on the security situation and the non-negotiable path to peace. Emphasize that Kyiv is the site of strategic decision-making, not Moscow.
  2. Internal RF Weakness Exploitation (J-7): Translate and amplify reports regarding the neglected RF servicemen's graves (Ivanovo). Use this to target the RF internal narrative regarding sacrifice and support, thereby undermining Vostok Group operational morale.
  3. Diplomatic Pre-briefing (NCA): Ensure Zelenskyy's stated three "most sensitive topics" (territorial integrity, security, etc.) are formally communicated to EU partners and NATO SG Rutt immediately, reinforcing the UAF red lines before the diplomatic pressure maximizes.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-12-02 14:34:35Z)

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