Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – STEPNOHORSK DEFENSIVE POSTURE

TIME: 021434Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: KINETIC CRISIS / COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Clear conditions continue to favor RF ISR and precision strike capabilities (KABs, guided loitering munitions) over UAF concealment.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: The immediate operational objective is delaying the Stepnohorsk MLD while maximizing the positive messaging output from the Dublin diplomatic track. Critical vulnerability is the potential suspension of US weapons aid (see Section 3.2). RF: RF forces are executing the kinetic-diplomatic synchronization perfectly. Claims of success (Zelyony Gai) are timed precisely with high-level talks in Moscow, generating maximum coercive effect on the US intermediary team.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (CRITICAL): RF intends to secure battlefield parity or advantage in the South (Zaporizhzhia) to force a favorable ceasefire line coinciding with the Pokrovsk gains. The Moscow meeting is the mechanism for delivery of the ultimatum.

CAPABILITY (Multi-Domain Coercion): RF is successfully using:

1. Kinetic Pressure: Sustained KAB strikes on UAF staging areas (FACT).
2. Psychological Warfare: Leaking information (via proxies/RT) regarding the suspension of US arms shipments to undermine UAF morale and negotiating position (JUDGMENT).
3. Technological Adaptation: The confirmed targeting of MOGs by guided munitions is the primary operational threat. The unverified claim of Geran-2 equipped with AAM (WarGonzo) suggests RF is actively seeking to counter UAF aerial innovations (like the R-60 TTP noted in previous reporting).

COA (IMMEDIATE): Execute Stepnohorsk MLD, spearheaded by units from the Vostok Group (38th Guards Motorised Rifle Brigade confirmed active in the Zelyony Gai sector).

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift in targeting toward C2 and reserve staging areas using KABs (confirmed near Zap/Donetsk border) following AD suppression is the primary tactical maneuver.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

Confirmed, sustained KAB strike capacity and the ability to launch simultaneous operations across multiple sectors (Vovchansk, Pokrovsk consolidation, Stepnohorsk MLD) confirms robust ammunition supply and forward logistical staging.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective. The synchronization between kinetic claims (Zelyony Gai 14:31Z) and the high-level meeting start time (Witkoff/Kushner in Kremlin 14:18Z) demonstrates superior C4ISR integration and political goal alignment. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is critically challenged by the MOG vulnerability and the potential strategic implication of the rumored US aid suspension. Force posture remains defensively anchored around Stepnohorsk. NCA focus is currently divided between operational crisis management and crucial diplomatic counter-programming.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Diplomatic Resilience: Ireland pledges substantial (€100M non-lethal military, €25M energy) aid (FACT).
• Peace Framework: Zelenskyy confirms collaboration with the US on a 20-point peace plan, providing a counter-narrative to Russian diplomatic coercion (FACT).

Setbacks/Challenges:

• STRATEGIC RISK (CRITICAL): Report from The Atlantic (citing Bundeswehr source) claims the US has suspended certain weapon deliveries (FACT reported via secondary source). This is the single most important destabilizing factor in the information and operational environment.
• Operational Vulnerability: Confirmed KAB strikes near critical staging areas.
• Loss of Territory: The claimed loss of Zelyony Gai severely degrades the eastern flank defense of Stepnohorsk. (JUDGMENT: HIGH probability of loss).

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate clarification and mitigation plan regarding the reported US weapons suspension. Failure to address this swiftly will degrade force readiness and domestic morale.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is focusing on:

1. Isolation Narrative: Amplification of the US aid suspension rumor to portray Ukraine as abandoned by its key security partner.
2. Internal Stability/Normalcy: Putin's focus on "record low unemployment" and TASS reporting on cultural events (Nutcracker) attempt to project stability despite the ongoing war effort, contrasting with UAF kinetic losses.
3. Coercive Diplomatic Framing: Pro-Kremlin sources are ensuring maximum visibility of the Witkoff/Kushner meeting with Putin, framing the US as being forced to deal directly with Moscow due to RF kinetic success.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is highly susceptible to the US aid suspension narrative. The NCA’s visible engagement in Dublin must be used aggressively to counteract this messaging. The subsequent travel of Kushner/Witkoff to Kyiv (Axios) provides a potential future IO opportunity to re-assert UAF agency, but the immediate threat is the perceived US withdrawal of support.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The two diplomatic tracks are clashing:

• Dublin (UAF Track): Solidified support, financial aid, and UAF control over the peace framework outline (20 points).
• Moscow (RF Coercion Track): Meeting between Putin and US proxies (Witkoff, Kushner). The goal is to leverage the Pokrovsk victory and the Zelyony Gai advance to force a ceasefire ultimatum.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK MLD EXECUTION AND DIPLOMATIC ULTIMATUM DELIVERY (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF forces will fully exploit the confirmed AD suppression and the likely seizure of Zelyony Gai to execute the mechanized assault on Stepnohorsk, potentially bypassing the city to target critical infrastructure or communication lines NLT 021600Z. Simultaneously, the RF ultimatum will be delivered via the US intermediaries following the Kremlin meeting, demanding a ceasefire on current battle lines.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2/RESERVE DECAPITATION STRIKE AMPLIFIED BY EXTERNAL SHOCK (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF launches coordinated, deep-strike attacks (KAB saturation, ballistic missile use) against the UAF 5th Assault Brigade staging area and key divisional C2 in the Zaporizhzhia deep rear. This kinetic blow would be immediately amplified by a coordinated RF information campaign (e.g., announcing the specific type of US weapon suspension), intending to break UAF operational coherence and strategic political will simultaneously.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. Stepnohorsk Defensive Shift (J-3): EXECUTE PHASE-LINE M-2 DELAY. The loss or imminent threat to Zelyony Gai demands immediate pre-positioning of anti-tank reserves to cover the eastern flank of Stepnohorsk. Utilize long-range fires to interdict all confirmed RF vehicle routes moving from Zelyony Gai toward the MLD axis NLT 021600Z.
2. Hardening Protocol Enforcement (J-3/J-6): STRICT ENFORCEMENT OF MOG EMCON. Mobile AD units (MOGs) currently operating in the Zaporizhzhia AOR must maintain strict EMCON (Emission Control) and use validated high-fidelity decoys until new EW counter-TTPs are confirmed effective against the guided loitering munitions. Survivability is the highest priority.
3. Northern Flank Disruption (J-3): While Stepnohorsk is the Main Effort, task Special Operations Forces (SOF) to execute targeted deep strikes in the Kharkiv/Luhansk rear (e.g., against known KAB re-arming points or forward aviation fuel dumps) to disrupt the RF ability to sustain KAB pressure on the Northern flank, mitigating the Vovchansk risk.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

1. Immediate US Aid Clarification (NCA/J-7): The National Command Authority must issue an immediate, highly controlled statement NLT 021530Z addressing the "rumors of aid suspension." The statement should emphasize the continuity of security partnership, the success of the Dublin talks, and the 20-point peace plan framework, while promising a swift, factual update on the status of US shipments. Do not confirm specific details of the suspension publicly yet.
2. Amplify Diplomatic Gains (J-7): Immediately distribute media releases and presidential statements heavily amplifying the tangible military and energy support (€125M total) secured from Ireland, contrasting specific, tangible Irish aid with RF attempts at political coercion in Moscow.
3. Prepare for US Proxy Visit (NCA): Prepare high-level operational and IO teams for the impending arrival of Witkoff and Kushner. The objective of the meeting in Kyiv must be publicly framed as "Kyiv briefing the US delegation on the conditions for a just peace" — maintaining the narrative that Ukraine dictates the terms, not Moscow.

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