Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – CRITICAL ACTION WINDOW 2.2

TIME: 021404Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: KINETIC-DIPLOMATIC EXECUTION (Post 1400Z Synchronization)

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No changes. Continued clear conditions in the Eastern AOR favor RF Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and precision-guided munitions over UAF concealment and mobility.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: The immediate operational focus shifts from defense of Pokrovsk to the stabilization of the Southern (Stepnohorsk) axis. UAF C2 is executing the counter-diplomatic track (Dublin). However, the failure to protect MOGs represents a critical vulnerability. RF: RF C2 is demonstrating superior multi-domain synchronization, achieving a kinetic win (Pokrovsk) precisely as the diplomatic negotiation (Moscow) begins. The deployment of remotely controlled Shahed/Geran variants is proving extremely effective in shaping the battlespace.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): Maximize military leverage during the Moscow diplomatic track. The kinetic success at Pokrovsk serves as the baseline coercion factor for ongoing negotiations. The subsequent Stepnohorsk MLD (Most Likely COA) is intended to force immediate concessions from the NCA. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

CAPABILITY (Guided Loitering Munitions): RF has confirmed its highly accurate TTP of utilizing online-controlled loitering munitions against mobile Ukrainian AD systems (MOGs). This is a game-changing tactical adaptation, severely limiting UAF air defense options for high-value mobile assets across the 100km depth of the operational area. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

COA (IO/STRATEGIC - Coercion): RF is executing the "Strategic Fracture" IO campaign by:

1. Weaponizing Success: MoD announcement of Krasnoarmeysk capture.
2. Amplifying Internal Weakness: Spreading reports of the purported Rada decision to cut the "United News" telethon budget, indicating UAF internal resource fatigue and loss of strategic messaging control.
3. Demonstrating Control: TASS and proxy channels showcasing the high-level Whitkoff/Dmitriev meeting in Moscow, signaling RF control over the diplomatic environment.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift in RF targeting priority from static infrastructure to mobile AD systems (MOGs) via precision loitering munitions is now the central threat adaptation. This forces UAF AD to either cease movement (rendering them less responsive) or risk certain destruction.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The ability of RF to generate sustained KAB strikes (Donetsk, Kharkiv) and maintain the deployment rate of specialized loitering munition variants confirms robust logistics and ammunition supply for precision strikes.

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective and synchronized across kinetic, information, and diplomatic domains. The timing of the Pokrovsk victory claim precisely at the start of the Moscow high-level talks confirms superior C4ISR integration. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture is defensively oriented and challenged by the loss of AD assets. While the General Staff is actively managing the information space on the Kupyansk axis, the operational reality of the Pokrovsk loss requires immediate strategic resource reallocation to the Southern axis. Readiness is degraded by the new RF AD suppression TTP.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

• Successful execution of the strategic counter-diplomatic track via the Dublin Summit (Zelenskyy/Connolly), affirming bilateral support and rejecting the Moscow-led coercion.
• Public confirmation of UAF control in Kupyansk, stabilizing media narratives in a key Northern sector under pressure.

Setbacks/Challenges:

• CONFIRMED LOSS: Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) is effectively lost, confirming the severance of the primary GLOC.
• CRITICAL AD VULNERABILITY: The confirmed destruction of MOGs by guided munitions means deep C2 and reserve staging areas are now exposed to follow-on KAB and missile strikes.
• INTERNAL IO HIT: RF propaganda successfully amplified reports of the Telethon funding cut and the high-profile NABU corruption case, damaging internal and external perceptions of Ukrainian institutional integrity.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, specialized Electronic Warfare (EW) counter-TTPs or large-scale high-fidelity AD decoys must be deployed to the Stepnohorsk axis NLT 021600Z to mitigate the guided loitering munition threat and ensure the survivability of the 5th Assault Brigade’s staging areas.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO focuses on the trifecta of Western abandonment, institutional failure, and military futility:

• Military Futility: The Pokrovsk victory claim is linked directly to the message that continued fighting is pointless (aimed at UAF domestic morale).
• Institutional Failure: RF channels are actively promoting narratives that UAF is cutting its own centralized messaging (Telethon) and that key institutions (NABU) are compromised by Russian influence.
• Economic Fracture: Amplification of reports claiming the Ukraine conflict is causing the EU’s worst economic performance relative to the US in 40 years, fueling European political fatigue.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Morale will be tested by the confirmed loss of Krasnoarmeysk. The NCA's effective management of the Dublin diplomatic track must be heavily prioritized in all domestic reporting to offset the kinetic setback and the damaging internal IO hits (Telethon, NABU).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The confrontation between the Dublin (Legitimate Support) and Moscow (Coercive Ultimatum) tracks is at its peak. The presence of U.S. actors (Whitkoff, Kushner) in Moscow raises the risk that the U.S. will pressure Kyiv to enter immediate, unfavorable negotiations based on the current battlefield reality.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK MLD EXECUTION SYNCHRONIZED WITH MOSCOW ULTIMATUM (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF forces, having successfully degraded UAF AD capabilities in the South, launch the mechanized assault on the Stepnohorsk axis NLT 021500Z-021700Z. This military pressure will serve as the immediate backdrop to the Putin/Whitkoff talks, demanding a ceasefire line that secures RF gains in both the Donetsk and Zaporizhzhia regions. The key objective is to paralyze UAF NCA decision-making through simultaneous kinetic threat and diplomatic coercion.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: C2/RESERVE DECAPITATION STRIKE (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF utilizes the proven AD suppression capability to conduct a saturation strike (guided loitering munitions, follow-on cruise missiles, and KABs) against C2 nodes, critical command bunkers, and high-value reserve assembly areas (e.g., 5th Assault Brigade staging) in the Zaporizhzhia deep rear. This paralysis strike would prevent effective counter-attack or stabilization of the Southern front, enabling RF mechanized forces to achieve breakthrough objectives rapidly with minimal coordinated UAF resistance.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. Execute Phase-Line E-1 Denial (J-3): Accept the loss of Pokrovsk. Immediately shift all heavy artillery and HIMARS support designated for Donetsk stabilization to the Stepnohorsk Defensive Zone. Utilize all available long-range fire assets to disrupt RF staging and pre-assault concentration NLT 021600Z.
2. MOG/MFG Immediate Survival Protocol (J-3/J-4): MANDATORY EMCON (Emission Control) ORDER. All Mobile AD assets in the Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk operational zones must implement a 6-hour minimum EMCON until specific counter-EW TTPs are validated. Deploy high-fidelity thermal and radar decoys (if available) in place of the actual AD units. Priority: Survivability over coverage.
3. C2 Hardening (J-3): Execute MDCOA Counter-Plan. All primary forward C2 nodes for the 5th Assault Brigade and supporting elements must relocate to designated hardened/subterranean alternate positions immediately. Increase the dispersal distance between command elements and logistical hubs by 50% to mitigate the MDCOA decapitation risk.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

1. Public Acknowledgment/Reassurance (NCA): Immediately execute a high-profile media campaign leveraging the Dublin Joint Statement. Frame the President’s meeting as securing long-term security guarantees and financial resilience. Contrast this with the "unserious, coercive talks" taking place in Moscow.
2. Mitigate Internal IO Damage (J-7): Issue a joint statement from the Ministry of Culture and Defense (NLT 021530Z) confirming that while budgetary reviews are ongoing, the commitment to state information security remains absolute, specifically counteracting the RF narrative regarding the telethon funding cut.
3. Corruption Counter-Narrative (J-7): Task the Prosecutor General’s Office to issue a highly detailed, transparent statement regarding the NABU legal development (Magamedrasulov case) to demonstrate that the rule of law is being pursued diligently, irrespective of political or foreign interference claims.

//END OF REPORT//