Sitrep 2025-12-02 11:04:32

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 021115Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: CRITICAL DECISIVE KINETIC PRESSURE // PEAK IO-KINETIC SYNCHRONIZATION UPDATE: Immediate situation remains CRITICAL. RF kinetic preparations at Dobropillia/Zelenyi Hai (D/Z H) are proceeding as anticipated, synchronized precisely with the commencement of high-level diplomatic talks in Moscow. UAF is facing simultaneous political destabilization (Rada blockade) and a severe information campaign designed to erode confidence in UAF manpower. The critical operational window (021130Z DEC counter-fire) is now complicated by high-volume cognitive disruption.

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

Location	Status	Assessment	Confidence
Stepnohorsk MLD / D/Z H Salient	Imminent Assault Preparation (JUDGEMENT)	RF preparations are confirmed continuing and synchronized with diplomatic events. Focus remains the breach of the Main Line of Defense (MLD) NLT 1400Z.	HIGH
Zaporizhzhia Oblast Rear	Humanitarian Stress (FACT)	Official data confirms 1 in 5 residents are internally displaced (IDP), straining local resources and confirming the high impact of fighting near the MLD.	HIGH
Central Chernihiv Region	Active Reconnaissance (FACT)	Confirmed detection of a UAV moving south (11:00Z). This suggests RF is actively prosecuting deep strike reconnaissance missions, potentially validating the MDCOA threat to the energy grid in Northern/Central oblasts.	MEDIUM
Active Conflict Zone	FPV Attack on Civilian Transport (FACT)	Documented RF FPV attack on a civilian evacuation vehicle (10:59Z), demonstrating RF willingness to violate humanitarian norms and operational complexity in rear areas.	HIGH

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No change. Stable conditions favor mechanized maneuver and RF air operations (KAB/UAV).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: Under severe pressure across multiple domains. Efforts to stabilize domestic political cohesion (Rada blockade) and manage the resource triage (AD vs. Energy) are competing directly with the priority fire mission deadline (1130Z).

RF: RF Vostok Group maintains synchronized kinetic and information pressure. The C2 mechanism is demonstrably effective at linking the Stepnohorsk threat directly to the Moscow talks timeline.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): To maximize psychological and diplomatic pressure on the UAF National Command Authority (NCA) precisely during the critical window (021115Z - 021600Z DEC) by:

Achieving kinetic breakthrough at Stepnohorsk (1400Z).
Flooding the information space with narratives of UAF strategic collapse (manpower crisis).
Delegitimizing the NCA via targeted high-level corruption allegations (Zelenskyy/Yermak).

COA (DIPLOMATIC EXTENSION): TASS confirms Whitkoff’s arrival and Peskov confirms talks will last "as long as required" (10:45Z), indicating RF will use the duration of the talks to demand maximum kinetic flexibility and media coverage for the Vostok Group assault. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF Information Operations (IO) have adapted rapidly by exploiting domestic Ukrainian reports (Chmut fund head) regarding manpower shortfalls. This immediately counters UAF recruitment/morale efforts and directly supports the diplomatic goal of coercing a favorable ceasefire.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains adequate, supported by an active domestic military-industrial complex (UralDroneZavod job post, 10:59Z) indicating long-term planning for UAS production. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective in executing simultaneous, multi-domain operations. The synchronization of TASS reporting (arrival, talk duration) with IO attacks and kinetic posturing at Stepnohorsk demonstrates a unified chain of command focused on generating integrated effects. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF frontline posture is holding, but readiness is severely impacted by internal political instability. The blockade of the Verkhovna Rada (10:42Z) creates an immediate crisis of governance and provides RF IO with critical visual evidence of internal chaos at a moment of extreme external threat.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

Counter-IO: DShV recruitment video (10:35Z) counters RF narratives about collapse by promoting long-term commitment.
Confirmed Attrition: Continued reporting of confirmed RF casualties (Shaphan, 10:49Z) maintains the attrition narrative.

Setbacks/Challenges:

Political Disruption (CRITICAL): The Rada blockade compromises the NCA’s ability to project unified control and focus fully on the imminent Stepnohorsk assault.
Manpower Narrative: The amplification of the UAF strategic crisis narrative by RF media (Operation Z) is a high-risk cognitive attack demanding immediate, high-level counter-narrative messaging.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Maximized, uninterrupted counter-fire against D/Z H NLT 021130Z DEC.

NEW CONSTRAINT (Political Distraction): Political disunity (Rada blockade) poses a strategic constraint, potentially delaying or complicating resource allocation and command decisions during the critical assault window.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is executing a three-pronged attack:

Strategic Collapse Narrative: Directly attacking UAF manpower and long-term viability (Chmut quote), aiming to fracture international support and demoralize defenders.
Corruption/Delegitimization: Linking corruption allegations to the President's Office (RT/Colonelcassad) to frame the UAF leadership as illegitimate during diplomatic talks.
Domestic Diversion: Using non-war news (Bolshoi tickets, Indonesia floods) to project normalcy internally while maximizing external crisis coverage.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public sentiment is subjected to a "push-pull" dynamic: High-impact negative news (blackout warnings, Rada chaos, strategic collapse claims) vs. positive news (diplomatic activity, DShV commitment). NCA response to the Rada blockade will determine the immediate direction of domestic morale.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The entire diplomatic environment is now centered on Moscow. The confirmed arrival of Whitkoff and the TASS statements regarding the length of talks place RF in the position of dictating the immediate diplomatic tempo, which is directly tied to kinetic success at Stepnohorsk.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK PENETRATION & IO ULTIMATUM (021400Z DEC) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will maintain preparatory fires until 1330Z. The synchronized mechanized assault from D/Z H begins at 1400Z. RF IO will immediately leverage the assault and the 'strategic collapse' narrative, pressuring Whitkoff in Moscow to force a cessation of hostilities on terms favorable to the new Russian line of control.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: ENERGY GRID COLLAPSE & OPERATIONAL ISOLATION (ESCALATED RISK) (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF launches a synchronized deep strike, likely involving jet-powered Shaheds, against critical energy infrastructure (Dnipro/Kharkiv/Odesa) NLT 021200Z DEC. This is enabled by the confirmed UAV reconnaissance in Chernihiv. The resulting AD diversion creates the gap exploited by the Vostok Group at Stepnohorsk, achieving a deep breakthrough and cutting the T0408 MSR.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

Event	Estimated Timeline (ETA)	Confidence	Decision Point/Trigger
UAF Counter-Fire Required	021045Z - 021130Z DEC	HIGH	J-3 must confirm 100% execution of planned fire missions against D/Z H staging areas.
MDCOA Trigger/Strategic AD Diversion	021200Z DEC	MEDIUM	Confirmation of multi-axis missile/UAV launch against rear oblasts (Dnipro, Kharkiv, potentially Chernihiv based on 1100Z UAV report).
NCA Internal Stability Message	NLT 021145Z DEC	HIGH	NCA must issue a strong statement addressing the Rada blockade and reaffirming political unity to counter IO attacks.
Stepnohorsk MLD Assault Launch	021400Z - 021600Z DEC	HIGH	Detection of armor columns moving from Dobropillia towards MLD.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gaps/Unresolved Questions	Collection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (KINETIC FIRE PLAN)	RF Staging Density/Asset Type. Confirmation of specific armored vehicle types (MBT vs. IFV ratio) staged in D/Z H.	IMINT/UAS (Dobropillia/Zelenyi Hai): Continuous high-resolution ISR focusing on the specific composition of the mechanized assault wave. (Timeline: IMMEDIATE/CONTINUOUS).
PRIORITY 2 (INFRASTRUCTURE AD RISK)	UAV Intent in Chernihiv. Was the 11:00Z UAV a precursor to a deep strike or standard ISR? Which targets are now most vulnerable in the Northern/Central oblasts?	SIGINT/ELINT (Chernihiv/Kyiv AD Sector): Continuous monitoring for correlation between UAV flight path and known RF target packs. (Timeline: NLT 021130Z DEC).
PRIORITY 3 (INTERNAL STABILITY)	Rada Blockade Status. Is the blockade sustained or resolved? What are the opposition's political demands?	OSINT/HUMINT (Verkhovna Rada): Continuous monitoring of parliamentary proceedings and media reports on the status and longevity of the political disruption. (Timeline: IMMEDIATE/CONTINUOUS).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

CRITICAL FIRE MISSION EXECUTION (J-3): EXECUTE THE SCHEDULED INTERDICTION FIRES AGAINST DOBROPILLIA/ZELENYI HAI WITH 100% RESOURCE ALLOCATION NLT 021130Z DEC. Failure to degrade this staging area will result in a near-certain operational breakthrough at 1400Z.
AD Triage Reaffirmation (J-3/J-4): Maintain the decision to prioritize protection of the highest priority forward fire support base (FSB) over a secondary city power node for the next 6 hours. Kinetic counter-fire capability must be preserved to prevent operational collapse.
Counter-IO Deployment (J-3/J-7): Deploy small, highly visible UAF Special Operations Forces (SSO) or DShV teams equipped with body cameras to the Stepnohorsk MLD to film highly effective attrition against the initial RF wave. This footage must be ready for immediate release (021430Z DEC) to counter RF breakthrough claims.

7.2. Strategic Communications and Political Stability (NCA/J-7)

IMMEDIATE POLITICAL UNITY STATEMENT (NCA): The President and parliamentary leaders must issue a joint statement NLT 021145Z DEC that: a) Condemns the Rada blockade as an act of internal sabotage benefiting the adversary during a critical kinetic window. b) Reaffirms the dedication of the entire government to the war effort and the Stepnohorsk defense.
COUNTER-COLLAPSE NARRATIVE (J-7): Immediately initiate a high-volume, global campaign countering the 'strategic collapse' narrative. Use verified numbers of reserve activation, training center outputs (reference DShV video), and international training assistance to demonstrate sustainable manpower.
DIPLOMATIC COUNTER-PROGRAMMING (NCA): Maintain continuous, high-profile engagement with EU/US partners (Ireland Summit framework) throughout the day, ensuring that international media coverage of the Moscow talks is balanced by reports demonstrating robust Western and Ukrainian internal coordination.

//END OF REPORT//

Situation Report