Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 021045Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: CRITICAL DECISIVE KINETIC PRESSURE // STEPNOHORSK ASSAULT IMMINENT

SUMMARY: The operational situation remains CRITICAL, characterized by RF tactical consolidation in Zaporizhzhia synchronized with aggressive diplomatic and information warfare maneuvers. RF Vostok Group is posturing for a kinetic breakthrough of the Stepnohorsk Main Line of Defense (MLD), timed to coincide with the 021400Z DEC diplomatic negotiations in Moscow. UAF forces in the Southern Operational Zone are engaging in high-intensity defensive combat, claiming significant enemy attrition (300 personnel eliminated in 24 hours), yet confirmed RF KAB strikes and localized explosions in Zaporizhzhia Oblast (10:20Z) confirm sustained enemy kinetic reach. The operational priority remains the interdiction of RF staging areas at Dobropillia/Zelenyi Hai (D/Z H) NLT 1130Z to degrade the mechanized assault effort.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Weather remains stable and conducive to mechanized movement and fixed-wing/KAB operations. Visibility supports both high-altitude KAB delivery and close-range observation/targeting.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: Defensive posture across the Southern Axis is critically strained. Southern Command reports high attrition against RF forces but is forced to allocate scarce AD assets to protect vital infrastructure (due to energy grid warnings) rather than solely reinforcing frontline fire support bases. UAF NCA has confirmed receiving a briefing on the US peace plan framework (10:31Z), indicating active diplomatic counter-planning.

RF: RF Vostok Group is maintaining synchronized pressure. Forces are focused on maximizing KAB saturation fires while using strategic Information Operations (IO) to divert international attention and pressure the UAF NCA during the upcoming diplomatic window.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): To achieve a tactical breakthrough at Stepnohorsk NLT 021600Z DEC, specifically targeting the period immediately following the start of the Putin-Witkoff talks (021400Z DEC). The breach is intended to serve as undeniable diplomatic leverage.

CAPABILITY (Aviation/KAB): RF maintains a HIGH capability for massed, deep-reaching KAB strikes, evidenced by the targeting of Huliaipole and continued strikes on rear infrastructure, effectively suppressing UAF counter-battery and forward defenses.

COA (KINETIC - REINFORCED):

1. Shaping Phase (1045Z – 1330Z): RF will maximize KAB saturation fires on Stepnohorsk strong points and UAF long-range artillery positions identified through overhead ISR.
2. Mechanized Assault (1400Z – 1600Z): RF Vostok Group will launch armor and mechanized infantry from the D/Z H salient, targeting weak points in the MLD. This action will be accompanied by immediate, real-time media coverage via state sources (TASS/WarGonzo) to amplify battlefield success.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

Hybrid Escalation (Cognitive Domain): RF SVR is actively using media channels (WarGonzo) to leak and amplify threats concerning direct French involvement in the conflict (10:02Z). This is a strategic messaging adaptation designed to deter the deployment of key Western advisory/training assets. This is synchronized with attempts to discredit EU political cohesion via amplification of Belgian police raids on the EU diplomatic service (10:08Z, 10:23Z, 10:26Z).

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF Aviation logistics supporting KAB delivery are HIGHLY responsive, confirmed by the video evidence of strikes near Huliaipole (10:29Z). Ground sustainment for the armored assault remains adequate following the consolidation of D/Z H. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly centralized and synchronized, effectively linking kinetic action with IO and high-level diplomatic signaling. The rapid integration of the French threat narrative suggests rapid adaptation to recent Western security commitments. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF readiness is defensively oriented and maximized for counter-mobility and high attrition rates in the Southern OTD. The commitment of resources to protect the threatened national energy grid introduces a severe competing priority that degrades frontline reserve capacity.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. High Attrition: Defense Forces of the South confirm the elimination of approximately 300 RF personnel in the preceding 24 hours (10:11Z), demonstrating effective defensive lethality under pressure. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
2. Diplomatic Counter-Positioning: The UAF President’s office received a briefing on the US peace plan framework (10:31Z), ensuring Kyiv maintains control over its own diplomatic narrative, countering the RF-centric talks in Moscow.

Setbacks/Challenges:

1. Infrastructure Vulnerability: The explicit warning regarding imminent emergency blackouts indicates RF strategic strikes are successfully overloading UAF AD/power generation capacity.
2. Confirmed Explosion: The explosion in Zaporizhzhia Oblast (10:20Z) confirms that RF forces maintain the initiative in delivering ordnance close to or past the MLD.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Interdiction Fire Window (021130Z DEC). The priority remains maximizing counter-fire volume against the D/Z H salient before 1130Z to force degradation or delay of the RF assault timeline.

NEW CONSTRAINT (AD/Energy Triage): The confirmed threat to the energy grid (Dnipro, Kharkiv, Odesa, Chernihiv Oblasts) requires an immediate, high-risk triage decision on AD deployment, potentially forcing the withdrawal of SHORAD protecting forward artillery (e.g., HIMARS positions) to shield critical infrastructure.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is focused on simultaneous external and internal distraction:

1. Deterrence (French PMC): The SVR threat against French involvement is designed to coerce France into reducing military support or advisory presence in Ukraine.
2. Cohesion Attack (EU/Belgium): High-volume amplification of the Belgian police raids on the EU diplomatic service HQ is intended to portray the EU as corrupt, unstable, and internally preoccupied, reducing its credibility as a unified sanctions partner ahead of the Moscow talks.
3. Kinetic Justification: RF channels continue to frame the capture of Dobropillia/Zelenyi Hai and the threat to Krasnoarmeysk (Pokrovsk) as confirmation of inevitable military victory.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is subject to conflicting inputs: high frontline success (300 eliminated) vs. acute, immediate threat to home front services (blackout warnings). The active high-level UAF diplomatic activity (peace plan briefing) is vital for demonstrating sovereignty and control.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The diplomatic situation is at a pivot point. The TASS report confirming the Moscow meeting between Dmitriev and Whitkoff (10:13Z) reinforces RF's control of the narrative regarding the talks. UAF must amplify its own peace plan discussions with the US to ensure the Moscow meeting is framed as RF responding to UAF terms, not dictating them.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK PENETRATION (021400Z DEC) (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF will maintain preparatory fires until 021330Z DEC. The RF Vostok Group launches the mechanized assault from the D/Z H salient NLT 021400Z DEC, synchronized with the commencement of the Moscow talks. RF forces will seek a penetration deep enough to force UAF counter-attack/withdrawal, immediately demanding a ceasefire to freeze the lines in their favor. The RF IO apparatus will be ready to saturate global media with images/video of the breakthrough.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: ENERGY GRID COLLAPSE & OPERATIONAL ISOLATION (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF launches coordinated wave of jet-powered Shaheds and cruise missiles targeting critical substations/power plants across three major oblasts (Dnipro, Kharkiv, Odesa) NLT 021200Z DEC. This forces the full redirection of UAF strategic AD assets (e.g., Patriot batteries) to protect the cities. This AD gap is immediately exploited by RF Vostok Group, which executes a successful, deep mechanized flanking maneuver north-west of Stepnohorsk, capturing the T0408 MSR and cutting off the defenses. This synchronized multi-domain attack creates national paralysis (infrastructure failure) and operational collapse (isolated defenders).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. IMMEDIATE FIRE MISSION (J-3): COMMIT ALL AVAILABLE LONG-RANGE FIRES (HIMARS, MRLS, ATACMS if authorized) TO THE DOBROPILLIA/ZELENYI HAI SALIENT NLT 021130Z DEC. Focus secondary cluster missions on suspected fuel/ammunition caches and soft skin vehicle concentrations.
2. AD Triage (J-3/J-4): Execute the immediate relocation of one (1) mobile MRAD battery (e.g., Patriot or NASAMS) to protect the highest priority forward fire support base (FSB) for the next 6 hours, accepting increased risk to a secondary city power node if necessary. Protection of kinetic counter-fire capability outweighs protection of non-critical civilian infrastructure given the 1400Z threat window.
3. Counter-Mobility Priority (J-3, Stepnohorsk): Prioritize the completion of the forward obstacle belt along the MDCOA axis (NW exit of D/Z H) using available engineer units. Utilize all remaining UGV/drone-dropped mines to supplement existing obstacles.

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

1. PRE-EMPTIVE DIPLOMATIC STANCE (NCA/J-7): Issue a high-profile statement NLT 021330Z DEC (30 minutes prior to Moscow talks). This statement must: a) Explicitly condemn the RF kinetic aggression at Stepnohorsk as an attempt to blackmail the peace process. b) Reaffirm that negotiations are based only on the UAF peace plan framework, referencing the positive talks with the US (10:31Z update).
2. NEUTRALIZE IO DIVERSION (J-7): Immediately release messaging linking RF kinetic action (Stepnohorsk) to its hybrid warfare efforts. Directly label the SVR French threat and the amplification of the EU internal investigation as transparent attempts to distract international observers from the imminent assault.
3. AMPLIFY SUCCESS (J-7): Maximize coverage of the Southern Command's claimed high RF attrition (300 eliminated) to maintain domestic morale and counter the narrative of Russian momentum.

//END OF REPORT//