Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 021030Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: CRITICAL DECISIVE KINETIC PRESSURE // STEPNOHORSK BREACH IMMINENT

SUMMARY: The kinetic situation in Zaporizhzhia remains CRITICAL. RF consolidation in Dobropillia and Zelenyi Hai is confirmed by multiple RF state and war correspondent sources (FACT, HIGH CONFIDENCE). The window for pre-emptive counter-fire against the RF staging area is now less than two (2) hours. Strategically, the Witkoff delegation has arrived in Moscow (FACT, HIGH CONFIDENCE), synchronizing kinetic action with the diplomatic talks planned for 1400Z. RF is employing sophisticated Information Operations (IO) via leaks regarding frozen assets to maximize diplomatic leverage. The threat of a coordinated mechanized assault on the Stepnohorsk Main Line of Defense (MLD) NLT 1400Z remains the primary operational concern.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

No significant meteorological changes affecting the Stepnohorsk operation. The environment remains conducive to mechanized movement and air operations (KAB delivery). RF continues to exploit clear weather windows for KAB saturation.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: Resources are critically constrained by the need to protect rear areas (Bila Tserkva UAV alert 09:37Z) while reinforcing the Stepnohorsk MLD. UAF C2 integrity remains robust, demonstrated by successful internal counter-intelligence operations (SBU British spy arrest, NAEK Energoatom corruption charges).

RF: RF Vostok Group is posturing for decisive action. The operational tempo (OT) is synchronized with the diplomatic timeline. RF continues to focus long-term strategic support (India military logistics agreement ratification 09:38Z) and expand geopolitical threat messaging (SVR threat against French PMCs 09:41Z).

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE): RF intends to achieve a confirmed kinetic breach of the Stepnohorsk MLD prior to, or within the first hour of, the Putin-Witkoff negotiations (Target: 021400Z DEC). This is intended to force the US delegation to acknowledge the military fait accompli and pressure UAF into a ceasefire based on current lines.

CAPABILITY (KINETIC): RF possesses the necessary combined arms capability (armor, artillery, high-volume KAB fires) to execute a localized mechanized penetration from the Dobropillia salient. RF claims "over a company" of UAF losses in the seizure of Dobropillia (FACT, 09:59Z), suggesting rapid, effective application of fire and maneuver.

COA (KINETIC): RF Vostok Group will initiate heavy preparatory fires (Artillery/KAB) between 1200Z and 1330Z DEC against the Stepnohorsk MLD, focusing on known UAF strong points and counter-battery radars. The main armored thrust will follow, utilizing the Dobropillia-Zelenyi Hai corridor to maximize momentum and penetrate the UAF defense line.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

1. High-Tempo IO Synchronization: RF leveraged the time between tactical success (Dobropillia capture) and diplomatic talks (Witkoff arrival) to saturate the IE with claims of victory and US/Western negotiation weakness (frozen assets leak). This confirms a high degree of integration between GRU/MoD and high-level political C2.
2. Strategic Threat Diversion: The SVR threat against French PMCs (09:41Z) is likely aimed at deterring further Western security training and advisory presence in Ukraine, widening the conflict narrative to external state actors.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment for the Zaporizhzhia offensive remains adequate, supported by confirmed KAB strikes and formalized commercial logistics links to occupied regions ("KIT" advertisement, 10:00Z). The ratification of the India-Russia military logistics agreement (09:38Z) signals RF strategic confidence in long-term resupply networks, bypassing Western sanctions pressure. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness is assessed as HIGH. The rapid, synchronized operational timeline—kinetic advance, immediate diplomatic framing (Peskov), and high-level diplomatic engagement (Witkoff arrival)—confirms integrated, centralized strategic decision-making.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF posture at Stepnohorsk is defensive and challenged. Units must maintain readiness for a mechanized assault while simultaneously preparing for high-intensity KAB fire. Readiness is bolstered by demonstrated internal security success (SBU arrests 09:51Z, 10:00Z), projecting institutional resilience despite kinetic losses.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Internal Integrity: The SBU neutralization of a UK instructor spying for RF and corruption charges against a key Energoatom official strengthens internal confidence in C2 integrity and counter-espionage capability (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
2. Maritime/Deep Strike Pressure: Continued UAF pressure on RF maritime assets (tanker attack 09:57Z) and deep rear targets (St. Petersburg internet outage 09:54Z) confirms maintained capability to impose costs across multiple domains.

Setbacks/Challenges:

1. Expanded Salient: The confirmed loss and consolidation of Dobropillia and Zelenyi Hai reduce warning time and increase the immediate vulnerability of the Stepnohorsk MLD.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: TIME-SENSITIVE COUNTER-FIRE. The operational requirement is to maximize artillery expenditure against the Dobropillia staging area NLT 021130Z DEC to disrupt the RF assault synchronization.

CONSTRAINT: AD assets remain strained by KAB saturation in the South and UAV attacks in the North (Bila Tserkva). This forces a difficult triage decision between protecting kinetic capabilities (artillery/HIMARS) and protecting rear critical infrastructure.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is acutely synchronized with the diplomatic process:

1. Kinetic Victory Frame: Massive amplification of the Dobropillia/Zelenyi Hai capture via TASS/war correspondents to project unstoppable momentum ahead of the talks.
2. Diplomatic Leverage (The Leak): The broadcasted Politico report (via RF channels) suggesting the US planned to return frozen assets after a peace deal is a highly effective IO trap designed to create distrust between the US and EU allies regarding sanctions enforcement and potentially weakening Witkoff's mandate.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is actively managed via transparency on internal security (SBU arrests) and successful volunteer fundraising efforts (Sternenko leveraging E-Support funds 10:01Z). This narrative of resilient, sovereign action counters the RF narrative of inevitable defeat. Local morale in Zaporizhzhia will be tested by the confirmed KAB strikes.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

CRITICAL JUNCTURE: The arrival of the Witkoff delegation in Moscow (09:52Z) initiates the final synchronization phase. RF will use any kinetic victory in Stepnohorsk to immediately harden its stance. The "frozen assets" leak necessitates immediate, high-level counter-messaging from Kyiv and its allied partners regarding the permanent status of sequestered RF funds.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK PENETRATION AND CEASEFIRE DEMAND (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF Vostok Group completes final staging in the Dobropillia salient. Heavy preparatory fires commence NLT 021200Z DEC. The main mechanized assault is launched at approximately 021400Z DEC, timed with the start of the Putin-Witkoff negotiations. RF forces achieve a tactical penetration, which is immediately broadcast by RF media as a "major military victory," allowing RF diplomats to demand an immediate ceasefire and freeze-the-lines based on the newly acquired territory.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: INTERDICTION AND STRATEGIC BYPASS (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF Vostok Group bypasses the most heavily defended part of Stepnohorsk, utilizing concentrated fire to neutralize UAF long-range artillery positions (HIMARS/MLRS). Simultaneously, RF forces execute a rapid mechanized flanking maneuver North-West from Dobropillia, successfully interdicting the key T0408 MSR leading to Orikhiv. The resulting isolation of Stepnohorsk forces the UAF NCA to choose between immediate counter-attack (diverting strategic reserves) or an unfavorable operational withdrawal, providing RF a catastrophic operational victory that destabilizes the entire Southern Axis during the diplomatic talks.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. CRITICAL FIRE MISSION: DOBROPILLIA (J-3): EXECUTE MAXIMUM AVAILABLE LONG-RANGE AND TUBE ARTILLERY FIRES AGAINST THE DOBROPILLIA/ZELENYI HAI ASSEMBLY AREA NLT 021130Z DEC. The objective is attrition and disruption to delay the RF launch beyond the 1400Z diplomatic window. Prioritize cluster munitions and guided rounds against confirmed troop concentrations.
2. AD Asset Triage (J-3/J-4): Accept higher risk for non-critical rear infrastructure (e.g., Bila Tserkva) and immediately dedicate all available mobile SHORAD (e.g., Gepard/Patriot assets) to protect the forward fire support bases (HIMARS, heavy artillery) defending Stepnohorsk from KAB attacks.
3. Counter-Mobility (J-3, Stepnohorsk): Utilize UGV counter-mobility teams and dedicated reserve engineer assets to rapidly improve anti-armor obstacle belts covering the Northwest approach routes (MDCOA axis) out of Dobropillia/Zelenyi Hai.

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

1. IMMEDIATE COUNTER-IO (NCA/J-7): Issue a high-level public statement NLT 021300Z DEC (prior to the Moscow talks) that achieves two goals: a) Acknowledge and refute the Dobropillia loss, framing it as a desperate act of aggression timed to coincide with peace talks. b) Directly address the "frozen assets" leak, affirming that these assets are permanently committed to Ukrainian recovery and that any suggestion of their return is an unacceptable diplomatic precondition.
2. Amplify Resilience Narrative (J-7): Maximize media coverage of the SBU's success in neutralizing the foreign spy and prosecuting the Energoatom official. Use this to project a narrative of UAF sovereignty and resilient governance capable of securing both the front line and the rear from internal and external threats.
3. Sustain Deep Strike Narrative: Ensure Western media coverage emphasizes UAF's capability to impose costs on RF critical infrastructure (St. Petersburg incident, Black Sea strikes), demonstrating continued operational reach during the Stepnohorsk pressure.

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