Situation Report

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR) – MULTI-DOMAIN FUSION

TIME: 021100Z DEC 25 OPERATIONAL PHASE: DECISIVE KINETIC PRESSURE // STEPNOHORSK MLD CRITICAL // DIPLOMATIC HARDENING PHASE

SUMMARY: The operational situation in the Zaporizhzhia sector has rapidly deteriorated. RF Ministry of Defense (MoD) confirms the capture of both Zelenyi Hai and Dobropillia (FACT, HIGH CONFIDENCE). This kinetic expansion significantly increases the attack front against the Stepnohorsk Main Line of Defense (MLD), creating an immediate, high-risk operational salient. This success is being maximally leveraged by the Russian National Command Authority (NCA): Peskov has publicly hardened the diplomatic negotiation floor, stating that "peaceful settlement" requires fulfilling all "SVO" objectives and endorsing the Trump plan as a viable basis. The immediate window for the anticipated mechanized assault on Stepnohorsk remains NLT 021400Z DEC, synchronized with the Putin-Witkoff talks. UAF counter-fire missions against the newly captured Dobropillia salient are now mandatory to prevent a defensive collapse.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Weather in the Southern Operational Zone (Zaporizhzhia/Kherson) remains generally conducive to kinetic operations and armor movement. Northeast theater (Kharkiv/Kupiansk) is experiencing meteorological degradation, which may temporarily mitigate large-scale RF air employment (KAB saturation).

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF: Units are under extreme duress on the Southern Axis. C2 must execute a rapid triage of AD assets and kinetic reserves. The demonstrated success of SBU counter-intelligence against foreign espionage (UK instructor) indicates C2 integrity, but this does not address immediate frontline kinetic deficits.

RF: RF is fully committed to a strategic synchronization designed to peak during the 1400Z diplomatic talks. Resources dedicated to force modernization (BMP-3 upgrades) and recruitment sustainment (increased veteran benefits) signal commitment to a prolonged, high-intensity conflict. RF is executing IO to project humanitarian concern in Vovchansk (Kharkiv) while simultaneously advancing in Zaporizhzhia.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

INTENTION (IMMEDIATE/DIPLOMATIC): RF intends to secure a de facto military victory condition in Zaporizhzhia (breaching Stepnohorsk) prior to, or during, the 1400Z Moscow talks. The strategic intent is to impose a ceasefire based on the fulfillment of "SVO objectives," as explicitly stated by Peskov (FACT, 09:04Z).

CAPABILITY (FORCE PROJECTION): RF demonstrates the capability for strategic geopolitical expansion (reported Sudan naval base proposal) and technological sustainment (confirmed BMP-3 upgrades), projecting long-term confidence and resource stability. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - based on confirmed TASS reporting of external proposals).

COA (KINETIC): Vostok Group will exploit the Zelenyi Hai/Dobropillia salient by launching the main mechanized assault on the Stepnohorsk MLD. The attack is designed to create a breach and penetrate depth NLT 021400Z DEC, utilizing heavy KAB and artillery preparation fires starting around 021300Z DEC.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

1. Expanded Salient: The immediate capture of two villages (Zelenyi Hai and Dobropillia) suggests increased operational depth and momentum, potentially overwhelming local UAF defenses faster than anticipated in the previous report (which focused only on Zelenyi Hai).
2. Diplomatic Pre-framing: Peskov's explicit endorsement of the "Trump plan" as a working basis, paired with the demand to meet "SVO objectives," is a sophisticated IO tactic designed to bifurcate allied support and pre-validate RF demands ahead of the Witkoff meeting.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains robust, evidenced by:

1. High volume KAB use (confirmed attacks on Zaporizhzhia).
2. Continued investment in IFV modernization (BMP-3 upgrade, confirmed by propaganda).
3. Strong domestic messaging on contract recruitment and veteran financial support. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness is assessed as HIGH. The rapid, synchronized operational timeline—capture of Dobropillia (09:29Z), subsequent MoD briefing/video (09:33Z/09:31Z), and immediate political framing by Peskov (09:28Z)—confirms integrated multi-domain synchronization between kinetic operations, military IO, and high-level diplomatic strategy.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture is highly challenged due to the kinetic pressure on Stepnohorsk and the critical requirement for immediate counter-fire assets. Units near Stepnohorsk (5 OShB) are now facing an attack originating from an expanded salient. Readiness hinges entirely on the rapid deployment of reserve counter-fire and specialized counter-mobility teams to deny RF consolidation in Dobropillia.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Successes:

1. Counter-Intelligence: SBU report of neutralizing a UK instructor spying for RF confirms successful defense of UAF C2 integrity and counter-espionage capability (CONFIDENCE: HIGH).
2. Strategic Support: Sweden pledges $120M in civilian winter aid, mitigating the strategic impact of RF CRI attacks.

Setbacks/Challenges:

1. Expanded Kinetic Loss: Confirmed loss of Dobropillia and Zelenyi Hai significantly degrades the immediate defensive geometry of the Stepnohorsk MLD.
2. CRI Stress: Ongoing power outages (per previous report) continue to strain civilian and military redundancy systems.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL REQUIREMENT: Immediate, overwhelming kinetic response on the Dobropillia-Zelenyi Hai corridor. This requires the redeployment of long-range precision fires (HIMARS, MLRS) from less critical sectors now to disrupt RF staging, regardless of the Pokrovsk status.

CONSTRAINT: The 1400Z diplomatic window imposes a strict time constraint. Failure to visibly slow the RF advance before the talks begin will maximize RF leverage.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is focused on:

1. Victory Projection: Amplifying the Zelenyi Hai/Dobropillia capture via video and official MoD briefing (TASS) to project irresistible momentum.
2. Diplomatic Rigidity: Peskov defining the required outcome of negotiations (meeting SVO goals) and simultaneously attempting to legitimize external diplomatic concepts (Trump plan).
3. Humanitarian Masking: MoD video of 'evacuating civilians' from Vovchansk attempts to cloak kinetic action in humanitarian concern, targeting Western and domestic audiences.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF domestic morale is maintained by the transparency of high-level counter-corruption/counter-espionage efforts (Sheyko, SBU arrests) and projection of competent C2 (ZSU officer video). However, the combined news of CRI degradation and frontline losses in Zaporizhzhia will necessitate proactive messaging to maintain civilian resilience.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The Putin-Witkoff 1400Z meeting is the strategic pivot point. The RF position is now explicitly hardened: any ceasefire must acknowledge current or projected SVO gains. Allied unity is confirmed by the Sweden aid and previous Ireland Summit plans, but the danger of RF splitting the US delegation using the Trump plan endorsement remains high.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: STEPNOHORSK BREACH AND DIPLOMATIC DEMAND (CONFIDENCE: HIGH) RF forces, utilizing the expanded forward operating base in Dobropillia and Zelenyi Hai, will launch a coordinated mechanized assault on the Stepnohorsk MLD (5 OShB sector). NLT 021400Z DEC, RF forces achieve a tactical penetration. RF MoD immediately broadcasts this success, allowing the Russian delegation at the Moscow talks to demand an immediate "freeze the lines" ceasefire ultimatum to Witkoff, supported by the pre-framed narrative that UAF failure to comply sabotages peace and contradicts the acceptable framework (Trump plan).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: FLANKING MANEUVER AND STRATEGIC INTERDICTION (Risk Level: CRITICAL/HIGH) RF Vostok Group uses the capture of Dobropillia to launch a rapid, shallow flanking maneuver northwest, bypassing Stepnohorsk's strongest fortifications. They succeed in using long-range fire (or direct penetration) to interdict the key MSR (Main Supply Route) feeding the UAF units defending Orikhiv or Stepnohorsk reserves. This strategic interdiction, coupled with the AD attrition caused by CRI strikes, forces the NCA to make an immediate, unfavorable withdrawal decision simultaneous with the Moscow diplomatic talks, leading to a catastrophic collapse of the Southern defensive line.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

7.1. Operations and Force Protection (J-3/J-5)

1. CRITICAL Counter-Fire Mission (J-3, Stepnohorsk): EXECUTE HIGH-VOLUME ARTILLERY DENIAL FIRES AGAINST DOBROPILLIA IMMEDIATE AREA NLT 021130Z DEC. Target C2 nodes, staging grounds, and known RF supply lines feeding this new salient. Priority objective: Inflict catastrophic attrition on RF Vostok Group before their 1400Z launch window.
2. Reserve Activation (J-3, J-5): Immediately place one (1) dedicated Brigade reserve on high alert (30-minute reaction time) for deployment to secure the flank North-West of Stepnohorsk, covering the potential interdiction route identified in the MDCOA.
3. AD Protection Priority (J-3/J-4): Given the confirmed KAB usage against Zaporizhzhia, redeploy mobile SHORAD assets to protect key forward artillery/HIMARS positions supporting the Stepnohorsk defense. Accept temporary increased risk for non-critical CRI in exchange for kinetic survival.

7.2. Information Operations and Strategic Communications (J-7/NCA)

1. De-Legitimize RF Demands (CRITICAL/IMMEDIATE): NCA must issue a statement NLT 021300Z DEC that directly refutes Peskov's requirement to meet "SVO goals" for peace. Frame this RF demand as a pre-negotiation surrender requirement. Reiterate that any kinetic gains made while the US Special Envoy is in Moscow are acts of bad faith and aggression.
2. Counter-Propaganda Pivot (J-7): Amplify the SBU counter-intelligence success (British spy arrest) and Sweden's aid package to pivot the domestic and international narrative towards UAF sovereignty and resilient governance in the face of aggression.
3. IO Denial of Naval Attacks: Maintain operational ambiguity regarding the Midvolga 2 strike while ensuring the message of UAF capability to strike RF economic interests is sustained via allied maritime channels.

//END OF REPORT//